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Abstract
The essays in this thesis explore diverse manifestations and different aspects of political
text. The two main contributions on the methodological side are bringing forward novel
data on political actors who were overlooked by the existing literature and application
of new approaches in text analysis to address substantive questions about them. On the
theoretical side this thesis contributes to the literatures on lobbying, government trans-
parency, post-conflict studies and gender in politics. In the first paper on interest groups
in the UK I argue that contrary to much of the theoretical and empirical literature mech-
anisms of attaining access to government in pluralist systems critically depend on the
presence of limits on campaign spending. When such limits exist, political candidates
invest few resources in fund-raising and, thus, most organizations make only very few if
any political donations. I collect and analyse transparency data on government depart-
ment meetings and show that economic importance is one of the mechanisms that can
explain variation in the level of access attained by different groups. Furthermore, I show
that Brexit had a diminishing effect on this relationship between economic importance
and the level of access. I also study the reported purpose of meetings and, using dy-
namic topic models, show the temporary shifts in policy agenda during this period. The
second paper argues that civil society in post-conflict settings is capable of high-quality
deliberation and, while differing in their focus, both male and female can deliver argu-
ments pertaining to the interests of broader societal groups. Using the transcripts of civil
society public consultation meetings across former Yugoslavia I show that the lack of
gender-sensitive transitional justice instruments could stem not from the lack of women’s
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physical or verbal participation, but from the dynamic of speech enclaves and topical
focus on different aspects of transitional justice process between genders. And, finally,
the third paper maps the challenges that lie ahead with the proliferation of research that
relies on multiple datasets. In a simulation study I show that, when the linking informa-
tion is limited to text, the noise can potential occur at different levels and is often hard
to anticipate in practice. Thus, the choice of record linkage requires balancing between
these different scenarios. Taken together, the papers in this thesis advance the field of
“text as data” and contribute to our understanding of multiple political phenomena.
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Chapter 1
Political Text and its Analysis
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“In the beginning was the Word [...]”
—John 1:1
1.1 Content Analysis
The study of political text traces its origins back to the beginning of the 20th century.
Although some authors (Krippendorff, 2004; Neuendorf, 2002) recognise the precursors
to content analysis in the Biblical studies and decipherment of ancient languages, such as
Egyptian hieroglyphs found on Rosetta Stone by Jean-François Champollion and Thomas
Young (which has a decree issued by King Ptolemy V inscribed on it and thus, strictly
speaking, falls in the category of political text), I will limit my overview to the develop-
ments that happened in social and computational sciences over the last century1.
Analysis of newspapers and propaganda studies constitute the two major strands of
research on political text in the first half of the century. Starting from crude physical
measurement of space occupied by articles dedicated to a specific topic on a newspaper
sheet, they evolved into simple classification schemes, such as attitudes towards the Neu-
trality Act (Allport and Faden, 1940), a major policy debate in pre-war America. It is
worth noting that in the discussed period there were no rigid boundaries between differ-
ent domains of social science, and psychological concepts such as attitude in the work by
the eminent psychologist Gordon Allport above were frequently applied to public policies
and the debates surrounding them. In fact, Harold Lasswell, a pioneer in the study of
propaganda and, later, a major figure in the quantitative study of political text is equally
acclaimed in political psychology and political science. In his earlier work Propaganda
Techniques in the World War (Lasswell, 1927), Lasswell explored different propaganda
strategies utilised by belligerents in the First World War. This analysis, though very de-
tailed, was done in a rather haphazard manner, without due consideration to such issues
as sampling and measurement, and was later criticised by the author himself (Lasswell
1Krippendorff (2004) provides an extended historical survey of content analysis.
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et al., 1949). The push for a more systematic and quantifiable approach is the marker
of all later Lasswell’s works on content analysis. With the external political changes, the
rise of Nazism and, eventually, with the commencement of the Second World War, the
focus of propaganda analysis shifted from describing the strategies to the detection of
propaganda in news broadcasts and political speeches2 In the current statistical learning
language this could be described as a shift from classification tasks to building prediction
models, though the empirical methods remained unsophisticated. However, this period
also brought some important analytical innovations, such as decoupling the message from
the author, which led to Lasswell’s communication model of ‘who says what to whom in
what channel and with which effect’ and also formalised such aspects of text analysis as
sampling, validity and reliability.
The post-war period saw the integration and further refinement of the quantitative
approaches to the analysis of political text (Berelson, 1952; Lasswell et al., 1949). But,
most importantly, this is when first computers were introduced in text analysis. The
pivotal moment came with the publication of the ground-breaking work The General
Inquirer: A Computer Approach to Content Analysis by Stone et al. (1966). In addition
to compiling extensive content analysis dictionaries and implementing software for main-
frames to process large volumes of text, the authors provided a wide selection of case
studies with applications ranging from anthropology to political science. Although tabu-
lation of specific words had been applied prior to the General Inquirer, this was the first
comprehensive treatment of the analytical categories underlying particular sets of words
and a substantial step forward in dictionary methods. The authors made a distinction
between an alphabetical enumeration of the terms of interest - ‘dictionary’ proper and
assigning categorical tags to a word list, called ‘thesaurus’, a name borrowed from lexi-
cography (Stone et al., 1966, pp. 135-139). While the former technique is better suited
for looking at the meanings of specific concepts, the latter is useful when a researcher
is not interested in the words per se, but rather in the analytical categories that they
2Perhaps, less directly than in the well-known case of the German tank problem (Ruggles and Brodie,
1947), sometimes this research helped forecast military operations and troops concentration.
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define as a group. Furthermore, the General Inquirer was the earliest implementation of
key-word-in-context (KWIC) approach (allowing the researcher to explore a given term
amongst other words surrounding it in text), stemming (reducing the word to its stem
by removing affixes) and automatic syntactic analysis (assigning part-of-speech tags to
words) in social sciences. All of these features were implemented as extensions of an elab-
orate dictionary approach. As a whole, the dictionary approach received a lot of attention
in political science and remains a method of choice for many empirical researchers today.
The proliferation of personal computers has made text analysis available to a wider
scholarly community. Oftentimes methodological innovation stemmed not from the shifts
in research focus, but from the evolution of text analytical programs and word processing
software. From the earlier days of the General Inquirer, many software packages func-
tioned as milestones in formalising approaches to working with textual data. WordStat
(Péladeau, 1998), a content analysis module for SimStat, used inclusion and exclusion
lists for words and categories, which later became known as ‘stop-words’ list or words
deemed uninformative for the ensuing analysis3. Most new packages came with embed-
ded wordcount and gradually new features such as readability scores (Klare, 1974) and
concordance analysis (KWIC), were added. The metrics for text readability emerged in
the educational context (Flesch, 1948), where children’s reading assignments and stan-
dardised tests in schools had to be evaluated on the their difficulty and accessibility to
different grade levels. There is a large number of different scores available4, but most of
them typically include three key components: (1) the sentence length (average or total, in
words), (2) the length of words (average or total, in syllables or letters), (3) the number
of words of certain type (pronouns, prepositions, difficult words from a pre-specified list),
optionally, with applied weights and some combinations and ratios of these numbers.
Although mostly confined to its original domains of educational research and psychol-
ogy, readability scores have recently started receiving more attention in political science
3Although, the term ‘go-words’ list is found occasionally in the literature (Krippendorff, 2004), it was
not nearly as widely adopted as ‘stop-words’ list.
4In his review article Klare (1974) provides a number of examples.
17
(Spirling, 2015; Benoit et al., 2019). For example, Spirling (2015) applied Flesch Reading
Ease index to parliamentary speeches in Britain, showing that the Second Reform Act
of 1867, which extended franchise to a much larger section of male population, mostly
less educated, prompted the parliamentarians, especially those serving in the cabinet, to
reduce the linguistic complexity of their speeches.
The development of methods that eventually came to be used in the analysis of polit-
ical text was happening in parallel and often in disciplines that saw very little interaction
with political science. One of the earlier examples of the applications of Markov chain
models was the study of the sequences of vowels and consonants in the novel Eugene One-
gin written by Alexander Pushkin (Markov, 1913). Although it didn’t see any immediate
successors outside statistics, through information theory the works by Shannon (1948,
1951) and Zipf (1949) it re-entered the study of language and social systems. Zipf’s prin-
cipal contribution, which became known as ‘Zipf’s law’5, was that the product between
a word’s rank in the list sorted by frequency, multiplied by its frequency is, roughly, a
constant number:
r × f = C
Or, to put it differently, the word with rank 10 is expected to occur three times
more often than the word with rank 30. Although not precisely, this relationship usually
holds in practice. In the paper on record linkage I provide an illustration of Zipf’s law
using traditional text (the State of the Union addresses in the US), more idiosyncratic
expression of textual data (organization names in the UK) and simulated labels. I use a
generalization of Zipf’s law proposed by Mandelbrot (1954) to simulate the dataset that
exhibits the properties of real-world text.
Another important strand of, primarily, statistical work was the authorship attribu-
tion. Mosteller and Wallace (1963, 1983) apply Bayes’ theorem to the Federalist Papers
5Zipf also introduced what he called ‘the principle of least effort’, as a tendency of humans to minimise
the rate of work, that would affect both linguistic and non-linguistic behaviour, this theory had far less
impact than his empirical observation of word frequencies.
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with disputed authorship and identify Madison as the principal contributor. From the
standpoint of classical quantitative text analysis, an interesting aspect of this work is the
focus on function words over content words. The idea behind it is that personal writing
style that can be used for correctly identifying the author is revealed through the usage
of function words, such as prepositions (on, by, of) and conjunctions (while, although),
rather than nouns or adjectives that tend to reflect content. Despite the book being, at
its core, a statistical work, this theoretical idea of function words having a meaning of
their own received further development.
Building upon the General Inquirer, Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) and psycho-
analytical theory, Pennebaker and King (1999) developed a large dictionary, representing
over a dozen psychological constructs, called ‘Linguistic Inquiry andWord Count’ (LIWC)
(Pennebaker et al., 2001) and a complementary proprietary software for applying the ex-
tended version of the dictionary. Despite relative computational simplicity, the inclusion
of a large number of theoretically interesting concepts, e.g. power, body and insight (Pen-
nebaker et al., 2015), has led to its wide adoption among social scientists and beyond.
Among other, political science applications of LIWC include profiling German party lead-
ers based on their tweets (Tumasjan et al., 2010) and sentiment analysis of Congressional
debates (Yu et al., 2008)6. The later theoretical framework, however, shifted to the role of
function words (particularly, pronouns) in defining linguistic style and personality traits
(Pennebaker, 2011). This makes the argument, bar psychological aspect, broadly resemble
the one, made by Mosteller and Wallace half a century ago.
Despite being introduced more than a century ago, dictionary methods remain a
highly popular method of choice in political science (Young and Soroka, 2012; Soroka
et al., 2015; Proksch et al., 2019). While certainly not a go-to approach for every task,
dictionary methods provide a useful and quick way of estimating pre-defined concepts
from text. The possibility of accessible and flexible machine translation (Lucas et al.,
6As these examples suggest, it is also a dictionary of choice for computer scientists working on cross-
disciplinary topics. One of the possible reasons for that is that it appears as a recommended lexicon,
along with the General Inquirer, to boost training set in sentiment analysis tasks when the data is sparse
in landmark natural language processing textbook (Jurafsky and Martin, 2009).
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2015; de Vries et al., 2018; Proksch et al., 2019) has further provided an opportunity to
extend the analysis to multiple languages (Paskhalis et al., 2019) through translation of
the original corpus of documents or through translation of the off-the-shelf or curated
dictionaries.
1.2 Classical Applications
As the central contribution of this thesis lies in expanding the range of political actors
whose output is analysed using quantitative methods of text analysis, it is helpful to
review the classical lines of research. Until recently, those, almost exclusively, focused
on parties and legislators. While, undoubtedly very important, they are hardly the only
political actors whose actions are consequential for democratic polities. In this work
I argue and show empirically that other political actors, such as interest groups and
members of the civil society leave behind a trove of data that can be successfully used
to generate new insights. Furthermore, I argue that apart from ideological scaling, text
analysis can contribute to other important questions about political actors, such as their
policy agenda and the state of deliberative democracy. However, moving forward requires
careful consideration of the methodological state of the field as well as the advances and
mistakes made in prior application of ‘text-as-data’ approaches.
The single most important frontier in applying text analysis to political text7 can be
described as scaling public policy positions of political actors8. The longest and perhaps
the largest research project undertaken in political science, the Manifesto Project (or
Manifesto Research on Political Representation, MARPOR9) (Budge et al., 1987, 2001;
Klingemann et al., 2006; Volkens et al., 2013) was designed to cover all free, democratic
elections after the Second World War. As the project’s name suggests, the key data source
7Laver (2014) reviews the application of text analysis as well as other methods to infer policy position.
8The theoretical roots of assigning ideal points to political actors on a latent policy dimension lie in
seminal economic models of spatial competition (Hotelling, 1929; Downs, 1957).
9MARPOR (since 2009) was also previously known as the Manifesto Research Group (MRG) (1979-
1983) and the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) (1983-2009) and one still comes across these
former names in the literature.
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for inferring policy positions were party manifestos, issued prior to the parliamentary elec-
tions and stating party vision and goals. By being the principal political organizations
in democratic systems political parties and their policy positions are of immense impor-
tance for both political scientists and voters. Although the precise contractual nature of
manifestos is often violated, when parties fail to implement the promised policies, the
pledges made in them constitute an important accountability mechanism. The centrality
of manifesto promises is most conspicuous in the case of British politics (Kavanagh, 1981).
Although this position has been criticised on both theoretical and normative grounds, the
amount of attention they receive in academic literature and journalistic reports has never
receded. The critics suggested that, first, the bureaucratic model of government suggests
that civil servants might have upper hand when it comes to policy delivery over legislators.
Second, coalition governments, more frequent in other democratic systems can prevent
the promised policies from being implemented. And, third, putting too much emphasis on
adversarial party manifestos can promote partisanship, societal fractures and disregard
for opposition.
In reality the end goal of public policy scaling is often elusive. The central tenet of
every methodological approach is that it is position that is being measured by a given
technique. However, the mechanics of text analysis usually involves counting units of
choice (be it word, sentence or another category), that give how much emphasis a party
puts on specific issue. In Manifesto Project this ingrained controversy has been overcome
by the development of saliency theory (Budge et al., 1987, pp.24-28). The core assumption
which allows to bridge the gap between saliency and position is that emphasis corresponds
to preference and stressing particular issue is indicative of the support for it. Another
way to look at it is that parties tend to avoid direct confrontation with other parties and
rather than offer different views on the same agenda are more likely to conceal their views
on the issues that are less important to them and might prove to be unfavourable with
voters. It is worth noting that this theoretical shift in party competition literature from
confrontation theory (Robertson, 1976) to saliency theory resulted from a combination
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of analytical considerations and methodological caveats. Subjecting saliency theory to
independent testing, Dolezal et al. (2014) find support for some of its implications. While
parties indeed tend to avoid mentioning each other directly, the level of issue convergence
is higher than it is predicted by the theory. The authors’ empirical analysis of party
manifestos in Austria shows that parties tend to compete over the same issue and engage
in direct confrontation over them.
Text analysis constitutes the core of the MARPOR methodology. And this part of the
research project attracted most criticism from other scholars. All party manifestos are
analysed after manually coding by a single coder into 56 issue categories10. This follows
the order normally used in manual text analysis, with text (1) being unitised, divided
into basic units of analysis; (2) coded by a human coder and (3) aggregated into single
score. The first step a coder takes is unitises them in ‘quasi-sentences’, the basic unit of
coding in the MARPOR project. The choice of this unit over others such as word, para-
graph or entire text was driven by the realisation that long natural sentences can contain
several political ideas (Budge et al., 2001, pp.93-107). This segmentation of grammatical
sentences into conceptual quasi-sentences is inherently subjective and has been shown to
be a source of inter-coder unreliability, while offering no benefits over splitting text at
a pre-defined set of punctuation marks that would produce a more linguistically-sound
unit of coding (Däubler et al., 2012). In addition, Dolezal et al. (2016) recently suggested
using ‘kernel sentences’, based on Chomsky’s (Chomsky, 1957) syntactic model, as a unit
of analysis for manifesto data. This approach, however, still relies on human coders man-
ually dividing the sentences into kernel sentences, albeit the rules are better grounded
in linguistic theory and can be expected to be less subjective. After unitising, a coder
assigns one code out of the 56-category coding scheme (further subdivided into 7 domains
such as external relations and fabric of society) to each quasi-sentence. As the project
includes manifestos in multiple languages it makes it very costly to code any document
twice. In a coding experiment, Mikhaylov et al. (2012) show that together with complex
10The number of issue categories was expanded from initial 21 to 56 categories today.
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coding scheme this produces systematic misclassification. Furthermore, coding by a single
coder results only in ideal point estimates without any measures of uncertainty (Benoit
et al., 2009). This limitation can be partially overcome by bootstrapping confidence inter-
vals, but doing so affects many substantial conclusions as a number of party ‘movements’
along the left-right scale can be attributed to stochastic noise in textual data rather than
actual changes in party position. After the coding is complete, the researchers calculate
a single score on a left-right scale, with RILE being the most frequently used for this
dataset. As some of the coded categories are neutral, for computing point estimates of
party position (θ) the percentages of 13 left categories are summed up and subtracted
from the equivalent summation of the percentages of 13 right categories:
θ =
R− L
N
The choice of summative index assumes constant marginal effect of each additional
quasi-sentence and has been criticised by Lowe et al. (2011). Instead, the authors argued
for the adoption of log odds-ratios, which would reflect decreasing marginal effect. Put dif-
ferently, the more pro-right quasi-sentences have been read, the less would be the assumed
effect of each additional on the voter and this should be reflected in a shrunken left-right
scale. The foundation for this aggregation method would be a well-known psychological
regularity, namely, Weber-Fechner’s law (Fechner, 1965), which states that equal relative
increments of the strength of perceptual stimuli lead to equal changes in sensation. It is
reasonable to believe that audial or visual perception of political text would not fall far
from other sensory modalities. Despite all the methodological concerns raised by other
scholars, only very few of them were adequately addressed by the original MARPOR
authors (Volkens et al., 2013). This is rather unfortunate for the advancement of the
discipline as manifesto dataset continues to be widely used in comparative politics by
researchers who prefer a well-established source for party positions without the need to
get bogged down in abstruse methodological debate.
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The first attempt to automate coding of party manifestos came with the creation of
dictionary by Laver and Garry (2000). This dictionary was based on a new hierarchically-
structured coding scheme with simplified policy areas. In this scheme all categories had
their antithesis as well as neutral and British 1992 Conservative and Labour manifestos
were used to get a pool of words for populating the dictionary. After having 1992 and 1997
manifestos from the UK and Ireland coded by experts, they ran the computer program
that calculated left-right score using just the raw word counts and the dictionary. Though
the correlation between the two varied across policy areas, face validity was shown when
this method correctly identified the key perceived party movement of those electoral
campaigns - Liberal Democrats shifting to the left of Labour in 1997. Additionally, the
authors contend that the resultant estimates reflect positions rather than issue saliency,
however, this opinion was not widely accepted. Overall, this application of dictionary
method was an improvement over manual coding, but it still required a rather laborious
development of bespoke dictionary, as well as its manual population with words. Implic-
itly, in this paper as well as other in other applications of dictionary method, researchers
adopt ‘bag-of-words’ approach. The idea is rather simple and straightforward to imple-
ment, but conceptually goes against what most people would consider to be linguistically
sound. It effectively states that text can be represented as word frequency matrix, entirely
leaving out syntax and structure. Dictionary method, in effect, calculates frequencies of
pre-specified words and then aggregates them by category. ‘Bag-of-words’ assumption,
however, goes beyond dictionary approaches. It underpins most contemporary text anal-
ysis application, including, but not limited to, Wordscores, Wordfish and IRT-type models
discussed below, topic models and word embeddings. While not uncontroversial, the em-
pirical research presented in this thesis relies extensively on independence of words within
label, sentence and the entire text.
After dictionary method the next logical step was to predict frequencies of all words,
possibly, excepting ‘stop-words’. This was the approach adopted in Wordscores method
developed by Laver et al. (2003). By computing word frequencies of ‘virgin’ texts, relative
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to ‘reference’ texts with known scores, it assigned them a position on a pre-defined scale.
The key feature of this approach, which could also be referred to as supervised scaling11, is
the need to have a set of texts with known positions (training set). It drastically reduced
the analysis time, but as with all supervised methods, the requirement to define training
set a priori can constitute a hurdle if the corpus is new and unexplored or the researcher
is dealing with a language other than English, where pre-scored texts might not be readily
available. Another, more subtle, assumption is that reference texts contain all the words
that are relevant to the position which is being extracted. Wordscores has been criticised
by the MARPOR authors (Budge and Pennings, 2007) for the seeming arbitrariness of
the choice of reference texts. Lowe (2008), while giving a generally positive assessment
and drawing parallels between Wordscores and correspondence analysis, also notes the
problem with the lack of underlying statistical model and the inherent need for applying
transformation to get interpretable estimates12.
The next key advancement in automated text analysis came with the adoption of
unsupervised scaling (or learning in computer science literature) model instead of super-
vised learning used in Wordscores. This was the idea developed by Slapin and Proksch
(2008) in their Wordfish13 model. Instead of using reference texts, Wordfish assumes a
statistical model that generated the observed word counts. The model draws upon liter-
ary style literature (Peng and Hengartner, 2002) and follows above-mentioned work by
Mosteller and Wallace (1963). The model is based on Naive Bayes assumption, frequently
encountered in text analysis literature. It states that words are distributed independently
of each other. In other words, the usage of one word by a text author does not increase
or decrease the probability of the usage of any other word from a sample space. Al-
11As Benoit and Nulty (2013) show, Wordscores is mathematically equivalent to Naive Bayes classifier,
with the principal difference that the former uses individual word-level posterior probabilities to construct
an additive scale, while the latter predicts the class using them multiplicatively in the joint probability
model.
12Martin and Vanberg (2008) provide an extended discussion of several procedures for Wordscores
transformation.
13The name ‘Wordfish’ might appear mysterious, but it comes from the English translation of the
surname of French statistician Poisson, whose name was given to the distribution used in the underlying
statistical model.
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though this assumption is clearly violated in all real texts (hence, its ‘naivity’), it has
been shown to perform well in many text classification tasks, such as spam detection
(Sahami et al., 1998). The model is, essentially, a Poisson word count model, similar to
the one used in the unpublished manuscript by Monroe and Maeda (2004), with such
parameters as party-year(αit) and word (ψj) fixed effects, as well as party position (ωit)
and word-discriminating parameter (βj):
yijt ∼ Poisson(λijt)
λijt = exp(αit + ψj + βj ∗ ωit)
As is clear from the model specification, the entire right-hand side is unknown and
has to be estimated with the expectation maximization (EM) algorithm. The main crit-
icism addressed at Wordfish, and, potentially, other unsupervised scaling models is the
assumption that ideology dominates analysed texts. Otherwise, as Grimmer and Stewart
(2013) point out, the model will seize upon the primary source of variation across texts. In
practice this assumption is only met if the manifestos represent an exhaustive statement
of party platform. If, however, a policy position on particular dimension is of interest,
Slapin and Proksch (2008) suggest that Wordfish is applied only to corresponding sections
of manifesto.
In the pursuit of better reliability and reproducibility (King, 1995) of human coding,
researchers have turned to crowd-sourcing platforms. Rather than hiring a handful of
coders and subjecting them to rigorous training before they master the coding scheme
and can tag units of text analysis with high inter-coder agreement, scholars started ex-
ploring the potential of online platforms that match employers to workers, who, in turn,
do relatively simple human intelligence tasks, such as tagging pictures, answering surveys
and taking part in experiments. This approach has been shown to perform well and be
more representative than often-used convenience sampling (Berinsky et al., 2012). Benoit
et al. (2016) used Crowdflower to classify sentences with a coding scheme simplified
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from 56-category into two scales: economic policy (left-right) and social policy (liberal-
conservative). The results show high agreement between experts and crowd-sourced work-
ers judgement about the placement of manifestos on both scales and provide evidence
that human judgement and replicable research do not have to be mutually exclusive. An-
other prospective avenue for further refinement of scaling policy preferences from textual
data is extending statistical models. The body of research on policy positions shows that
there is some potential in adopting item response theory models to political text (Benoit
et al., 2016). Item response theory (IRT), which originated in psychometric studies of
human intelligence, has been used prominently in political science for establishing policy
positions. At first, it proved to be a highly consistent method for analysing roll call votes
in US Congress (Poole and Rosenthal, 1985; Clinton et al., 2004). But later its usage
spread to surveys (Bafumi and Herron, 2010), campaign contributions (Bonica, 2013)
and Twitter followership networks (Barbera, 2015). Currently, there is also ongoing work
on incorporating IRT in text analysis of party manifestos (Däubler and Benoit, 2017). In
the chapter on civil society deliberation in post-conflict settings, we adopt IRT model to
measuring the quality of deliberation using human-coded speech acts as units of analysis.
While we find no difference across genders, the primary focus of our analysis, the varying
difficulty and discrimination parameters of individual components (items) provide inter-
esting insight into how hard it is to meet the normative aspects of deliberation in highly
contentious environments.
No less important than the evolution of tools for the analysis of party manifestos was
the spread of those methods to other sections of political science. In their application of
Wordfish scoring to the US Senate and Irish Dail, Lauderdale and Herzog (2016) extend
it to build Wordshoal model by subjecting the derived debate-specific point estimates for
each speaker to Bayesian factor analysis to discover underlying policy dimensions with
speakers placed on these latent scales. Wordfish model has also been successfully applied
in the analysis of speeches in the European Parliament (Proksch and Slapin, 2010) and
consultation submitted by lobbying groups (Klüver, 2009).
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Overall, the body of literature that emerged from measuring policy positions of parties
and legislators using textual data provides a robust foundation for extending the types
of political actors analysed, as well as bringing in new research questions and new data
to address them. In the empirical chapters below I will show that some of the models
discussed above can be adopted for analysing data on interest group meetings and civil
society discussions.
1.3 New Frontiers
Increasingly, the analysis of political text starts incorporating methods developed in nat-
ural language processing14 and machine learning15. Most types of problems that machine
learning addresses, can be, roughly, divided into two broad categories: classification and
prediction. While the latter is only infrequently a concern for political scientists16, clas-
sification in general and text classification in particular is a problem, often faced by
researchers. As the technical entry barrier is often high for social scientists, it is unsur-
prising that some of the earlier applications of machine learning methods to political
questions were done by computer scientists. For example, Yu et al. (2008) applied sup-
port vector machine (SVM) and Naive Bayes classifiers to speeches in Congress in order
to infer party affiliation of the speakers. Drutman and Hopkins (2013) applied hand cod-
ing and SVM to the Enron dataset, that includes over 250,000 internal emails that were
released following the corporate investigation, to uncover the key lobbying strategies that
were pursued by company’s employees. Often scholars do not want to classify each in-
dividual document as the universe of certain texts is hypothetically infinite, but rather
learn about the proportions of texts of each pre-determined category in the population
(Hopkins and King, 2010). Or, conversely, cluster the existing texts in groups that might
14Jurafsky and Martin (2009) offer a classic introduction into the field of natural language processing.
15Grimmer and Stewart (2013) review the currently available methods of automated text analysis for
political scientists with a focus on machine learning and information retrieval methods. Wilkerson and
Casas (2017) provide the most recent overview of the state of computerised text analysis
16The only obvious exception to that is electoral forecasting, which is a vibrant research area on both
sides of the Atlantic (Gelman and King, 1993; Hanretty et al., 2016)
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prove to be a new, conceptually interesting, categorisation scheme (Grimmer and King,
2011). These two classification approaches correspond to what is known as supervised
and unsupervised learning models in statistical and computer science literature (Hastie
et al., 2009). It is also sometimes referred to as computer-assisted clustering (CAC) and
fully automated clustering (FAC) in their applications to political texts (Grimmer and
King, 2011; Grimmer and Stewart, 2013).
Despite the relatively large selection of new methods for automated or semi-automated
text analysis, many of them did not see wide adoption. If this criterion is used to judge
the success of a particular method, topic modelling (Blei et al., 2003) is perhaps the
most prominent approach in the field of text analysis of those introduced more recently.
The roots of this method lie in latent semantic indexing (LSI), a technique developed
by Deerwester et al. (1990) to improve the performance of information retrieval systems
by deriving latent semantic structure of a set of documents. This is achieved by using
singular-value decomposition to estimate a reduced number (50-100 for thousands of
words and documents) of orthogonal factors or dimensions and then treating those as
latent semantic space to calculate document and word similarity. Hofmann (1999) ex-
tends the model by introducing a probabilistic model to the, otherwise, linear algebra
transformation. Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA), developed by Blei et al. (2003) is a
full Bayesian implementation of the probabilistic LSI. Another way to look at is as a
hierarchical Bayesian mixture model, where each document i is a finite mixture of un-
derlying topics, with proportions pii drawn from Dirichlet prior, each topic k comes from
an infinite mixture of topic probabilities with multinomial prior and, conditional on the
topic, a word wij is drawn from a multinomial prior:
pii ∼ Dirichlet(α)
τk ∼Multinomial(1, pii)
wij ∼Multinomial(1, θij|τk)
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Although it is possible to design a different topic model, based on different priors,
LDA remains by far the most widely used. Some of the generalizations of the LDA
include hierarchical Dirichlet processes (Teh et al., 2006), where the number of topics can
be learnt from data and, more specific to political science, structural topic model (Roberts
et al., 2014), where prior distribution for words is expanded to include covariates. This
set-up allows to test for significant differences in word distributions conditioning on other
parameters of interest. In the first empirical chapter I use a variant of dynamic topic
models (Blei and Lafferty, 2006) to explore the evolution of policy agenda from the
meetings between the government and interest groups in the UK. In the second empirical
chapter we apply structural topic models to estimate the differences in thematic focus
across genders.
Most recently, political scientists started adopting deep learning approaches and word
embeddings to relax the traditional ‘bag-of-words’ assumption (Rheault and Cochrane,
2019; Spirling and Rodriguez, 2019). Recall that the main premise underpinning most
text analysis models is that words or, rather, wordcounts can be considered in isolation,
irrespective of their context. Instead, to estimate embeddings a window around the input
word of some size is specified and both the counts of the the word itself as well as
the counts of the words occurring within this windows are used as the inputs in the
neural network model17. As the output, each word can be represented as a vector in
some n-dimensional space (embedding), where proximity between the words reflects their
semantic similarity in the training corpus18. However, despite their promise, producing
new insights into the political science phenomena using word embeddings remains a task
of the future research.
17Rheault and Cochrane (2019) provide a longer treatment of word embeddings in the context of
political science
18This provides some scope for vector arithmetic as in the classical example of king+ woman = queen
from Mikolov et al. (2013), the original developers of this approach.
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1.4 Conclusions
In the past decade quantitative text analysis has grown out of niche methodology, largely
restricted to ideological scaling, into broad and diverse approach to working with any
textual data, be it legislative speeches, newspaper articles, public consultations or social
media stories. While the range of political actors who are studied using this approach has
been gradually growing over the years, there are still many research questions that have
seen limited application of text analysis.
The three main challenges that I outline and tackle in this thesis are (1) data challenge,
(2) language(s) challenge and (3) computation challenge. Despite the decreasing costs
of data collection, obtaining high-quality textual data remains a challenge. Oftentimes,
the data remains locked in non-machine-readable format that requires optical-character
recognition or scattered over many pages of dynamically generated website that requires
writing a sophisticated scraper. What remains even more challenging is ensuring the
completeness and consistency of data collection. In the first paper of this thesis I make
an attempt to address this challenge by implementing two open-source software packages
to assist in compiling data government transparency reports in the UK. Secondly, apart
from several notable exceptions19 most text analysis have been tried and applied to the
more common Western languages, such as English and German. At least in part this can
be explained by more easily accessible datasets, such as party manifestos or US congress
speeches. However, the accessibility of text analysis for other language often varies a lot.
This problem can be partially addressed by adopting computational tools from natural
language processing. In the second paper of this thesis I use such tools specially designed
for Balkan languages to facilitate pre-processing and text analysis in Serbian. And, finally,
despite the rapid increase in computational power available to empirical researchers, some
applications still require making trade-offs. This is especially true when working with large
datasets that do not fit into computer memory. In the third paper I illustrate some of the
19See King et al. (2013), for example of text analysis applications in Chinese and Rozenas and Stukal
(2019) for text analysis in Russian.
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trade-offs involved when linking multiple datasets that contain only textual labels as the
common identifier.
Altogether, this thesis identifies the challenges for current applications of text analysis
in political science and outlines a few potential avenues of addressing them. Furthermore,
it contributes to theoretical discussions in such fields as British politics, lobbying and
post-conflict studies.
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Chapter 2
Interest Group Access and Campaign
Spending Limits: Evidence from Brexit
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ABSTRACT
Scholars have long been focused on studying lobbying and the potential influence that
such activities can have on public policy. The ability to lobby state actors, however, crit-
ically depends on having access to them in the first place. So far much of the theoretical
and empirical literature on potential mechanisms of acquiring access has been limited
to donations or other forms of financial transactions. In this study I argue that in plu-
ralist states with campaign spending limits, the influence of money is more restricted
and other mechanisms such as economic importance, long period of interest-government
interactions and ideological proximity play an important role in securing meetings with
government officials. I use government transparency reports for 2010-2018 from the min-
isterial departments in the UK to measure the level of access and saliency of policy issues
that provide evidence of the importance of these alternative mechanisms.
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“ ‘Politics’ for us means striving to
share power or striving to influence
the distribution of power, either
among states or among groups within
a state.”
—Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation
2.1 Introduction
There is a widespread concern both in academic (Gilens and Page, 2014; Acemoglu et al.,
2015) and popular (Cave and Rowell, 2015) writing that economic elites and business
interests receive preferential treatment from the government. If this is the case, adopted
policies become biased in the direction of preferences of these actors rather than reflect
the position of a median voter. While direct systematic evidence of influence is scarce,
much of the literature has been dedicated to access, as a necessary (but not necessarily
sufficient) condition for influencing public policy (Wright, 1990; Hansen, 1991; Ainsworth,
1993; Austen-Smith, 1995; Schnakenberg, 2017; Judd, 2019). In his seminal work The
Governmental Process Truman (1951) put access as the basic interest group objective:
“Whichever is operating at a particular point in time, however, power of any kind cannot
be reached by a political interest group, or its leaders, without access to one or more key
points of decision in the government.”(Truman, 1951, p.264) Although in part this focus
has been driven by practical considerations, as empirically it is easier to observe some form
of access to government officials than the effects they might have on policy, the question,
“Which of a plethora of interest groups seeking access get it?” remains the source of a
long-standing debate in political science. This pluralist view of liberal democracy goes
back to the discussion of ‘factions’ in The Federalist Papers (Hamilton et al., 1787). In
the twentieth century this view was further developed by Dahl (1961), who argued that
despite the competition, many diverse interests, including those of the general public, get
represented. A major theoretical criticism of this view came from Olson’s (1965) work on
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collective action, who pointed out the ‘free rider’ problem that riddles widely dispersed
interests, as opposed to numerically small, but well-coordinated, groups. Such lack of
coordination can lead to what Schattschneider (1960) called “heavenly chorus [...] with a
strong upper-class accent” or, later, labelled as ‘unheavenly chorus’ by Schlozman et al.
(2012). In the context of British politics this polemic is paralleled by the introduction of
the insider/outsider typology (Grant, 1978) used to characterize the groups that enjoy
access to policymakers and those operating away from official cabinets. Subsequent critics
(Maloney et al., 1994), argued, however, that most interest groups in fact do not become
engaged in consultation process due to highly technical nature of many policies considered
by the government.
Most studies to date have focused on the US, which is a specific example of plural-
ist system where campaign contributions play an oversized role. As I argue below, this
situation arises when there is an absence of campaign spending limits. When those are
present, however, political candidates have little incentive to raise large sums of money
in donations and most interest groups cannot be differentiated on the basis of campaign
contributions. This suggests that other access attainment mechanisms should be at work
in these systems of government-interest relations. In particular, I focus on economic im-
portance as a key explanatory variable which accounts for preferential treatment of some
organizations. I illustrate my argument with the case of Britain, a classical example of
pluralist system which also enforces strict campaign spending limits since the introduc-
tion of the Corrupt and Illegal Practices Prevention Act in 1883 (Rix, 2008). I further use
the referendum on the membership in the EU as an exogenous policy shock that, by im-
posing additional temporal constraints, has made already limited face-to-face time with
policy-makers an even scarcer resource. Despite the anticipated pro-business bias, I find
that in the aftermath of the popular vote to leave, upheld by the government, economic
importance played a less prominent role in securing meetings with the government.
This study makes five distinct contributions. First, it addresses an important con-
cern about preferential treatment of business over public interests in political systems
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with restricted influence of direct financial investment in lobbying and financing political
candidates. Second, I hypothesize and test economic importance and long-running ties
between interest groups and state as an access mechanism that might determine achiev-
ing government access in pluralist systems with campaign spending limits. Third, I use
an exogenous policy shock in the form of Brexit to estimate the joint effects of time
constraints and public pressure arising from a highly charged political issue on access
attainment. Fourth, given the importance and implications of Brexit that reach beyond
national British politics, this work contributes to our understanding of the processes
that accompanied the crucial years of negotiating withdrawal agreement. And, fifth, by
collecting a novel dataset from transparency reports, I advance the discussion of open
government data beyond Freedom of Information (FOI) regulations.
2.2 Lobbying and Campaign Spending Limits
Most empirical and theoretical research on pluralist democracies emphasizes the impor-
tance of campaign contributions as a key mechanism of securing access to policymakers
(Austen-Smith, 1995; Grossman and Helpman, 2001; Fouirnaies and Hall, 2014; Kalla
and Broockman, 2016; Powell and Grimmer, 2016; Fouirnaies and Hall, 2018). The usual
argument is structured around strategic considerations on part of the organized inter-
est, that channel money to legislators who enjoy incumbency advantage (Fouirnaies and
Hall, 2014), are committee members (Powell and Grimmer, 2016) or possess other pro-
cedural powers, such as making committee assignments (Fouirnaies and Hall, 2018), in
exchange for meetings and, potentially, influence. Donations, thus, act as a mechanism
of either facilitating access through some quid pro quo arrangement (Snyder and Ting,
2008; Kalla and Broockman, 2016) or signalling close policy preferences between interest
groups and political candidates (Austen-Smith, 1995; Hall and Deardorff, 2006). However,
even scholars of the US politics note that there is less money than one would anticipate
to observe given the expected payoffs (Ansolabehere et al., 2003), with very few publicly
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listed companies donating money to political campaigns (Fouirnaies and Hall, 2018).
Figure 2.1: Global Restrictions on Political Finances. (a) Limits on donations to
political candidates and (b) limits on candidate campaign expenditure.
Limits on donations
Yes
No
No data
(a)
Limits on spending
Yes
No
No data
(b)
Note: Further details on data and methodology of evaluation are available in Ohman (2012).
This link between donations and political favours weakens once one considers pluralist
systems with low campaign spending limits or corporatist systems with public funding
of political parties (Siaroff, 1999), the types of systems dominant across Europe. This
gives rise to an important theoretical puzzle. Either such systems create a level playing
field where every organization has equal chances of being heard by the government or
there are other factors at play driving the biased representation of commercial over public
interests. In what follows I focus on economic importance, one of the factors that can
shape interest-government relations in systems where donations play only modest role
due to imposed campaign spending limits.
It is important to consider the two main regulatory restrictions that can affect this
relationship between organized interest and political actors. First, it is possible for gov-
ernment to impose limits on the amount of money donors can give to political candidates
and parties. Figure 2.1a shows countries across the world that have some limits on dona-
tions to candidates. Second, it is possible to restrict the sums that political candidates
can spend on their campaigns (figure 2.1b). While there is some literature assessing the
impact of the former restriction (Barber, 2015), no study has yet looked at how the mech-
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anisms determining access differ under the latter1. In other words, do policymakers treat
business interests as a more welcoming party to the negotiation table than civil society
groups or non-profit organizations? And, if so, what drives this preferential treatment
when almost no organization coaxes elected politicians through donating money to their
political campaigns?
There are several implicit assumptions in these questions that need to be spelled out
and tested. First, campaign spending limits have a more profound impact on the shape
of interest-government relations than restrictions on donations. While the former com-
pletely changes the incentive structure by drastically limiting the demand for campaign
resources, the latter merely necessitates some adjustments on how money-raising is or-
ganized. Indeed, as the Figure 2.1 shows, the most studied case of the US illustrates this
point very well. Rather than levelling the playing field, diverse restrictions set at both
state and federal level, arguably, shape how corporations channel their money through
political action committees (PAC) and individual donations. Conversely, imposing limits
on campaign expenditure would lead candidates in more competitive races to spend very
close to the maximum amount permitted. At the same time candidates in safe seats have
little incentive to raise money in donations given their confidence in electoral outcome.
Second, in line with the previous literature, politicians’ time is a limited and valuable
resource that requires competition between interest groups. As was argued in previous
studies on Britain only some groups acquire ‘insider’ status, while many remain excluded
from the policy-making process (Grant, 1978, 2000)2. Or, to put it in other words, the
demand-side for access is present in all polities. And, third, politicians are not omni-
scient and require information about the implications of potential policy changes, thus,
supplying access to some interest groups but not others.
1There is emerging literature on the effects of campaign spending limits on electoral competition (Avis
et al., 2017; Fouirnaies, 2018), however, this study is the first one that looks at how campaign spending
limits shape interest-government relations.
2See also Maloney et al. (1994) for the critique of this dichotomy.
48
2.3 The British Case
When looking at the global variation in different forms of regulation affecting the rela-
tions between political candidates, their electoral campaigns and organized interest, the
potential combinations are almost innumerable. However, in expanding our understand-
ing of the interest-government relations it is helpful to explore a case which both builds
upon the studies that looked at the US as a pluralist system par excellence and at the
same time differs from it in the important respect of having strict campaign spending
limits. While some authors looked at the patterns of access in countries that can more
accurately be described as corporatist (Binderkrantz et al., 2015), this is the first study
to provide an in-depth analysis of access acquisition in pluralist system where campaign
contributions do not play a prominent role.
Britain, by being a classic example of the pluralist system in Europe and also a country
with a long history of regulating political campaigns (Rix, 2008) provides an ideal case
for such study. It is worth noting that despite the particularities of Westminster-type
democratic systems, in those two respects– a diverse range of interest groups seeking
access and restrictions on the amount of money candidates can spend on the electoral
campaign, the UK is not entirely different from a range of other states, such as Canada,
Ireland or Italy, to name but a few.
Interest (or pressure) groups featured prominently in the earlier studies of British
politics (Beer, 1956; Eckstein, 1960), but their presence in academic literature declined
considerably over the years. This is unfortunate as there is no indication that their politi-
cal clout has diminished correspondingly3. Even more surprisingly, this has been happen-
ing against a backdrop of increasing scholarly attention to interest groups in American
politics (Kalla and Broockman, 2016; Schnakenberg, 2017; Fouirnaies and Hall, 2018;
Li, 2018; Judd, 2019) in the wake of the Citizens United v. FEC court ruling. Despite
3The consistent emergence of ‘cash-for-X’ controversies with ‘cash-for-questions affair’ in the 1990s
and ‘cash-for-influence scandal’ in the 2000s is a testimony to the continuous concern about outside
influence on politicians. David Hencke, “Tory MPs were paid to plant questions says Harrods chief,”
The Guardian, October 20, 1994, and Stephen Byers, “Ex-ministers suspended from Labour party over
lobbying allegations,” The Guardian, March 23, 2010
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certain similarities in the interest-government relations, notably, the pluralistic nature of
access seeking, not all insights from literature on the US are directly applicable to the
case of Britain. Crucially for my argument here, faced with low spending limits individual
political candidates have little incentive to raise substantial amounts to finance their elec-
toral campaigns. This is especially the case for candidates, who do not run in marginal
constituencies. These low investment in spending and raising campaign finances on the
part of the candidates manifests in low number of donations4 and decreased return on
investment (access in return for campaign funding) on the part of organized interest.
Figure 2.2: UK Candidate Spending 2005-2017.
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0 %
50 %
100 %
150 %
0 %
50 %
100 %
150 %
Margin of loss/victory
Pe
rc
e
n
ta
ge
 L
im
it
Conservative Labour Liberal Democrat Other
Note: Percentage of spending limits for short campaign reached by candidates in 2005-2017 Parliamentary
General Elections and their margin of loss/victory. Candidates above the 100% level are those who spent
above their legally permissible threshold. Data obtained from the spending returns reported to the
Electoral Commission.
To illustrate the spending behaviour of candidates in the parliamentary General Elec-
tions, I analyzed spending reports for the past four elections that took place in 2005,
2010, 2015 and 2017. Figure 2.2 shows the distribution of levels of campaign spending
limits reached by candidates in General Elections in the UK and their election results.
The curves for all parties peak around 0, which indicates that candidates running in
4For more details on donations see Appendix A.
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close races tend to reach the highest permissible levels of campaign spending. On the
contrary, nonviable candidates concentrated in lower left corners of the panels, as well
as candidates running in the safe seats (on the right) that they win with high margins
spend considerably less and often do not go above 50% of the threshold5. In other words,
winning candidates running in very safe areas can be expected to spend well below their
permissible threshold. Taking into account a substantial number of safe seats for major
parties in the UK, spending considerations and fund-raising appear to play a role only
for a small number of candidates and MPs. Which, in turn, attracts fewer donors and
interest groups, who anticipate limited returns on political donations.
2.4 Access Mechanisms
What are the potential sources of differential treatment of interest groups when candidates
do not expand efforts to raise campaign funds and very few organizations donate to politi-
cians? As politicians seek re-election, they are likely to be more attentive to the interests
that help them secure one. In this sense, raising additional campaign funds can be viewed
as one of the strategies to increase the chances of victory (Jacobson, 1978; Jacobson and
Carson, 2015). However, as Gelman and King (1993) have argued, election campaigns
are important insofar that they permit voters to learn about fundamental issues, such as
the state of the economy. Thus, in order to increase the chances of re-election incumbent
politicians operating in polities with strict campaign spending limits can instead focus
on improving their standing on those fundamental issues. In performance-oriented retro-
spective voting model (Barro, 1973; Ferejohn, 1986) voters decide on the candidate who
maximizes their well-being subject to constraint that politicians pursue their own inter-
est. Furthermore, operating in the world of imperfect information, voters do not observe
the actions of the politicians’ directly. To put it in the context of interest group access,
voters do not know how frequently the government meets with conservation organizations
5In practice these are relatively small amounts of money. With mean spending limit threshold being
roughly £12,000, the winners, on average, spend about £9,000.
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or trade unions, they only learn about the changes in their well-being linked to environ-
mental or labour regulation and cast their ballot accordingly. However, to understand the
complexities of individual policy issues, politicians require information about them in the
first place. As interest group scholars have long argued (Milbrath, 1964; Baumgartner and
Leech, 1998) information provision is one of the key activities that interest group engage
in, often targeting both politicians as well as mass public. It is important to note that this
information cannot be assumed to be entirely objective and unbiased. Indeed, as scholars
have shown a considerable part of information provision involves agenda-setting, issue
definition, and framing (Baumgartner and Leech, 1998). What is important, however, is
that politicians either consider some interest groups to be the best sources of information
or, simply, lack the capacity to get a more unbiased sources, thus being restricted to the
pool of interest groups bidding for access.
It is hard to argue that of all fundamental issues that politicians might choose to
deliver on to increase their chances of re-election, the economy is not the most impor-
tant one. As has been aptly written by the Bill Clinton’s political strategist for 1992
presidential campaign: ‘[It’s] the economy, stupid’. Overall, the link between economic
performance and voting has been studied extensively in the literature (E.g. Soroka et al.
(2015); for reviews, see Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2000, 2007)) and found to be highly
predictive of the electoral outcome. With this consideration in mind, politicians can be
expected to be more likely to meet interest groups whose potential effects on the economy
are larger. In other words, the economic importance of some groups can make their posi-
tion and policy input essential to decision-makers. Tax contributions to the state economy,
employment of voters, infrastructure projects are all important concerns for politicians
seeking re-election that oftentimes cannot be addressed without consulting business or-
ganizations. Indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests that changes in tax regulation in the
UK are often preceded by meetings with representatives of major corporations (Cave and
Rowell, 2015). Thus, re-election concerns and the focus on economic performance could
lead politicians to prefer meeting with business associations over civil society groups and
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with larger corporations over local firms.
Second, in addition to economic importance politicians might prefer meeting organi-
zations with whom they or their party had developed a strong connection over time. This
mechanism is especially relevant to the British case, which is defined by long-established
connections between some groups and political parties. Notably, until the present day
sitting MPs are permitted to take jobs outside of parliament. Despite the requirement to
disclose any financial interests or income since 1975, the practice of keeping second jobs
continues to be a source of heated debate6. In comparison to other countries, a higher
proportion of firms in the UK have been shown to have some political connection. Faccio
(2006) estimates that 39% of firms (by market capitalization) have at least one of their
large shareholders or top officers who is an MP, minister or is closely related to a top
official. Historically, these close connections developed largely along the party lines. The
history of the Labour party until very recently was intertwined with trade unions, while
business interests and large business associations had close connections with the Conser-
vative party. Eggers and Hainmueller (2009) find that Conservative candidates winning
the elections leave behind larger estates, while Labour MPs do not seem to gain finan-
cially from their political careers. This finding can also be attributed to the differences in
the nature of historical links between politicians and interest groups. Despite the decline
of some of those affiliations in recent years, certain organizations might still be perceived
as more reliable sources of policy-related information due to close historical or personal
links.
While in the empirical section below I will focus on these two mechanisms, namely,
economic importance and long-running ties with the government as the key explanatory
variables, there are several other potential mechanisms that I outline below without ex-
plicitly testing them. As has been argued in some theoretical work before (Austen-Smith,
1995; Hall and Deardorff, 2006), preferential treatment arising from campaign contribu-
6One recent example includes George Osborne, a former Chancellor of the Exchequer, taking the edi-
torship of Evening Standard, while retaining his position as an MP. “George of all trades,” The Economist,
March 23, 2017.
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tions could be a result of closely-aligned policy positions, with donations merely signalling
of this proximity. In many circumstances, however, it is plausible that policy positions
of interest groups are known to politicians in advance. This would make signalling re-
dundant, while still giving more saying to groups with preferences similar to those of the
government. For example, one can imagine a conservation group lobbying government
which includes a Green party as part of the ruling coalition. Fourth, as some issues be-
come more salient, interest groups connected to these areas, e.g. operating in a particular
sector of the economy, even if they do not, in general, are dominant for the economy at
large, can enjoy periods of better access to government. Fifth, interest groups can promise
lucrative career opportunities to politicians after they retire from the office (Eggers and
Hainmueller, 2009; Blanes I Vidal et al., 2012; Palmer and Schneer, 2019). This mecha-
nism is similar in spirit to quid pro quo financial transactions that occur during tenure
in the office, apart from its delayed effect. While this ‘revolving door’ path is certainly a
possibility, I argue that getting a chance to promise profitable post-retirement positions
and ensuring that politicians perceive this as a genuine and trustworthy transaction,
given the inherent delay and almost no legally-binding instruments, hinges upon having
pre-existing established relationship that should be manifest through having consistent
access in the first place.
2.5 Data and Research Design
In this study I use transparency reports released by ministerial departments of the British
government. I collected and collated 1,193 individual files published quarterly on the of-
ficial government website7. Despite a high variability in the specific release format, the
standard fields that are contained in the vast majority of transparency files provide sub-
7To facilitate data systematic data collection from https://www.gov.uk/government/publications,
I wrote a special R package. Furthermore, I identified any inconsistencies or missing periods in the
automatically downloaded data, by checking the yearly distribution of meetings within each department.
This, as well as the details of compiling a consolidated dataset from individual files are available in
Appendix C.
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stantial information about the contacts between government and organized interest. The
observed variables include official, with whom the meeting took place, date when it hap-
pened (usually, up to month and year, as well as day for the latest periods), organization,
one or several entities that participated in the meeting and a short description of a purpose
of that meeting8.
The collected data covers the period from 2010 to 2018 and includes information
on all 24 current government departments. Overall, in the specified period government
officials9 had over 60,000 meetings10 with over 30,000 organizations. To the best of my
knowledge, this is the first study which uses the dataset on all reported government
meetings in Britain11. Before proceeding to the research design, it is worth describing the
context around the adoption of regulation that made it obligatory for the government
departments to issue transparency reports.
The pledge to implement measures of greater government transparency was part of
the Conservative party’s electoral campaign for the 2010 General Election. It came as a
response to 2010 ‘cash for influence’ scandal, when a number of influential (and largely)
Labour MPs, including 5 cabinet ministers, were recorded offering their services as lob-
byists to an undercover reporter12. The scope of the reforms that happened when the
coalition of Conservatives and Liberal Democrats took the office was greater than is
being exploited in the present study. The establishment of the Open Data Institute,
headed by the inventor of the World Wide Web, Tim Berners-Lee, or the creation of
8See the detailed instructions used by civil servants to fill in the reports in Appendix B.
9The data covers ministers, junior ministers, as well as, in some cases, permanent secretaries and spe-
cial advisers. The meetings of the latter were not required to be reported when they were accompanying
their respective ministers.
10In addition to meetings, the departments are required to report the details of ministers’ overseas
travel, gifts and hospitality. However, this data is far smaller than information about meetings and,
arguably, less informative. With the vast majority of meetings taking place in London, trips are relatively
rare and, often coincide with diplomatic missions abroad. Gifts and hospitality might contain information
about extra efforts that interest groups make to persuade policymakers’ of their position. But given
that both parties know ex ante that this information will become public, they are very likely to avoid
any transactions that might compromise them, leaving only ceremonial gifts that are retained by the
department.
11See, however, Dommett et al. (2017) for a descriptive analysis of the data covering coalition years
from 2010 to 2015
12“The great stink,” The Economist, March 25, 2010
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a dedicated open data repository13 received considerably more public attention. While
establishing the precise rationale for making this data publicly available is beyond the
scope of the present study14, it is important to consider the incentives of policymakers.
The requirement to disclose meetings with external organizations forms part of the Min-
isterial Code15, which sets out guidelines and standards for government ministers (Blick,
2014). While no sanctions are specified for breaking the ‘rules’, given public nature of the
document and scrutiny by the opposition and media, re-election concerns are likely to be
the primary force driving compliance with the code. This lack of explicit enforcement of
a new regulation, however, led to uneven and protracted adoption by the departments.
The quality of the data released by the government departments gradually improved
and reports started to be published more systematically (once per quarter) and in proper
machine-readable format (CSV or well-formed Excel file16). Overall, it can be said that by
2013-2014 the reporting standards were sufficiently standardized and largely followed17.
In addition to transparency reports, I use data provided by Bureau van Dijk on more
than 10,000,000 organizations registered in the UK18. This dataset includes both private
and public companies, as well as non-profit organizations. The linking of transparency
data to information on interest groups allows to create a uniquely rich dataset for studying
the level of government access and different mechanisms that can increase or decrease the
chances of attaining it. All linked organizations were further manually labelled by the
author whether they are regular private companies or charities or represent a multitude
13In fact the website in question, https://data.gov.uk/ contains only a fraction of the data files used
in this investigation, while the main https://www.gov.uk/government/publications, from which the data
was obtained, stores the full universe of department transparency reports.
14It could be a result of the electoral uncertainty - while winning a plurality of seats in the Parliament,
Conservatives still required the support of Liberal Democrats to form a government. Thus, it would be in
the interests of the incumbent to pass relevant legislation, such that in case of a future loss, transparency
data could be exploited for criticizing the new incumbent and fighting the following electoral campaign. It
is also plausible that they, simply, perceived the preference for greater transparency to be shared by large
parts of the electorate. See Berliner (2014) for more detailed discussion of the adoption of transparency
regulations.
15Further details of the provisions specified in the Ministerial Code are available in Appendix B.
16For earlier years is is not uncommon to find reports in PDF or even DOC format.
17See Appendix D for descriptive statistics across years and departments.
18In the present analysis I restrict the entire available dataset of 300,000,000 organizations across the
world to those legally registered in Britain for both conceptual and computation reasons.
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of interests by functioning as umbrella organizations. An examples of those would include
trade associations, chambers of commerce and multi-academy trusts.
In this study I exploit the unexpected results of the EU membership referendum
(Brexit in common parlance) as a sudden exogenous policy shock, that could have a dra-
matic impact on the types of interests that get access to government ministers during the
crucial two-years phase of negotiating withdrawal agreement. While a definitive identifi-
cation of the effects of Brexit on access attainment is impossible due to composite nature
of shock and the lack of well-defined control group, I approximate it by comparing the
association between different mechanisms and the level of access before and after the EU
referendum.
In what follows I provide a brief overview of the EU referendum in the UK and the
theoretical expectations about the effects it might had on the level of access acquired
by more or less economically powerful interest groups. Next, I show the changes that
the referendum made in the policy agenda of government-interest discussions by looking
at the changes in keywords usage and using a variant of dynamic topic model to model
the overall evolution of government-interest agenda over time. After that I outline the
modelling strategy for measuring economic importance of different groups over time. And,
finally, I present the results of the main analysis of access mechanisms, comparing the
relationship between different mechanisms and the level of access achieved before and
after the referendum.
2.6 EU Referendum and Time Constraints
In June 2016 voters in the United Kingdom took part in the referendum on membership
in the EU. With 51.9 % of them voting for the Leave option , the government started the
process of withdrawing from the European common market. While there is an ongoing
debate about the reasons for this outcome (Hobolt, 2016; Clarke et al., 2017; Colantone
and Stanig, 2018; Carreras et al., 2019), it is important to note that the referendum
57
result, although a clear possibility according to some polls19, took most members of the
government, public and organized interest by complete surprise. Very few, if any, at
that time took any measures to alleviate the potential economic damage caused by the
sudden and dramatic change in political governance, tariff policy and labour market.
Furthermore, despite the referendum being legally non-binding, the government decided
and publicly announced that it will not renege on the ‘will of the people’ and deliver
Brexit, whatever the costs might be for economic actors. In March 2017, it invoked article
50 of the Treaty of the Union and started a two-year countdown process to the actual
withdrawal20. All of these points to a situation, in which business interests were faced
with high uncertainty about the future that was further exacerbated by time constraints
imposed by the triggering of the article 50. Under these circumstances, we would expect
an increase in the demand for access, while the supply side, namely, policymakers’ time,
is even more limited than usually.
The collected transparency reports permit a rough test of this supposition by including
a stated goal of the meeting between interest groups and government officials. Indeed, as
the lower panels of figure 2.3 show, there was a sharp rise in the proportion of words ‘eu’
and ‘brexit’ used to describe the purpose of meeting with the government officials. It is
worth noting that these two words start from different baselines. While the term ‘brexit’
is, essentially, absent prior to some time earlier in 2016, the discussions regarding ‘eu’
were always part of government’s agenda. This, however, jumps to over 4 % of all words
some time in late 2016. The two additional terms, ‘discussion’ and ‘banking’, are plotted
as a reference. As the former is used throughout the period under analysis to describe
a general or introductory meeting its usage is nearly constant across time. On the other
hand, the discussion of banking regulations featured in the aftermath of the financial
crisis of 2008, but tails off over time.
When time is in short-supply, one would expect political actors to be more selective
19E.g. https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2016/06/28/online-polls-were-right
20The date for triggering article 50 surfaced in October 2016, which could be another important signal
to organized interests that time is in short supply. More detailed timeline of the UK’s withdrawal from
the EU can be found in Evans and Menon (2017)
58
Figure 2.3: Purpose of Meetings. The monthly share of the words discussion, banking,
brexit and eu in the reported purpose of meeting with a loess smoothed line.
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about whom do they grant access to. Whatever the mechanisms driving preferential
treatment of some interests over other, they are likely to become more pronounced during
the period of extreme uncertainty. In other words, a reasonable expectation would be that
only a selected few interest groups get audition. However, it is important to note another
side of the Brexit crisis, which is the popular nature of the vote that set off this chain
of events. This and great level of public scrutiny (considerably higher than for any other
policy issue , that accompanied the process of negotiating new terms with the EU make
the usual expectation that large business interests will prevail far from given. In what
follows, I use this unique case of increased demand for access under the conditions of
reduced supply, accompanied by high level of pressure exerted by the voters, to test
empirically the mechanisms and biases in acquiring access in pluralist systems.
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2.7 Measurement of Issue Salience
The imposition of strict time constraints on policy-making process when the status quo
is not a viable option creates a lot of uncertainty for all interests affected by the change.
First, it increases the number of affected parties. Under standard conditions when a new
bill is introduced into parliament, groups that are content with the status quo only need
to engage in the consultation process to the extent to which they believe a draft bill has
chances of replacing the current status quo. However, when the status quo is not among
potential options, this should mobilize all groups no matter where their preferences lie.
Second, the level of uncertainty depends on how narrow the potential changes could
be. Broader changes to multiple policy areas imply higher current and future costs of
planning and implementation. Facing such costs coupled with ambiguous payoffs, groups
are likely to respond by investing resources into discerning any credible signal about the
future from the policymakers. Both of those aspects are characteristic of the bargaining
process between Britain and the EU in the aftermath of the referendum. The status quo,
remaining a member of the single market, was ruled out by the government from the
very beginning of negotiations. Furthermore, it is hard to conceive a more sweeping set of
reforms that would simultaneously affect tariffs and labour market than exiting the EU.
These two points should provide theoretical underpinning for the expected increase in
the demand for access on the side of interest groups. As even in the best case scenarios we
can only observe groups that acquire access rather than the entire universe of those that
seek it, it is typically impossible to measure demand empirically. However, for changes
of such magnitude it might be feasible to derive observable implications from the data.
One such indirect test could be done by looking at the shifts in the focus of discussion
by the interest groups that acquire access. Re-balancing the focus from a more niche
policy area (e.g. environment) to the one that substantively affects a larger population of
organized interest could indicate an increase in competition among different organizations.
A tentative indication of that can be seen in the Figure 2.3 above. However, the question
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remains about how one policy area fares against others. For that we would need to model
jointly the salience of various policy issues indicated in the reported purposes of meetings
as well as their co-evolution over time.
Until recently the most widely used approach to modelling the salience of policy issues
over time is manual coding of multiple data sources, such as adopted by the Comparative
Agendas Project (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; Baumgartner et al., 2019), the largest
and most well-known cross-country collaboration of its kind. While human coding has
its merits, such as fine-grained categorization and nuanced understanding of context
by the coders, similar cross-time cross-country projects, such as Comparative Manifesto
Project (Budge et al., 1987; Volkens et al., 2013), designed to capture shifting party policy
positions over time has been shown to suffer from major methodological drawbacks,
such as lack of uncertainty estimates (Benoit et al., 2009) and unreliability of many
theoretically informed categories (Mikhaylov et al., 2012). In light of this critique, here
I adopt an alternative approach to modelling policy agenda over time, the one based on
unsupervised learning from text (Grimmer and Stewart, 2013). More specifically, I use
a variant of dynamic topic modelling (Blei and Lafferty, 2006b) to capture cross-time
variation in declared policy interests. While here this method is applied to the case of
Britain, it is easily extendable to other national contexts21.
Topic models in their original form proposed by Blei et al. (2003) are Bayesian hi-
erarchical mixed-membership models, where each document in a corpus is given prior
Dirichlet distribution over a fixed number of topics and each word in a document is
drawn from multinomial distribution conditioned on a randomly chosen topic. The ap-
peal of this method is the possibility to model documents as a mixture of different topics
as opposed to ascribing each of them to a single class (Quinn et al., 2010). Another
advantage of unsupervised methods, to which topic models belong, is learning from the
data without the need to pre-specify the policy areas and label individual documents as
21See Greene and Cross (2017) for the recent application of dynamic topic models for exploring the
policy agenda of the European Parliament.
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containing a subset of them22. One of the disadvantages of the original implementation of
topic models, Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA), was both cross-sectional and temporal
independence of topics. These shortcomings of the original model were later addressed
in Blei and Lafferty (2006a) and Blei and Lafferty (2006b), respectively. As the primary
concern of policy agenda literature and the main observable implication of changes in de-
mand for access are shifts in issue salience over time, dynamic topic models are a natural
choice of modelling strategy.
The key downside of the original Dirichlet prior over topic proportions is indepen-
dence of individual components of the resultant vector from each other. This severely
constrains our ability to model any endogenous dependency structure that might appear
more appropriate for the problem at hand. To address this limitation, I follow Blei and
Lafferty (2006b) and replace Dirichlet prior with sequentially chained normal distribu-
tions. To recap the original formulation, let D be a collection of documents {d1, ..., dM},
each of them being a mixture of K different topics. Every document contains Wdi words,
drawn from a common vocabulary V . Thus, each observation is a word {w1, ..., wN} that
is conditioned on the topic z and word probabilities βij = P (wj = wv|zi = zk). Topic z
here has the following prior structure:
zN ∼ Multinomial(θ)
θ ∼ Dir(α)
where α is a pre-specified concentration parameter of the Dirichlet distribution. In-
stead of using Dirichlet, in the dynamic topic model this prior structure is replaced by a
simple state space model:
22Further details on the differences between supervised and unsupervised models are available in Hastie
et al. (2009).
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θ ∼ Multinomial(α)
α ∼ Multinomial(ηt)
ηt ∼ N(ηt−1, σ2I)
where ηt is a topic proportion parameter at period t is conditioned on the equivalent
parameter at t − 123. In contrast to the model proposed by Blei and Lafferty (2006b), I
assume word probabilities βz to be fixed across time. In other words, while permitting
topics to evolve over time, the composition of topics remains constant. This assumption
is adopted for substantive reasons as well as with computational considerations in mind.
Given the relatively short time span of the observed data (2010-2017), it is highly likely
that the lexicon used to describe different policy areas remained constant. At the same
time, chaining β parameters requires the computation of covariance matrix of V × V
size, which becomes prohibitively large even for middle-size vocabularies. In addition
to that manual inspection and qualitative assessment of the estimated topics becomes
problematic when word probabilities change over time.
As the individual descriptions of meetings are very short (typically, not more than
a single sentence) they have to be aggregated to make the estimation of topic model
feasible. Monthly aggregation was chosen to balance the trade-off between granularity
of observed changes and the amount of data needed for model fitting. In other words, a
composite string containing purposes of all meetings in a given month, is taken here a
single document for modelling purposes. After some experimentation, the model with 10
topics was selected to describe the evolution of policy issues in Britain between 2010 and
2018. Figure 2.4 shows how salience of different policy areas changed over this period.
Table 2.1 further lists the 10 words with the highest probability of being generated by a
given topic.
23The state of η at time period 1 is modelled by taking a random draw from a normal distribution:
η1 ∼ N(0, 5)
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Figure 2.4: Evolution of policy issues over time. Modelled by fitting dynamic topic
model to the reported purposes of meetings between interest groups and government
aggregated by month.
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Much of the discussion with interest groups throughout this time is dominated by the
general industrial policy (‘Topic 2’), which is characterized by such words as ‘general’,
‘business’ and ‘meeting’. It is noteworthy that the proportion of the agenda dedicated to
the general business meetings visibly declines from around half to about 40% by the end of
the observed period. Another noticeable change is the proportional rise of the topics that
are related to Brexit (‘Topic 4’ and ‘Topic 10’). Each of them reaches 4% and 5% of the
overall agenda by the end of 201724. Other words within those topics (‘teacher’, ‘steel’,
‘academies’) indicate that, apart from a general upward trend, Brexit also encroaches
upon a diverse set of policy issues.
Although circumstantial, the resurgence of Brexit-related topics in the agenda of
government-interest discussions and its interplay with other policy areas points to the
24While both of those topics feature prominently at the beginning of the perioc, around 2010, this
can be attributed to the new coalition government of Conservatives and Liberal Democrats and the
manifesto promise of the former to re-negotiate the UK’s relationships with Europe, which resulted in
the referendum six years later.
64
Table 2.1: Top 10 words in each policy area. Estimates are derived by fitting dynamic
topic model to the reported purposes of meetings between interest groups and government.
Education (1) General (2) Coalition Summits (3) Brexit I (4) Geopolitics (5) Northern Powerhouse I (6) Military (7) Charities (8) Northern Powerhouse II (9) Brexit II (10)
exiting policy mesothelioma exiting antimicrobial powerhouse antimicrobial campaigning powerhouse exiting
brexit for ï dit wwi antimicrobial resistance esp steel brexit
powerhouse introductory table brexit mr resistance your awe charter exit
steel update unemployment termly premium official ebola deals relevant reading
charter business 1/2 exit transatlantic steel awe wwi northern regime
teacher meeting g8 do airport charter attendance friends benefit contribution
northern discussion localism victims de teacher army streets localism phonics
across general dairy apprentices pupil northern command animal children’s renegotiation
children’s issues waste supported 1/2 children’s get general devolution initial
devolution discuss big sponsorship army devolution academies discuss big academies
expansion of the population of interest groups that could be affected by the looming
policy changes.
2.8 Measurement of Economic Importance
In the absence of direct financial transactions between interest groups and policymakers,
economic importance could be a primary mechanism that explains advantageous position
of large corporations. Measuring this importance that different companies have in the
politicians’ eyes is not straightforward. Some of it can be captured by usual economic
indicators, such as assets and number of employees, but it seems rather improbable that
elected officials always consult those numbers before inviting relevant stakeholders or
granting access to those who made an inquiry. What the politicians are more likely to
have in mind is some noisy aggregate picture of how important a particular organization
might be. As most organizations exist for some period of time, prior economic history
might also play a role in determining their current perception. In principle, we are inter-
ested in measuring a subjective component of economic importance. Or, in other words,
how different objective economic indicators might be weighted by politicians when making
a decision about access. However, this measurement problem currently presents a chal-
lenge that is hard to directly address empirically. Instead, I model economic importance
as a latent variable with time-dependency structure. While this model does not explic-
itly include data that would allow to capture subjectivity directly, through aggregating
multiple economic indicators and incorporating temporal change, it should sufficiently
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approximate the types of information that politicians might take into account.
In order to measure economic importance of interest groups I build a dynamic factor
model that uses time series of objective economic indicators, while also incorporating
lagged latent component25. More formally, each interest group i at time point t is said to
have economic importance λit, which is a function of its economic importance at t− 1:
λit = θ + γλi,t−1 + υit (2.1)
Here, θ is the mean of economic importance of all groups across all years and γ is the auto-
regressive coefficient, which is assumed to be constant across time. Intuitively, this first-
order auto-regressive part on latent factor means that companies with exactly the same
performance figures in one year can have different importance based on their indicators
for the previous year. In other words, subjectively politicians give weight not only to
the current situation, but also to their recollections of past status of the company. It is
possible that former industrial titans still carry a lot of importance in the politicians’
eyes, while newly emerging technological start-ups are overlooked despite parity in the
economic indicators. By assuming γ to be constant across time, this ‘persistency effect’
is taken to have universal effect for each year-to-year transition.
One important caveat of this dynamic model is that initial observations has to be
modelled separately, as no data is available for preceding time points26. To approximate
the first latent state I follow Heckman (1978) and Stegmueller (2013) and model λi1 as:
λi1 = ψξi + υi1 (2.2)
Here initial observations are shaped by unobserved organization-specific characteristics
25The proposed model is similar in spirit to the approach adopted previously by Martin and Quinn
(2002); Stegmueller (2013) and Fariss (2014).
26Although the data for previous years is not incorporated in the model, one cannot simply assume
that organizations did not exist before certain universal moment in time. In fact for this model I am
using data for 2009-2018 to model the parameters for 2010-2017. However, adding extra time periods
simply shifts the problem to an earlier point and, potentially, attenuates the assumptions, but does not
resolve it.
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ξi with a scale parameter ψ.
All parameters in equations 2.1 and 2.2 are unobserved. To estimate the parameters in
the structural part of the model, I use the observed economic measures: assets, employees
and revenue, that are linked to the latent economic importance through the following
equation:
yijt = α + βjλit + j (2.3)
Where y is the logarithm of the indicator j for company i in year t27. Each indicator is
assumed to have unique loading βj on the latent factor λit28. To estimate the specified
model I use MCMC No-U-Turn sampling that was implemented in Stan (Carpenter et al.,
2017)29. Table 2.2 shows the regular and umbrella organizations that had most meetings
with the government between 2010 and 2018 and their respective economic importance
parameters averaged over this period. As these estimates were produced using registra-
tion data from UK, for some of the multinational groups (e.g. EDF Energy) economic
importance might appear underestimated. However, this reflects the fact that its UK sub-
sidiary is smaller, according to the indicators used, than for some other corporations (e.g.
KPMG). Amongst the umbrella organizations with most meetings we can find traditional
actors, such as Universities UK, representing the interests of higher education and the
British Medical Association, which unites doctors, other medical professionals and orga-
nizations within the National Health Service. It is worth noting that all umbrella groups
fall behind corporate entities in terms of their estimated economic importance. By and in
themselves they rarely employ a comparable number of people or hold significant assets,
as opposed to their constituent organizations, whose interests they assumed to represent.
Estimated economic importance parameters (λˆit) can now be used as an explanatory
variable for modelling level of access acquired by each of the organizations. Another
27Taking the logarithm of the indicators converts otherwise heavily right-tailed distributions of the
number of employees, assets and revenue to a one closer to normal. This adjustment substantially im-
proves the fit of the latent factor analysis model.
28For identification purposes the variances of the stochastic errors j ∼ N(0, σ2 ) and υit ∼ N(0, σ2υ)
are fixed: σ2 = σ2υ = 1. Furthermore, errors are assumed to be independent: Cov(υis, υit) = t∀s 6= t
29I run 10,000 iterations and discard the first 5,000 before estimating the parameters. Convergence
diagnostics are available in Appendix F.
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Table 2.2: Economic Importance.
(a) Individual Organizations
Organization Incorporation N Meetings Importance
bae systems 31 December 1979 428 58.00
bt 2 February 1988 291 47.86
kpmg 22 February 2002 250 52.66
network rail 22 March 2002 232 57.55
bp NA 183 62.01
centrica NA 179 57.83
tesco NA 169 60.85
vodafone 7 January 1980 138 55.25
lloyds banking group 11 January 1995 125 61.48
edf energy 1 April 1989 118 53.44
(b) Umbrella organizations
Organization Incorporation N Meetings Importance
universities uk 29 June 1990 189 40.83
which? 13 December 1960 144 44.15
national housing federation 22 June 1935 113 41.96
business in community 2 March 1982 101 42.67
eef 28 September 2006 88 44.37
cancer research uk 20 November 2001 74 50.07
thecityuk 26 November 2009 68 38.13
british medical association 21 October 1874 58 46.71
country land and business association 28 February 2007 57 41.27
scotch whisky association 22 April 1960 57 38.63
Note: Top 10 organizations by the number of meetings and their estimated average economic importance
over 2010-2018.
consequence of including the temporal lag in the model is smoothening of any abrupt
changes in the indicators of economic performance. In the Appendix I further show the
individual trajectories of economic importance over time to check for any changes in the
overall dispersion of estimated parameters over time.
2.9 Results
To measure the level of access enjoyed by interest groups if varying economic importance
and how it changes before and after the vote I take subsets of the full data with the
month of the referendum in the middle and one or two years window on each side30. First,
I compare the effects of hypothesized mechanisms on the level of access to government
before and after the EU referendum. The level of access is measured here as the number
of meetings each interest group gets during this period. Apart from the referendum itself
in June 2016, another potential break point could be the triggering of article 50 in March
201731. More formally, here I estimate the following quantities:
30In addition to that I test the break point with a placebo referendum date by shifting it two years
and testing the same model on this subset of the data.
31There are, however, a couple of considerations that suggest otherwise. First, given the then potential
level of policy uncertainty, it is reasonable to expect that interest groups’ demand for access increased
immediately after the referendum results were announced. Second, as Figure 2.3 indicates the first spike
in the mentions of EU-related terms in the description of meetings’ purposes happens around the time
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Meetingsi = exp(δ1I{Post−Referendum}+ (
∑J
j=1 δ2jmij + δ3jmijI{Post−Referendum}) + (
∑K
k=1 ηkxki) + )
(2.4)
Or the number of meetings the group i had before and after EU referendum took place
in June 2016 with mij characterizing mechanism j and xki capturing other organization-
level covariates. While δ1 is not of direct interest here, it represents any potential increase
in the overall number of meetings for the post-referendum period. Coefficients δ2j capture
a more interesting dynamic, as they show the relationship between different hypothesized
mechanisms and the level of access, while δ3j indicate how this relationship was shaped
by time constraints resulting from the abrupt decision to leave the European common
market. The exponentiation part is present here as the outcome of interest is the count
of meetings, which is modelled with Poisson regression.
Table 2.2 shows the estimates of this model. To capture the potential historical links
that interest groups might have with the government, I use the number of years that
passed between group’s incorporation and having a meeting to create what is labelled
as ‘age’. While it is likely that the specific nature of long-running ties between certain
group and the government depends on the incumbent, with Conservatives favouring busi-
ness associations and Labour tilting towards trade unions, the lack of variation in the
party controlling the government during the analyzed period, prevents from testing it
empirically32.
In this specification age and importance are averaged over years before and after the
referendum, in which each group had meetings. In other words, if a group had meet-
ings with the government in 2014 and 2015 (before the referendum took place) and in
September 2016 and some time in 2017 (after), its economic importance and age before
the cutoff is estimated as the mean of economic importance and years of existence in
of the referendum.
32Although in 2015 there was a shift from a coalition of Conservatives and Liberal Democrats to
Conservative government, this change was idiosyncratic for post-war era in British politics.
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2014 and 2015. Equivalently, for the post-referendum period the average of importance
and age is calculated for 2016 and 2017. To ensure comparability I estimate the model
on the restricted subset, with only meetings happening in the year or two years before
and after the referendum included.
The results of estimating this model on two subset of the data are presented in Table
2.3. There are no significant changes in the overall number of meetings for the shorter
one-year window, however, looking at a longer time span of two years we find that in the
post-Referendum period the same organization can be expected to have 36% (δˆ1 = 1.311,
model 6) more meetings, holding other organization characteristics constant. While that
politicians’ time is inherently limited and cannot be dramatically increased irrespective of
circumstances, when deciding between activities it is plausible that gathering additional
information on the potential effects of withdrawal was among their priorities, which led
to an increase in the number of meeting they held with organized interest. The age
variable appears to have minimal effect on the level of access across all specifications.
At the same time economic importance is consistently positive and statistically signif-
icant. Furthermore, the interaction term between the post-referendum coefficient and
economic importance is negative (and also statistically significant for longer time win-
dow), indicating that an organization of similar economic importance can be expected
to have 1% (δˆ3_importance = −0.0076, model 6) fewer meetings in the aftermath of the
referendum than before it. I also find that umbrella organization, representing multiple
interests have substantially more meetings. On average they can be expected to have
75% more meeting before the referendum (δˆ2_umbrella = 0.5545) and 90% more after
(δˆ2_umbrella + δˆ3_umbrella = 0.64).
In Figure 2.5 I also show the expected number of meetings before and after the
referendum given organization’s economic importance. The marginal estimates are based
on model 6 from the Table 2.333.
33Further robustness tests using placebo Brexit date can be found in the Appendix.
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Table 2.3: Models of the level of access.
Meetings (12 months pre/post) Meetings (24 months pre/post)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0.0056 -0.0593 0.0307 0.0367* 0.3044* 0.3111*Post-Referendum (0.023) (0.1742) (0.1742) (0.0169) (0.1276) (0.1275)
0.0585*** 0.0589*** 0.0578*** 0.0758*** 0.0799*** 0.0772***Economic Importance (0.0019) (0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0014) (0.0019) (0.002)
7e-04* -3e-04 6e-04 7e-04** -3e-04 5e-04Age (3e-04) (5e-04) (5e-04) (2e-04) (4e-04) (4e-04)
0.4976*** 0.4651*** 0.4199*** 0.6355*** 0.5836*** 0.5545***Umbrella (0.0284) (0.0398) (0.0411) (0.0207) (0.0302) (0.0314)
-3e-04 -0.002 -0.0079** -0.0076**Post-Referendum * Importance (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0028) (0.0028)
0.0019** 0.0019** 0.002*** 0.0016**Post-Referendum * Age (7e-04) (7e-04) (5e-04) (5e-04)
0.0662 0.0364 0.0959* 0.0874*Post-Referendum * Umbrella (0.0568) (0.0578) (0.0415) (0.0423)
Sector
-0.5661*** -0.5457*** -0.7934*** -1.0833*** -1.222*** -1.2763***Constant (0.0869) (0.1159) (0.155) (0.064) (0.0885) (0.1104)
Observations 894 894 870 1266 1266 1236
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
Note: Access is measured by the number of meetings that took place between any government minister and a given interest group. Poisson link is used to
model the dependent variable.
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Figure 2.5: Predicted number of meetings. Economic importance secures fewer meet-
ings in the aftermath of the EU referendum.
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Note: Estimates are based on Poisson GLM model. Ticks along the x-axis show the observed values in
the data.
The results demonstrate that in accordance with the theoretical expectations, eco-
nomic is a positive and significant predictors of the number of meetings between interest
groups and the government. A more surprising finding is that after the referendum this
association becomes weaker. At the same time there is no indication that age plays a
significant role in getting extra time with policy-makers or that Brexit affected the link
between organizational history and an associated level of access.
2.10 Discussion
As the results above indicate the direct association between economic importance and
long history is in line with theoretical expectations. However, the effect of Brexit and
concomitant time constraints is not immediately clear. Why did the relevance of or-
ganizations’ economic importance for securing access to the government decline in the
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aftermath of the referendum? While a well-grounded answer to this question will require
further investigation, it is possible to outline a few possible explanations. First, it is worth
noting that this empirical result is largely in line with the perception of business circles
as well as journalistic accounts of the negotiation process that emphasized that many
business interests were ignored and need to be vigorously defended34. Second, it is worth
highlighting another aspect of the Brexit process - high salience of the issue and, there-
fore, high visibility of much of the process. This distinguishes the process from any typical
bargaining over policy changes that interest groups usually engage in. As many of these
discussions can be highly technical in nature, usually they attract far less public scrutiny
than a sweeping set of changes that the departure from the EU common market would
necessitate. This finding also speaks to ‘scope of conflict’, proposed by Schattschneider
(1960). In this view business interests are more likely to prevail if the scope is narrow and
the visibility of the case is limited. As the exact opposite is true of the debate surround-
ing Britain’s relationships with the EU, it is, perhaps, less surprising that less important
groups, but who could be assumed to represent public preferences get more preferential
treatment and higher level of access to the government. Third, a, perhaps, less norma-
tively appealing explanation for this finding could be that the government in negotiating
the withdrawal agreement with the EU had to rely on the input from a number of con-
sultancies, which tend to be smaller on average than manufacturing and retail firms or
non-profit organizations or umbrella associations.
2.11 Conclusions
In this paper I propose and test mechanisms that drive differential access to policy-makers
in pluralist systems. In particular I focus on economic importance of organizations as an
explanatory variable that substitutes signalling through campaign contributions in those
pluralist systems which set limits on electoral spending by parties or individual can-
34“When the gloves come off,” The Economist, June 24, 2017.
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didates. In empirical analysis I illustrate this theoretical proposition with the case of
Britain. Using transparency reports I show that higher economic importance is associ-
ated with securing higher level of access. Umbrella groups that represent the interests of
multiple organizations are also more likely to have more meetings with the government.
However, a sudden shock of increased policy uncertainty in the aftermath of the EU ref-
erendum, weakens the association between economic importance and level of access. In
other words, organizations with less economic importance appear to get more access after
the referendum than prior to it. This finding can be a result of a high public scrutiny of
the negotiation process. In addition to theoretical contributions, I make several method-
ological advancements. First, I compile a novel dataset that allows to empirically test
government-interest relations with unprecedented precision. Second, I propose a new ap-
proach to modelling issues salience using recorded textual data. And, third, I apply a
latent variable modelling strategy to estimate economic importance at the level of indi-
vidual organizations. These findings advance our understanding of interest group access
in pluralist systems and can be relevant for many other national contexts beyond Britain.
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Appendix
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A Money in the UK Politics
Campaign Spending
In Figure 2 of the main text I show graphically the relationship between the marginality
of electoral loss or victory and the level of campaign spending. To investigate this rela-
tionship further and also focus on the most competitive candidates, I model the level of
spending limits reached by winning candidates as a function of the margin of their vic-
tory. For this I use the same data covering the UK General Elections from 2005 to 2017
as in the main text. The results in Table A.1 show a sizable effect of marginality even
when controlling for candidate’s party and different characteristics of the constituency.
For example, a candidate, who received 10% higher vote share than a runner-up can be
expected to have reached 5% less of the campaign spending threshold, holding every-
thing else constant. In other words, winning candidates running in very safe areas can be
expected to spend well below their permissible threshold.
Patterns of Donations
To investigate the effect of reduced incentives to engage in fund-raising reflected on the
patterns of donations, I analyse the donations data released by the UK Electoral Commis-
sion35. As political candidates are less invested in raising campaign funds, fewer interest
groups are likely to donate and their donations can be expected to be smaller. Figure A.1
shows the monthly trends in the number of donors and amount of donations to sitting
MPs from 2001 until 2017. Despite a few noticeable spikes, especially for Labour in the
run-up to the 2015 General Election, the trend remains almost flat over the entire period.
Notably, no more than 80 unique donors are recorded within any given month, with a
typical number well below 20 even for the two main parties.
35https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/
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Table A.1: OLS models of spending limit by winning candidates in 2005-2017 UK PGE.
Percentage of spending limit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
-0.5329*** -0.5491*** -0.5307*** -0.5049***Margin of victory (%) (0.0283) (0.0279) (0.0279) (0.0282)
0.2633*** 0.2468*** 0.27***Size of electorate (,000) (0.0424) (0.0432) (0.0463)
Constituency (ref: Borough)
-7.9484*** -1.0894 -2.9966Burgh (2.3583) (2.4876) (2.8268)
-5.0336*** -5.8272*** -6.4495***County (0.807) (0.864) (0.9181)
Party (ref: Conservative)
-1.3927 14.2272DUP (3.3445) (15.1854)
15.0177 15.3858Green (11.2555) (11.1581)
-21.1488* -12.2592Independent (8.7224) (12.413)
-3.9337*** -4.9582***Labour (0.9138) (0.9531)
9.1599*** 7.3085***Liberal Democrats (1.7815) (1.8273)
10.098 15.8458Other (13.7787) (15.5568)
16.2439** 16.0072**Plaid Cymru (5.749) (5.8521)
3.7783 19.8952SDLP (6.5129) (16.1705)
2.8073 18.2418Sinn Féin (4.2881) (15.4148)
-17.1228*** -15.8917***SNP (2.1818) (2.7185)
20.7055* 20.0578*Speaker (9.7642) (9.6791)
14.5709 19.3599UKIP (19.4476) (19.2897)
-1.7577 16.5303UUP (11.2485) (18.5521)
Country (ref: England)
-15.9302Northern Ireland (14.8277)
1.3389Scotland (2.0653)
0.4155Wales (1.8389)
General Election (ref: 2005)
-2.3493*2010 (1.0828)
-7.6318***2015 (1.1319)
-2.4303*2017 (1.1188)
84.6243*** 69.5292*** 72.2761*** 73.9441***Constant (0.7258) (3.0658) (3.3111) (3.5039)
Observations 2582 2582 2582 2582
R2 0.12 0.15 0.19 0.21
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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Figure A.1: Donation patterns in the UK
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B Transparency Policy
As the exact transparency policy provisions might affect the quality and nature of col-
lected data, some further contextual information can improve our understanding of the
data. In particular, I present two primary sources: verbatim detailed instructions pro-
vided for department employees on how the transparency reports should be compiled,
which gives an insight into how these variables are formed. These instructions are quoted
below:
__Minister__
Include name and title of all ministers who have attended external meetings
including with Newspaper and other media proprietors, editors or senior executives.
NOTE:
1) Don’t create separate documents for individual ministers.
2) Do include ministers who have nothing to record (nil return).
__Date__
Record month and year. Use the format: April 2014
__Name of organisation or individual__
Include any group, company, organisation or person not from or connected to government.
Include all official, political or personal meetings with newspaper and other
media proprietors, editors and senior executives as follow:
Proprietors
Newspapers: Chair, owner
Broadcasters: Chairmen
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Editors
Newspapers: The editor
Broadcasters: Editors (including political editors), channel controllers,
directors of programming, radio controllers
Senior Executives
Newspapers: CEOs
Broadcasters: Director Generals, CEOs
Meetings with individuals from media organisations operating below this level
should be included but shown as the name of the organisation only.
Political and personal meetings at this level should not be included.
NOTE:
1) If meeting was with multiple organisations, list them separately or use a collective name.
2) Don’t include meetings held in a party or constituency capacity.
Contact Cabinet Office if you are unsure about whether to record a meeting.
__Purpose of meeting__
Briefly describe topic or objective of meeting. Do not use ’general discussion’.
In addition to clerical instructions, figure B.2 shows section 8.14 of the Ministe-
rial Code, which is specifically focussed on the meetings with external organisations.
The latest version of the Ministerial Code is available at https://assets.publishing.
service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/672633/
2018-01-08_MINISTERIAL_CODE_JANUARY_2018__FINAL___3_.pdf
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Figure B.2: Section 8.14 of the Ministerial Code
C Data Collection
The transparency reports used in the analysis were obtained using the official government
portal https://www.gov.uk/search/all? and its previous version https://www.gov.
uk/government/publications. The interface of the core search engine is shown in figure
C.3.
Figure C.3: Main page of the gov.UK search engine
A specially designed R package was used to systematically collect the data from the
earlier version of the government publications website.
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Figure D.4: Annual number of meetings by department
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D Descriptive statistics
Figure D.4 shows the annual number of meetings held separately by each government
agency.
E Dynamic Topic Model of Issue Salience
Figure E.5 shows traceplots of several document-level θ coefficients.
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Figure E.5: Convergence diagnostics of document parameters
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F Model of Economic Importance
Dynamic Factor Model
To diagnose the convergence of the dynamic factor model I use Gelman-Rubin R-hat
measure and traceplots of βj auto-regressive coefficients for three economic indicators:
assets, employees and revenue from the measurement model:
yijt = α + βjλit + j
I took the logarithms of all indicators prior to fitting the model to ensure the nor-
mal distribution of the left-hand side variables. To estimate the model I use standard
uniformative prior specification:
δ ∼ N(0, 10)
ξk ∼ N(0, 10)
θ ∼ N(0, 10)
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γ ∼ N(0, 10)
α ∼ N(0, 10)
βj ∼ N(0, 10)
Figure F.6 shows the model convergence diagnostics. Of the rougly 20,000 estimated
coefficients, the vast majority have low R-hats and the traceplots show moderately good
mixture.
Figure F.6: Model convergence diagnostics
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Traceplots of auto−regressive coefficients
The dynamic part of the latent economic importance ensures the smoothness in any
between-year transition. While most of the indicators can reasonably be assumed to
change only slightly, to check whether variation of the estimated parameters remains
constant over time, I plot the overall trajectories for the organizations included in the
analysis. As Figure F.7 indicates, despite some large cross-year changes for a small number
of organizations, between-organization variation remains constant over time.
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Figure F.7: Trajectories of economic importance
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Stan Code
The Stan code used for fitting dynamic factor analysis model to measure economic im-
portance is provided below:
data {
int<lower=0> NN; // number of non-missing observations,
int<lower=0> NM; // number of missing observations
int<lower=0> T; // length of time series
int<lower=0> J; // number of measures
int<lower=0> K; // number of latent trends/interest groups
int<lower=0, upper=T+1> tt[NN + NM]; // time period id
int<lower=0, upper=J> jj[NN + NM]; // measure id
int<lower=0, upper=K> kk[NN + NM]; // interest group id
int<lower=0, upper=NN + NM> nn[NN]; // index of non-missing observations
int<lower=0, upper=NN + NM> mm[NM]; // index of missing observations
real yn[NN]; //vectorized matrix of log-transformed observed values
}
transformed data {
int<lower=0> N = NN + NM;
}
parameters {
real lambda[K,T]; // matrix of latent economic importance
real beta[J]; // vector of factor loadings, constrained to be positive
real ym[NM]; // vector of missing observations
real alpha; // measurement intercept
real delta; // initial condition scale factor
real ksi[K]; // initial condition fixed effect
real theta; // latent intercept
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real gamma; // autoregressive coefficient
// real<lower=0> sigma_lambda; // variance of latent factor
// real<lower=0> sigma_y; // variance of measurement instrument
}
transformed parameters {
// combine observed and missing economic indicators
real y[N];
y[nn] = yn;
if (NM > 0) {
y[mm] = ym;
}
}
model {
for (n in 1:N) {
if (tt[n] > 1) {
lambda[kk[n],tt[n]] ~ normal(theta + gamma * lambda[kk[n],tt[n]-1], 1);
y[n] ~ normal(alpha + beta[jj[n]] * lambda[kk[n],tt[n]], 1);
} else {
// initial condition
lambda[kk[n],tt[n]] ~ normal(delta * ksi[kk[n]], 1);
// lambda[kk[n],tt[n]] ~ cauchy(0, 5);
}
}
// Priors on coefficients
delta ~ normal(0, 10);
for (k in 1:K) {
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ksi[k] ~ normal(0, 10);
}
theta ~ normal(0, 10);
gamma ~ normal(0, 10);
alpha ~ normal(0, 10);
for (j in 1:J) {
beta[j] ~ normal(0, 10);
}
// Hyper-priors for variance parameters
// sigma_lambda ~ cauchy(0,3);
// sigma_y ~ cauchy(0,3);
}
generated quantities {
// post-multiply latent factors and loadings to ensure positivity
real plambda[K,T];
real pbeta[J];
for (k in 1:K) {
for (t in 1:T) {
if (lambda[k,t] < 0) {
plambda[k,t] = -lambda[k,t];
} else {
plambda[k,t] = lambda[k,t];
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}}
}
for (j in 1:J) {
if (beta[j] < 0) {
pbeta[j] = -beta[j];
} else {
pbeta[j] = beta[j];
}
}
}
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G Full Models of Access
Table G.2 shows the complete Poisson models from the main text, including exhaustive
list of coefficients for individual sectors.
Table G.2: Poisson models of the number of interest group meetings.
Meetings (12 months pre/post) Meetings (24 months pre/post)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0.0056 -0.0593 0.0307 0.0367* 0.3044* 0.3111*Post-Referendum (0.023) (0.1742) (0.1742) (0.0169) (0.1276) (0.1275)
0.0585*** 0.0589*** 0.0578*** 0.0758*** 0.0799*** 0.0772***Economic Importance (0.0019) (0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0014) (0.0019) (0.002)
7e-04* -3e-04 6e-04 7e-04** -3e-04 5e-04Age (3e-04) (5e-04) (5e-04) (2e-04) (4e-04) (4e-04)
0.4976*** 0.4651*** 0.4199*** 0.6355*** 0.5836*** 0.5545***Umbrella (0.0284) (0.0398) (0.0411) (0.0207) (0.0302) (0.0314)
-3e-04 -0.002 -0.0079** -0.0076**Post-Referendum * Importance (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0028) (0.0028)
0.0019** 0.0019** 0.002*** 0.0016**Post-Referendum * Age (7e-04) (7e-04) (5e-04) (5e-04)
0.0662 0.0364 0.0959* 0.0874*Post-Referendum * Umbrella (0.0568) (0.0578) (0.0415) (0.0423)
Sector (ref: Banking)
-0.5*** -0.763***Chemicals (0.1342) (0.0978)
0.396*** 0.326***Construction (0.1123) (0.0783)
0.2251** 0.0235Education/Health (0.0864) (0.0581)
-0.814*** -1.0744***Food/Beverages/Tobacco (0.1898) (0.145)
0.1881 0.1772*Gas/Water/Electricity (0.1071) (0.0716)
-0.6677** -0.7207***Hotels/Restaurants (0.2315) (0.1356)
-0.7292 -1.1121Insurance (0.5826) (0.5797)
0.7289*** 0.5928***Machinery/Recycling (0.0863) (0.0583)
-0.5501* -0.7277***Metal (0.2193) (0.182)
0.3441*** 0.2389***Other services (0.0817) (0.0541)
0.913*** 0.8338***Post/Telecommunications (0.0954) (0.0653)
0.0722 -0.1502Primary sector (0.1705) (0.13)
-0.0722 -0.0175Public administration/Defense (0.1588) (0.1201)
0.8318*** 0.7159***Publishing (0.1122) (0.0783)
-0.1494 -0.6281Textiles (0.4154) (0.3371)
-0.0413 -0.0581Transport (0.0965) (0.0657)
-0.2841** -0.469***Wholesale/Retail trade (0.1094) (0.0763)
0.3251 -0.04Wood (0.2707) (0.2637)
-0.5661*** -0.5457*** -0.7934*** -1.0833*** -1.222*** -1.2763***Constant (0.0869) (0.1159) (0.155) (0.064) (0.0885) (0.1104)
Observations 894 894 870 1266 1266 1236
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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H Robustness checks
Placebo Referendum
Table H.3 shows the results of a placebo test, with June 2014 used as the Brexit date and
the data restricted to meetings that occured 12 months before and after the threshold.
Table H.3: Poisson models using placebo Brexit (June 2014) as a cutoff.
Meetings (12 months pre/post)
Poisson Negative Binomial
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
-0.0966*** -0.1636 -0.1126 -0.0899 -0.0469 0.0042Post-Referendum (0.0229) (0.169) (0.1681) (0.055) (0.3947) (0.3874)
0.0778*** 0.0767*** 0.0724*** 0.0653*** 0.0654*** 0.0609***Economic Importance (0.0018) (0.0024) (0.0026) (0.0046) (0.0062) (0.0064)
-0.0011** -4e-04 0 -3e-04 2e-04 4e-04Age (4e-04) (5e-04) (5e-04) (0.001) (0.0013) (0.0013)
0.5914*** 0.623*** 0.6145*** 0.4766*** 0.4867*** 0.447***Umbrella (0.0308) (0.0417) (0.0425) (0.0738) (0.1009) (0.1004)
0.0027 0.0013 -2e-04 -0.0018Post-Referendum * Importance (0.0037) (0.0036) (0.0092) (0.009)
-0.0015* -6e-04 -0.0012 -5e-04Post-Referendum * Age (7e-04) (7e-04) (0.0019) (0.0019)
-0.0686 -0.0943 -0.0218 -0.0369Post-Referendum * Umbrella (0.0618) (0.0624) (0.148) (0.1451)
Sector (ref: Banking)
-0.5739*** -0.5234Chemicals (0.152) (0.2935)
-0.0255 -0.0184Construction (0.1079) (0.2465)
0.1523* 0.0656Education/Health (0.0708) (0.1579)
-0.9048*** -0.9229**Food/Beverages/Tobacco (0.1842) (0.3328)
0.2455** 0.1882Gas/Water/Electricity (0.0818) (0.2029)
-0.7364*** -0.7174*Hotels/Restaurants (0.1601) (0.3082)
-0.326 -0.4496Insurance (0.2952) (0.5336)
0.7671*** 0.4261*Machinery/Recycling (0.0714) (0.1919)
-1.054*** -0.9794*Metal (0.296) (0.4888)
0.1229 0.0559Other services (0.0652) (0.1488)
0.7749*** 0.8699***Post/Telecommunications (0.0816) (0.2446)
-0.4828* -0.5868Primary sector (0.1936) (0.3382)
-0.3747* -0.4063Public administration/Defense (0.1721) (0.3244)
1.0323*** 0.723*Publishing (0.0973) (0.295)
-0.6824 -0.7798Textiles (0.4126) (0.6733)
0.22** 0.0482Transport (0.0801) (0.2004)
-0.5845*** -0.5913**Wholesale/Retail trade (0.1041) (0.2141)
-0.9825* -1.0443Wood (0.4128) (0.6736)
-1.3744*** -1.3491*** -1.3182*** -0.8283*** -0.8464** -0.7098*Constant (0.0839) (0.1105) (0.1371) (0.1968) (0.2629) (0.3146)
Observations 973 973 955 973 973 955
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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I Software statement
The computational part of the study was conducted under Linux Ubuntu 18.04 using
R version 3.6.0 (R Core Team 2019). I used the following R packages in my empirical
analysis:
dplyr (Wickham et al. 2018),
ggplot2 (Wickham 2016),
kableExtra (Zhu 2018),
knitr (Xie 2018),
lubridate (Grolemund and Wickham 2011),
magrittr (Bache and Wickham 2014),
readr (Wickham, Hester, and Francois 2017),
rstan (Stan Development Team 2018),
stringi (Gagolewski 2018),
stringr (Wickham 2018),
tibble (Müller and Wickham 2018),
tidyr (Wickham and Henry 2018), and
quanteda (Benoit et al. 2018).
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Chapter 3
Gender, Justice and Deliberation:
Women’s Presence without Influence in
Peace-making
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ABSTRACT
Scholars have pinpointed that women’s underrepresentation in peace-making results in
gendered outcomes that do not address women’s needs and interests. Despite recent
increased representation at the negotiating table, women still have a limited influence on
peace-making outcomes. We propose that differences in female and male speeches reflected
in the gendered patterns in discourse during peace-making explain how women’s influence
is curtailed. We examine women’s speaking behavior in transitional justice debates in the
post-conflict Balkans. Applying multi-method quantitative text analysis to over half a
million words in multiple languages, we analyze structural and thematic speech patterns.
We find that men’s domination of turn-taking and the absence of topics reflecting women’s
needs and interests lead to a gendered outcome; the sequences of men talking after men
are longer than those of women talking after women, which restricts women’s deliberative
space and opportunities to develop and sustain arguments that reflect their concerns. We
find no evidence that women’s limited influence is driven by lower deliberative quality of
their speeches. This study of gendered dynamics at the micro-level of discourse identifies
a novel dimension of male domination during peace-making.
3.1 Introduction
Peace is much more than the cessation of violence. Scrutiny of the quality of peace has
revealed that peace often fails women (Wallensteen, 2015, 45). The end of a conflict
provides an opportunity to lay the foundations for gender-just peace, which transforms
unequal gender relations providing for women’s political, social, and economic agency
(Björkdahl and Mannergren, 2013; Lake, 2018). However, post-conflict peace-making also
introduces norms, structures, and power relations that disadvantage women. Some of
these are an extension of gendered conflict dynamics, stemming from different experience
of violence by men and women (Melander, 2016); others entail a reversal of women’s
wartime gains in political and social agency (Berry, 2018; Tripp, 2015; Kreft, 2019; Østby
et al., 2019). An imperative to make peace work for women has motivated scholars and
practitioners to tackle gender inequality during peace-making. Women’s participation in
peace processes matters; it is associated with longer and better peace (Melander, 2005;
Gizelis, 2009; Demeritt et al., 2014; Krause et al., 2018). Transitional justice is integral to
peace (Sharp, 2013). Thus, peace that works for women advances women’s representation
and rights, including the right to justice for wartime sexual and gender-based violence
(SGBV) (Chinkin and Kaldor, 2013)1.
Women’s presence in peace efforts is critical for bringing about gender-just peace,
because women’s presence provides women “communicative advantages” (Mansbridge,
1999, 642). Women can insert their perspectives into the peace-making process, which
paves the way for recognition of their needs (Brown and Aoláin, 2015, 147). Criticism
of women’s marginalization in peace-making has resulted in international and national
efforts to include women in peace processes (Adjei, 2019). However, women’s increased
presence in these processes has had only a limited impact on their outcomes. Scholars
have shown how provisions of peace agreements and mandates of transitional justice
instruments overlook or marginalize women’s needs, interests and entitlements (Bell and
1A discussion of SGBV against men or SGBV perpetrated by women is beyond the scope of this
article (Schulz, 2020)
103
O’Rourke, 2010; Burnet, 2008; Haynes et al., 2011; Hogg, 2009; Sandole and Staroste,
2015; Borer, 2009). The failure to bring about gender-just peace in contexts where women
are represented in the peace-making process poses a significant puzzle (Castillo Diaz and
Tordjman, 2012; Paffenholz et al., 2016; UN Women, 2015).
We address this puzzle of women’s representation without influence by examining
the black-box between women’s representation indicated by ‘bodies at the table’ and
outcomes that reflect women’s concerns. It is important to understand women’s contri-
butions to debates during peace-making. A gendered pattern of speaking behavior, that
reveals differences in speech by men and women, has a “cumulative effect on power and
influence” (Kathlene, 1994, 573). We study how discourse in a transitional justice process
is gendered since recognition of women’s justice needs is part of “gender-sensitive and
gender-responsive” perspectives on peace (Davies and True, 2019; UN Women, 2015).
Gender is a political, social, and cultural construction, which should not be conflated
with the sex identity of women and men (Carver, 1996). The concept of gender makes
visible how behaviors, norms, and discourses associated with the female and male sexes
in institutional and informal process are implicated in the production and reproduction
of inequality and oppression (Sandole and Staroste, 2015, 119-120; Krook and Mackay,
2011; Cameron, 1998, 4). Our analysis identifies how gender-based differences in discourse
during peace-making account for a gendered outcome that does not reflect women’s needs,
entitlements and interests.
To explain the lack of women’s influence despite their broadly equal representation,
we propose and test three mechanisms operating in discourse during peace-making: de-
liberation, emboldending, and de-centering. The first mechanism concerns how women’s
quality of deliberation, focused on justification of arguments, compares with that of men’s.
It is premised on the feminist critique of democratic deliberation and institutions that
male domination is perpetuated by prescribed modes of communication (Sanders, 1997;
Mackay et al., 2010; Acker, 1990). Foregrounding the structure of discourse and focusing
on turn-taking sequences, the second mechanism probes whether women are emboldened
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to put forth their views in deliberative enclaves (Sunstein, 2007). It assumes that when
women speak after each other in succession in mixed-sex debates, a deliberative space
is created that is conducive to the articulation of their needs. De-centering is the third
mechanism. Considering that women often de-center, i.e. they avoid discussing directly
violence that they have suffered (Kashyap, 2009; Theidon, 2013; Porter, 2016), we ex-
plore whether thematic differences in speeches by men and women can explain a gendered
outcome that marginalizes women’s interests and concerns.
We find that, in conditions where women are broadly represented equally, gendered
outcomes that disadvantage women result from men’s domination of turn-taking and
the absence of topics reflecting women’s concerns and interests; in mixed-sex debates,
the sequences of men talking after men are longer than those of women talking after
women, which restricts women’s deliberative space and opportunities to develop and
sustain arguments that reflect their needs and entitlements. We find no evidence that
women’s limited influence is driven by lower deliberative quality of their speeches. This
research shows that a micro-level of discourse during peace-making is a domain of male
domination that has been overlooked by scholars and practitioners puzzled by the elusive
influence of women who are present at the peace-making table.
We use a case of a civil society-led transitional justice process in the post-conflict
Balkans, known by its acronym RECOM,2 to scrutinize gender differences in discourse.
From 2010 to 2011, the multi-ethnic initiative organized debates dedicated to designing
the mandate of the regional fact-finding commission, which had emerged as a preferred
transitional justice approach in previous rounds of consultations. These debates produced
the commission’s draft Statute3. Defining the commission’s mandate, the document failed
to respond to women’s concerns, needs and interests, exposing the gender dimension as
a weakness of the RECOM’s process (Bonora, 2019). The draft Statute did not provide
for women’s equal inclusion in different facets of the commission’s operation, nor did
2RECOM stands for the Regional Commission for Establishing the Facts about War Crimes and other
Serious Human Rights Violations in former Yugoslavia from January 1991 to the end of December 2001.
3See Statut Koalicije za Rekom, 29 June 2011 at http://recom.link/wp-content/uploads/2011/
06/Statut-Koalicije-za-REKOM-26.06.2011-SRB.pdf
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it envisage appropriate procedures to facilitate recognition of women victims of SGBV
(although SGBV was listed among abuses to be investigated). To advance gender jus-
tice, transitional justice instruments also need to include appropriate gender-responsive
procedures (Swaine, 2018, 231-232), for example for staging women’s testimonies about
their experience of violence. Why did seemingly vocal contributions of women present
in RECOM’s debates not lead to the commission’s mandate that responds to women’s
needs, concerns and interests? To answer this question, we interrogated whether the pat-
terns in discourse are gendered by applying quantitative content analysis, which involves
human coding and computer-assisted text analysis of a corpus of over half a million words
comprised of the transcripts of RECOM’s debates.
Our evidence drawn from the study of women’s speaking behavior that reveals how
women’s influence is curtailed in a mixed-sex deliberative setting advances research about
peace more broadly. First, it demonstrates theoretical benefits of the empirical study of
processes that can help ensure gender-just “quality peace” (Waylen, 2014; Wallensteen,
2015), which has lagged behind the study of peace-making outcomes, such as peace-
agreements, and their effects. Second, we sound a note of caution about crude measure-
ment of women’s participation in peace-making in the existing scholarship and practice
(Paffenholz et al., 2016); it captures women’s physical presence, describes their roles as
signatories or negotiators, and specifies whether they take up senior roles (UN Women,
2015, 45), but neglects more refined measures such as how often they take the floor, how
many arguments they make, and how long they speak relative to men. Third, we expose
the untapped potential of quantitative analysis of discourse for the study of peace, that
contributes to insights gained through qualitative study of discourse and its effects (Jen-
nings, 2019). Quantifying and understanding the gendered patterns of discourse during
peace-making can help us devise practical interventions that advance peace that works
for women.
In the next part of this article, we review scholarly debates about gendered peace
and justice, and outline a critique of existing approaches to women’s representation and
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limited influence in peace processes. We then present mechanisms in discourse that can
explain why women’s representation in peace-making does not translate into policies that
promote gender equality. The article proceeds with a presentation of data and research
design, followed by the results of the analysis of the gendered nature of discourse. The
conclusion reflects on the contribution of this study to scholarship and policy.
3.2 Gendered Peace and Justice: (Re-)AssessingWomen’s
Representation in Peace Processes
Inaugurating the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Agenda, the 2000 UN Security
Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 prompted critical rethinking by scholars and practi-
tioners about how to bring about gender-just peace (Kirby and Shepherd, 2016, 252).
Accounting for “gendered peace” (Pankhurst, 2008), scholars have pinpointed systematic
underrepresentation of women in peace processes, despite a slow but steady trend of their
greater inclusion following UNSCR 1325 (UN Women, 2015, 45). Only 9 percent of ne-
gotiators in 31 major peace processes between 1992 and 2011 were women (Castillo Diaz
and Tordjman, 2012). Unsurprisingly, the outcomes of those processes were gendered, in
that 16 percent of 585 major peace agreements in 102 peace processes from 1990 to 2010
had references to women and their concerns (Bell and O’Rourke, 2010; Ellerby, 2016).
Our understanding of women’s influence in processes that define mandates of transitional
justice instruments is even more limited, although their proceedings and effects, for ex-
ample those of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY),
are also gendered (Gallagher et al., 2020; King et al., 2017)4. Analyzing the absence of
women in peace processes and its consequences is important (McLeod, 2019), but we also
need to better understand the limited influence of (the increasing number of) women who
are present in these processes.
Looking beyond women’s proportional representation, scholars have queried the kind
4Women were underrepresented even in trials involving SGBV charges at the ICTY (Sharratt, 2011).
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of representation of women in peace processes. The inclusion of elite women in peace
processes who are linked to elite men or clan leaders has resulted in a “veneer of female
legitimacy” (Ní Aoláin, 2016) and underrepresentation of non-elite women’s concerns.
Others stress that women often remain silent during meetings, negotiations, and other
events in peace-making process (Ellerby, 2016; Krause et al., 2018). Structural constraints
provided an alternative explanation. Bell and O’Rourke (2010, 978) contend that incorpo-
rating women’s concerns would make it harder to reach an agreement or might destabilize
existing agreements in the context of power-sharing. Normative considerations also play a
role. Local men in many conflict and post-conflict settings oppose women’s emancipation
and gender equality, which are often perceived to be externally imposed (Anderlini, 2007;
Khodary, 2016).
The WPS Agenda has promoted institutionalization of gender equality norms in peace
processes (Adjei, 2019). However, peace-making that now includes more women still pro-
duces outcomes that do not adequately reflect women’s needs and concerns. The study of
gender-just peace can benefit from engaging with scholarship on political representation
and communication that examines the gap between women’s descriptive and substantial
representation. Descriptive representation refers to women’s presence in political pro-
cesses (e.g. national legislatures), while substantive representation captures their influ-
ence on policy (Pitkin, 1967). Mendelberg et al. (2014) observe that “even high descriptive
representation does not consistently erase [women’s] low substantive representation” in
deliberative settings. Women’s limited impact on policy outcomes is evident in both West-
ern and non-Western countries, such as Rwanda (Devlin and Elgie, 2008). At the same
time, women’s greater representation may cause a backlash. Kathlene (1994) confirmed
Yoder’s “intrusiveness thesis” (Yoder, 1991), which holds that men react to women’s in-
creased presence in the legislative setting by themselves becoming more vocal5. However,
underrepresentation can also motivate greater participation by women in political debates
by incentivizing women to increase their visibility (Pearson and Dancey, 2011b, 910).
5See Karim et al. (2018).
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In contrast to scholars of peace-making, scholars of political representation and com-
munication have refined measures of women’s participation in public debates. Beyond
’counting women,’ they consider the proportion of women’s speaking turns to men’s, as
well as the duration of their speeches (Karpowitz et al., 2012, 21). As Kathlene (1994,
564) points out, “men and women may take an equal number of turns, but men may talk
longer than women in any given turn”. Men talk more than women in mixed-sex groups
and in different conversational contexts (Leaper and Ayres, 2007; Parthasarathy et al.,
2019). The shorter length of women’s speeches can offset any benefits to descriptive rep-
resentation – even if there is gender equality in terms of the number of speaking turns.
Male dominance in communication holds true even when family issues, which might be ex-
pected to stimulate women’s participation, are discussed in legislative settings (Kathlene,
1994, 569). Furthermore, during a single speaking turn, speakers may present arguments
about one or more policy points6. Men’s dominance in terms of the number of policy
points they address may amplify their impact on policy outcomes; alternatively, women’s
dominance over policy points may compensate for the fewer speaking turns they have.
These insights from the fields of political representation and communication reveal a
need for a more robust assessment of women’s representation in peace-making beyond the
binaries: women’s presence vs. women’s absence or women’s silence. When addressing the
question of why women’s representation does not translate into influence in peace-making,
assessment of women’s representation needs to consider both women’s proportional pres-
ence and the number of a speaking turns, the duration of their turns, as well as the
number of policy points they make. If, women’s presence thus re-assessed is (broadly)
at parity with men’s, and if it fails to translate into influence on policy, we can turn
to the analysis of speaking behavior to find out what hinders translation of descriptive
representation into substantive representation of women’s concerns in peace-making.
6Scholars of deliberative democracy take positions on policies as the unit of analysis rather than
speaking turns (Steenbergen et al., 2003).
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3.3 Presence without Influence in Peace-making: Mech-
anisms
We contend that understanding speaking behavior is integral to understanding processes
that result in gendered peace-making outcomes. As Kathlene (1994, 573) points out,
discourse analysis of political discussions can explain the gap between women’s represen-
tation and women’s influence on policy-outcomes (Dolan, 2006; Cowley, 2014; West, 2017;
Blumenau, 2019). We propose three mechanisms operating in public discourse that can
account for gendered outcomes in peace and justice processes: deliberation, emboldening,
and de-centering.
3.3.1 Deliberation
Deliberation spotlights the content of speakers’ contributions. Focused on how female and
male speakers substantiate their views when they take the floor, scholars of democratic
deliberation have studied the quality of speakers’ arguments. A reason-giving requirement
is at the core of democratic deliberation (Thompson, 2008): speakers provide reasons for
their positions and respond to reasons offered by others in an exercise of deliberative
reciprocity (Guttmann and Thomson, 1996). Deliberation also entails respect for inter-
locutors and openness to hearing their views. (Steiner et al., 2005, 22) point out that
respect requires empathy: “[t]he capacity and the willingness to put oneself in the shoes
of others and to consider a situation from their perspective”. Such ‘other-regarding’ com-
munication embodies the principle of reflexivity. Deliberators reflect on their positions,
weighing them in the light of counterarguments (Bächtiger and Steiner, 2005, 156).
Deliberative communication plays an important role in the transition from conflict to
peace. Deliberative virtues can help overcome mistrust and polarization in divided so-
cieties (Dryzek, 2005; O’Flynn, 2006; Steiner, 2012; Caluwaerts and Deschouwer, 2014).
They can also promote justice-seeking, by considering the perspectives of the ethnic
Other, but also those of women. Recognition of women’s concerns depends on their being
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an equal deliberative partner to men. Women’s communication styles, including deliber-
ation, can be understood from the prism of the difference/dominance debate (Cameron,
1998, 14-15). The former centers on suitability of deliberation as a mode of communication
in terms of women’s ways of speaking, while the latter highlights structural underpinnings
of male dominance of communication styles.
Difference democrats have pointed out that “[s]ome citizens are better than others at
articulating their arguments in rational, reasonable terms” (Sanders, 1997, 349). Recog-
nition that the requirement for dispassionate argument in deliberation particularly dis-
advantages women has led to calls for valuing diverse models of communication in a
democratic discussion, such as greeting, rhetoric, narratives, and story-telling (Sanders,
1997; Young, 2001). Directing attention to the gendered nature of institutions, scholars
have posited that communication and language are implicated in the process of control
(Mackay et al., 2010, 579-583). Male dominance in these gendered social structures is
secured by legitimizing certain rules, norms, and behaviors. The absence of emotionality
is prescribed in institutions (Acker, 1990, 151), which restricts the range of permissible
forms of articulation of needs and interests and impacts women adversely.
Addressing the question of “gendered deliberation” (Grünenfelder and Bächtiger, 2007),
emerging empirical research has not produced compelling evidence that the quality of
deliberation in national parliaments differs between men and women (Bächtiger and
Hangartner, 2010)7. Nonetheless, deliberation points to a possibility that women’s sub-
stantive marginalization in peace-making may be driven by different quality of argumen-
tation between men and women.
3.3.2 Emboldening
Scholars have highlighted gendered differences in the use of language between women and
men “in terms of both what they say and how they say it” (Krook, 2010, 233). However,
7In fact, women are more able to meet some deliberative standards, such as respect for one’s inter-
locutors, which facilitates deliberative exchange (Lord and Tamvaki, 2013; Pedrini, 2014; Gerber et al.,
2018).
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besides the quality of deliberation, a gendered pattern of speech also includes a structural
dimension of public discourse: who takes the floor, when do they do it, and to what effect?
Gender-specific features of language thus result from conversational interactions (Hannah
and Murachver, 2007, 275). Who follows whom may also matter: what if men are more
likely to speak in succession than women?
Research in political science, social psychology, and communication has shown that
women are interrupted more frequently by men than men are by women in legislative
and non-legislative settings, whilst specifying conditions under which interruptions occur
(Mattei, 1998; Mendelberg et al., 2014), and whether they are hostile or not (Kathlene,
1994). A gendered pattern of interruptions produces gendered consequences. Women are
less successful than men at taking and holding the floor (Grob et al., 1997, 293), and
their influence in the group is undermined (including women’s perception of their own
efficacy) (Mendelberg et al., 2014, 29). The gendered pattern of interruptions underscores
the importance of sustaining speaking opportunities in public debates. However, women
do not necessarily have to be interrupted by men in order to be marginalized in mixed-sex
debates. A gendered pattern of dominance may be sustained at the level of speaking se-
quences throughout the debate. A speech by a previous woman participant may embolden
another woman to contribute.
Whether a woman speaker is more likely to be followed by a another woman or a man
indicates whether women are speaking in succession, thereby creating a deliberative space
or an enclave conducive to women asserting their perspectives. Recognizing that women’s
perspectives are often marginalized in public fora, Sunstein (2007, 277) has argued that “a
special advantage of enclave deliberation is that it promotes the development of positions
that would otherwise be invisible, silenced, or squelched in general debate.” Delibera-
tive enclaves can “protect” (Mansbridge, 1999, 63) the discourse of the disadvantaged
and marginalized, ensuring greater equity and quality of deliberation (Karpowitz et al.,
2012, 605). For these scholars, enclaves refer to separate marginalized groups given an
opportunity to deliberate together. Alternatively, the structure of speaking turns can also
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restrict this deliberative space. It can pave the way for dominance in debates if speaking
sequences are gendered, and if men speak in longer sequences than women in mixed-sex
debates. If this is the case, such a pattern across the whole debate can cumulatively limit
women’s substantive contributions and their influence on the outcome of the debate.
3.3.3 De-centering
Both scholars of political representation and transitional justice have found evidence that
themes of contributions by men and women differ. Therefore, topics women address in
public debates can also be an indicator of their influence, or of the lack of it. Women
and men talk about different issues, and these thematically gendered patterns persist in
a range of settings: formal and informal, public and private, and virtual and face-to-face
communication, e.g. in national parliaments, on a campaign trail, or on social media
(Carroll, 2008; Krook, 2010; Dabelko and Herrnson, 1997).
The gendered pattern of political speech diversifies policy and legislative agendas
(Greene and O’Brien, 2016). At the same time, women speaking about women’s issues
enhances women’s representation and influence (Pearson and Dancey, 2011a; Herrnson
et al., 2003; Bratton and Haynie, 1999). This includes legislation on gender-based violence,
as illustrated by the toughening of sentences in the Egyptian parliament for performing
female genital mutilation (Abdelgawad and Hassan, 2019). However, in post-conflict set-
tings, during proceedings in truth commissions and war crimes trials, women de-center,
i.e. they are reluctant to talk about their own experience of conflict-related violence.
Instead, when they talk about violence, women center their narrative on others: their
husbands, partners, and children (Kashyap, 2009; Yarwood, 2013; Crosby and Lykesy,
2011; Theidon, 2013). This stands in contrast to women’s public advocacy on women’s
issues, including SGBV. Studies of women’s advocacy reveal the efficacy of frames, op-
portunity structures, and network dynamics (Berry, 2018), but this is of limited analytic
utility for understanding how women’s influence is limited in mixed-sex, face-to-face pub-
lic debates.
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Investigating the topics women and men address can also indicate to what extent
peace-making outcomes, such as mandates of transitional justice instruments, are re-
sponsive to women’s concerns. Considering that conflicts impact women differently than
men, whether women talk about violence they suffered in debates addressing the crimi-
nal legacy, or they de-center, captures an important aspect of a likely broader pattern of
thematic differences between women and men. This gendered thematic pattern can lead
to a gendered outcome.
In sum, the biggest challenge for researchers of gender and language is to establish
“why and where differences exist” (Hannah and Murachver, 2007, 275). These differences
matter; differentiated speech reflects differences in power, status, and authority, which
in turn determine speakers’ influence on policy. Despite the growing scholarship focus-
ing on women’s speaking behavior, gender-based thematic and structural differences in
speech patterns have not been studied together with the deliberative quality of women’s
contributions. The mechanisms we propose and test to account for why women’s repre-
sentation in a transitional justice process fails to produce a gender-responsive transitional
justice instrument incorporates novel measures of the gendered nature of discourse: the
sequential structure of turn-taking and the deliberative quality of speeches, alongside the
thematic content of their speeches.
3.4 Research Design
To study women’s representation without influence and to test the proposed mechanisms
to explain gendered outcomes, we focus on the RECOM process in the post-conflict
Balkans.
3.4.1 The Background
The RECOM grassroots civil society initiative advocates the creation of a regional fact-
finding commission that would compile a list of all victims of the wars surrounding the dis-
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solution of the former Yugoslavia 8. With their narrow focus on perpetrators, externally-
led efforts to promote justice in the Balkans through the operation of the ICTY from 1993
to 2017 had left a shared sense of elusive justice among victims on all sides of a series
of conflicts through the 1990s and into the early 2000s in the region. The international
court’s narrow focus on perpetrators and not victims is inherent in the pursuit of retribu-
tive justice.9 As a multi-ethnic, victim-centered transitional justice process, RECOM has
provided a local restorative approach to the legacies of the Balkan wars. It was embodied
by consultations with a wide range of stakeholders in 134 one- or two-day-long debates
from 2006 to 2011. Like other human rights initiatives in the poor, post-conflict region,
RECOM’s activities were supported by foreign donations. Nonetheless, the agenda-setting
for RECOM’s meetings remained in the hands of local actors, who launched and drove
this bottom-up transitional justice process (Rangelov and Teitel, 2014)10.
3.4.2 Case Selection
Case selection refers to the event that the theory tries to explain as well as to selection
of countries, both of which require attention (Gerring and Cojocaru, 2016, 408). With its
lack of provisions that reflect women’s concerns and ensure women’s equal involvement in
the commission’s work, RECOM’s draft Statute is a typical case of peace-making with a
gendered outcome11. Further, as a transitional justice process in the Balkans, RECOM is
a response to criminal legacy typical of civil wars fought along identity lines where sexual
violence is a part of the overall repertoire of violence (Wood, 2014, 461)12. Nested in a
larger body of the extant literature, a typical case contributes to theory development by
producing arguments that can explain some, but not all, cases (Toshkov, 2016, 292). The
value of case studies is in strictly "contingent generalizations that apply to the subclass of
8More details about the historical development of the initiative can be found in the Appendix.
9For a comprehensive assessment of the ICTY, see Orentlicher (2018).
10See Proces REKOM (2011).
11For example, see original mandates of the South African and Peruvian truth commissions (Borraine,
2000; Bueno-Hansen, 2015).
12For an overview of violence during the Bosnian war see Berry (2018, 116-129).
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cases" similar to those that are studied (George and Bennett, 2005, 32). The patterns of
discourse at the intersection of identity, gender, and wartime victimization can shed light
on gendered peace-making outcomes after other intra-state conflicts (Allansson et al.,
2017), and, specifically those fought along the ethnic identity axis. Because religion does
not frame peace-building efforts in the Balkans13, the findings are of limited applicability
to understanding women’s influence in the aftermath of intra-state conflicts in contexts
where religious norms (which are not limited to a single religious group) shape women’s
participation in peace-making 14.
3.4.3 Data
The text data analyzed in this study consists of transcripts of 20 debates about the
commission’s draft Statute organized by the RECOM15, comprising over 500,000 words.
The transcripts of these debates are publicly available on the RECOM’s website16. In
this text corpus, we code the gender and role (discussant or moderator) of each speaker.
The order of speaking was determined by moderators, who responded to participants’
requests to take the floor. Participants themselves were drawn from broad sections of
civil society in the region. Because of the consultative nature of the RECOM’s process,
the organizers’ priority was to make debates diverse and inclusive along different identity
axes (Bonora, 2019, 145): men and women, people from all ethnic groups involved in
Balkan conflicts, from different constituencies (victims, veterans, human rights activists,
and professionals, such as lawyers, journalists and teachers), and different generations.
Their aim was to ensure a wide representation of different experiences of conflict and
views on their appropriate redress by the regional commission, which would be codified
13Balkan conflicts cannot be classed as religious regardless of politicization of religious identities, see
Harris and Baumann (2019).
14Religion can both restrict women’s influence, for example when used to justify women’s exclusion
from political processes, and facilitate articulation of their concerns, as illustrated by religious-based
activism for women’s rights used in Libya’s Noor Campaign, see UN Women (2015).
15We check for the possibility that the conditions under which the draft Statute was adopted differ
from the conditions under which debates were held.
16See https://www.recom.link/sr/
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in the draft Statute. Holding debates both in rural and urban locations in all countries
of former Yugoslavia was an additional strategy to ensure the diversity of views.
3.4.4 Preprocessing
Preprocessing the text data involved a number of steps. We tagged each speaker’s speaking
turn (i.e. speeches), and within each speaking turn we code each speech acts i.e. arguments
(demands in the DQI terms) about any given issue under discussion, e.g. location of
the Commission’s seat or selection of commissioners. This enables us to capture the
gendered nature of discourse by analyzing not only who spoke and for how long, but also
how many arguments they made (about the articles of the draft Statute) and how well
substantiated those arguments were. Lastly, as the original sessions were held in multiple
languages (Albanian, Bosnian, Croatian, Macedonian, Montenegrin, Serbian, Slovenian),
the corpus was manually translated into Serbian17. We then applied a set of natural
language processing tools developed for Balkan languages.
3.4.5 Methods
We combine quantitative content analysis, which relies on interpretative coding of text
segments, to measure the quality of deliberation with a Discourse Quality Index (DQI),
as well as computer-assisted quantitative text analysis to quantify the word frequencies
in utterances at the speaker level. The combination of these two methods allows us to
conduct a granular analysis of the content of speakers’ contributions and of the frequency
of participants’ speeches and their speaking sequences, which could not be achieved by
conducting only a computer-assisted text analysis of gendered speech patterns18. We fit
Bayesian multi-level and structural topic models to estimate the effects of gender on
speech behavior: the quality of deliberation, turn-taking, and thematic content. In what
17Details on the linguistic aspects of preprocessing that was carried out by one of the authors with
some research assistance are provided in the Appendix.
18For example see Parthasarathy et al. (2019).
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follows, we first re-assess women’s representation in a transitional justice process, with
measures that have previously not been used by scholars of peace-making.
3.5 Verifying the Puzzle of Women’s Representation
and Influence in Peace-Making
We have argued that a more robust measure of women’s representation in peace-making
is needed before we can claim that their representation results in gendered outcomes
that marginalize their interests and concerns. Consequently, we distinguish three levels
of women’s representation: (1) physical presence, (2) representation in turn-taking, and
(3) participation in argumentation. The first level captures the turnout rate of women
and men in the debates about the Statute; the second level reflects the proportion of
participants who actually spoke during the debate as opposed to those who remained
silent; and the third level accounts for those speakers who made an argument about the
provision(s) of the draft Statute when they spoke.
Table 3.1: Average participation by men and women at different levels.
Men Women
Presence discussants
participants
50.5% 38.1%
Speech speech+arguments
discussants
55.4% 37.4%
Argumentation arguments
speech+arguments
81.1% 74.2%
Note: The percentages for presence do not add up to 100% as moderators are excluded.
Table 3.1 presents average participation levels across 20 debates at different levels for
discussants of both sexes. The number of participants varies between 18 and 7019. Of all
the participants, 38% were female discussants, of whom 37% made at least one utterance
(i.e. made a speech), and of those who spoke, 74% made a statement pertaining to at
least one of the articles of the draft Statute. While it is impossible to entirely rule out
underrepresentation of women driving a gendered outcome, other indicators of women’s
19Further summary statistics on participants are available in the Appendix.
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representation in speech, which have been overlooked in the existing literature, need to
be considered. We proceed to measure the length of participation: instead of time it took
for each individual to deliver a speech (Karpowitz et al., 2012), we use the number of
words that each speech contained. To assess the association between a speaker’s sex and
speech length, measured by the logarithm of the number of word units (tokens), we use
a random-intercept Bayesian multilevel model with consultations as level-2 units. Given
the number of consultations included in our analysis, Bayesian estimation allows us to
avoid potential problems with biased coefficient estimates and confidence interval coverage
that can be encountered when the number of groups is small (Stegmueller, 2013). Table
3.2 shows the estimated coefficients for a speaker’s sex and consultation-level predictors
(ethnic diversity, level of debates, participating community, and whether translation was
required, e.g. because of the ethnic composition of a debate). In addition to categorical
descriptors of the consultations, we include the proportion of women present as another
independent variable. Although the coefficient for female speakers is slightly negative
(βˆfemale = −0.112), meaning that women’s utterances, on average, tend to be shorter in
terms of the number of words spoken, this relationship is not statistically significant.
Table 3.2: Multi-level Linear Models of Speech Participation.
Log(words)
(1) (2)
Sex (ref: Male)
-0.116 -0.112Female (-0.252, 0.031) (-0.25, 0.028)
Consultation-level covariates
Groups 20 20
Observations 1472 1472
Note: 95% HPD intervals are shown in parentheses. Complete output is available in the Appendix.
Having checked women’s representation at several levels, in addition to their physical
presence, our analysis provides comprehensive assessment of their participation in the
RECOM’s debates; women made a vocal contribution both in terms of taking speaking
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turns and presenting arguments. Although it is somewhat lower than men’s, women’s
(under)representation does not provide a convincing explanation for the absence of pro-
visions reflecting women’s needs and interests in the draft Statute of the fact-finding
commission. We therefore examine empirically three mechanisms: deliberation, embold-
ening, and de-centering to assess whether there are any gendered patterns in discourse
that could lead to the gendered outcome.
3.6 Measuring the Quality of Deliberation
The first potential mechanism to account for a gendered outcome is the quality of delibera-
tion. To test this empirically, one of the authors adapted the measurement instrument and
constructed the Discourse Quality Index (DQI) for Transitional Justice, a variant of tech-
nique for analyzing the quality of deliberation (Steenbergen et al., 2003; Steiner, 2012).
The DQI is a set of analytical constructs that jointly measure the quality of deliberation.
Its construction responded to a need to supplement theorizing about deliberation with
“empirical investigations of real-life deliberations” (Steiner et al., 2005, 43), in particular
with application to parliamentary debates. The dimensions of the DQI are underpinned
by Habermas’ notion of “communicative action” (Habermas, 1984), which stipulates: “in-
dividuals give and criticize reasons for holding or rejecting particular validity claims, so
that universally valid norms can be discovered through reason” (Steenbergen et al., 2003,
25). The Discourse Quality Index for Transitional Justice contains eight components: the
first code captures the presence of (1) interruptions20. Habermas’ level of justification of
demands is denoted by (2) justification rationality, and content of justification is con-
sidered individually with reference to the (3) common good of a community, (4) specific
subgroup, such as victims or young generations, or (5) abstract principles, such as peace,
while respect is subdivided into two types: (6) respect towards participants and their ar-
20In the original work (Steenbergen et al., 2003) this component is labeled as participation, but here
we use interruption to avoid confusion with a general term participation referring to a speaker’s overall
contribution to debates.
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guments, and (7) respect towards groups, and, lastly, (8) story-telling captures whether
participants use stories alongside rational arguments.
The principal unit of analysis in the DQI coding strategy is a speech act, defined
as “the public discourse by a particular individual delivered at a particular point in a
debate” (Steenbergen et al., 2003, 27). The relevance of a speaker’s utterance for coding
is determined by whether it contains a demand, i.e. “a proposal on what decision should or
should not be made”(Steenbergen et al., 2003, 27). For example, a position on whether the
commission’s seat should be in Sarajevo illustrates a demand. The RECOM’s text corpus
consists of 1,211 speech acts uttered by discussants over 20 debates (excluding speech acts
by moderators in line with the practice followed in the analysis of parliamentary debates,
as well as in experimental studies). All speech acts were identified and manually coded
according to the DQI for Transitional Justice codebook developed by one of the authors.
Each of the 1,211 speech acts was coded twice, independently, along all dimensions of
deliberation, by one of the authors and a trained coder21.
Aggregation of multiple components of the DQI has received only limited attention
in the literature. It is not uncommon to calculate a simple additive index by summing
up the ordinal codes assigned to each speech act (Hangartner et al., 2007) or to consider
each of them separately (Steiner et al., 2005). Other researchers have applied principal
component analysis to combine the items of DQI (Caluwaerts and Deschouwer, 2014).
Here we largely follow the approach of Gerber et al. (2018) and estimate a two-parameter
Bayesian item-response theory (IRT) model to calculate an aggregate measure of the
quality of deliberation. This modeling strategy is appealing for several reasons. Substan-
tively, it assumes that the quality of deliberation is a unidimensional latent construct that
is manifested through multiple items (DQI components), each of which has a difficulty
and discrimination parameter. In the context of deliberation, the former can be viewed
as how big of a political, social, or psychological challenge each of the items presents to
a discussant. For example, while it could be a relatively easy task not to interrupt other
21The inter-coder reliability statistics are available in the Appendix. All of them indicate an acceptable
level of reliability.
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participants, in the context of a transitional justice process, substantiating one’s argu-
ments with references to the shared abstract principles can be far more challenging. At
the same time, some, perhaps more achievable objectives, such as delivering an argument
that overcomes an ethnic interest, can differentiate better between a lower and higher
quality speech act. This idea is captured by the second parameter of the model: discrim-
ination. Apart from theoretical appeal, IRT offers a number of statistical advantages.
First, it allows one to model the observed variables, derived from hand-coded speech
acts, as categorical variables22, without making assumptions that they are measured on
an interval scale and possess an additivity property that allows them to be meaningfully
summed up. Second, other types of modeling strategies such as factor analysis would
require another implausible assumption of normally distributed error terms23.
22In our analysis we simplify the codes with more than two categories by dichotomizing them into
binary variables, see the Appendix.
23While the ensuing analysis is focused on this aggregation approach, we also demonstrate its close
correspondence to other strategies in the Appendix.
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Figure 3.1: Response functions of each DQI component. Side panels show the examples of speech acts with high and low
quality of deliberation.
Dalje, član 8. - jako dobra odredba,
i vi insistirajte na tome da to ostane,
da su države ugovornice
dužne sarađivati sa REKOM-om.
Further, Article 8 - a very good provision,
and you insist on keeping it,
so that state parties
are obliged to cooperate with RECOM.
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Na konsultacijama u Mostaru
je od predstavnika ljudi s Kosova bilo
izričito zahtevano i se stave prisilni
 nestanci nakon oružanog sukoba.
Naime, to je bio problem kod njih.
A nije uslo u nacrt statuta.
Tako da svaka konsultacija
iznjedri nešto novo u statutu.
I zato smatram da bi možda bilo dobro
prihvatiti inicijativu
što je dosla iz Bosne i Hercegovine
da se član 14.
Promeni i da ide, kako rekla,
sva kršenja međunarodnog prava
i kršenja protiv čovečnosti. Hvala.
At the consultations in Mostar,
the representatives from Kosovo
explicitly requested that forced disappearances
after an armed conflict be also included.
Namely, that was an issue there,
but it was not included into the draft Statute.
Thus, every consultation
produces something new in the Statute.
And that's why I think it might be good
to accept the initiative
that came from Bosnia and Herzegovina
to change Article 14
and for it to say
all violations of international law
and crimes against humanity. Thank you
SA525 = 1.15
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Figure 3.1 shows the response functions of each of the DQI components. Avoiding
interruptions and showing respect towards other participants appear to be the easiest
deliberation criteria to satisfy. These results are also a consequence of very few identified
interruptions24 and instances of open disrespect that we observe in the data. This is a
noteworthy observation, given how demanding it is for people from different sides of an
armed conflict to discuss the criminal legacy together. All components related to the
content of justification as well as story-telling are the hardest principles of deliberation to
meet in practice. The steep curves for justification rationality and respect towards other
groups show that these two components can best discriminate between those speech acts
the quality of which falls just below or just above their respective difficulty.
To estimate the association between gender and the quality of deliberation we fit multi-
level model that includes both demand-level (model 2) and consultation-level (model
3) explanatory variables. Speech acts delivered by women tend to have slightly higher
quality of deliberation (βˆfemale = 0.031), although this relationship is not significant.
The empirical assessment of the quality of deliberation in a civil society context does not
support arguments that deliberation as a mode of communication disadvantages women.
As such, it is consistent with the findings from parliamentary debates (Bächtiger and
Hangartner, 2010). In the case of a transitional justice process, these results suggest that
the quality of arguments presented by women and men does not account for the content of
the adopted draft Statute that does not respond to women’s needs, interests and concerns.
3.7 Gendered Structure of Debates: Emboldening
The focus of the previous mechanism was speech, considered in isolation. Speeches, how-
ever, do not occur in isolation; they typically constitute part of a larger in situ or ex
situ conversation. It is plausible that gender becomes an important determinant not of
how well substantiated one’s arguments are, but of whether the arguments are voiced in
24Only about 4% of speech acts contain some form of interruption.
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Table 3.3: Multi-level Linear Models of the Quality of Deliberation.
DQI
(1) (2) (3)
Sex (ref: Male)
0.026 0.031 0.031Female (-0.054, 0.107) (-0.052, 0.111) (-0.047, 0.112)
Repeated Speaker (ref: No)
-0.092 -0.087Yes (-0.185, -0.002) (-0.182, 0.006)
Issue Polarization (ref: Low)
0.126 0.127Medium (0.042, 0.208) (0.047, 0.21)
0.341 0.327High (0.226, 0.457) (0.214, 0.445)
Diversity (ref: Mono-ethnic)
0.204Dyadic (-0.185, 0.579)
-0.016Multi-Ethnic (-0.385, 0.357)
Level (ref: Non-regional)
0.085Regional (-0.318, 0.481)
Type (ref: General)
0.054Professionals (-0.223, 0.331)
0.249Victims (-0.008, 0.501)
Translation (ref: No)
-0.025Translation (-0.318, 0.279)
0.025 -0.008 -0.147Intercept (-0.072, 0.122) (-0.121, 0.108) (-0.471, 0.179)
Groups 20 20 20
Observations 1211 1211 1211
Note: 95% HPD intervals are shown in parentheses.
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the first place. As the results of the DQI analysis indicate, there were very few direct
interruptions in our corpus. Interruptions are a focus of a considerable body of literature
as the result of them being a prominent feature of discourse that is also easy to measure
(Mattei, 1998; Mendelberg et al., 2014; Kathlene, 1994). However, a debate can be struc-
tured in such a way that participants do not feel emboldened to speak in the first place.
While a thorough analysis of this phenomenon would require looking at the underlying
psychological processes, we are still able to study some observable implications of this
mechanism from the transcripts of debates. Specifically, we look at the sequence in which
men and women deliver a speech.
In the absence of any gendered dynamics, we would expect to find no differences in the
number of speeches delivered in sequence by men and women. To test this mechanism
we fit a Poisson multi-level model with the number of speeches in a row delivered by
male and female discussants as the dependent variable. We adopt a hierarchical approach
here in particular to control for the percentage of female discussants, which varies at the
consultation-level25. While our approach is somewhat different from direct modeling of
transition probabilities when treating speech sequences as Markov chains (Eggers and
Spirling, 2014), we adopt similar underlying assumptions and exclude moderators from
analysis26. As Table 3.4 demonstrates, contrary to our expectations, the gender of the
speaker has a significant association with the number of speeches in sequence. The re-
sults show that sequences of speeches delivered by women are on average 40% shorter
(βˆfemale = −0.48) than sequences delivered by men, while controlling for the percentage
of female discussants and other consultation-level characteristics (model 2). Overall, the
average length of women’s sequences is 1.98 speeches, while that of men’s is 3.22. This
finding indicates that gendered dynamics of debates need not manifest itself in interrup-
tions or other conspicuous demonstrations of power asymmetry. Rather, they can result
25The number of groups is 19 in this case rather than 20, as one consultation contained only men,
which prevents us from modeling speech sequences there.
26As disentangling the mechanical effects of slight imbalance in participation ratios between genders
from the genuine differences in the structure of debates is not straightforward, we provide further ro-
bustness checks and alternative modeling strategies in the Appendix.
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Table 3.4: Multi-level Poisson Models of the Number of Speeches Made by the
Discussants of the Same Sex in Sequence.
Number of speeches in sequence
(1) (2)
Gender (ref: Male)
-0.488 -0.488Female (-0.596, -0.384) (-0.592, -0.384)
0.005% Female Discussants (-0.022, 0.033)
Diversity (ref: Mono-ethnic)
-0.105Dyadic (-1.11, 0.859)
0.605Multi-Ethnic (-0.378, 1.547)
Level (ref: Non-regional)
-0.569Regional (-1.529, 0.359)
Type (ref: General)
0.022Professionals (-0.64, 0.701)
0.094Victims (-0.759, 0.953)
Translation (ref: No)
0.231Yes (-0.5, 0.901)
1.269 0.838Intercept (1.064, 1.471) (-0.361, 2)
0.165 0.214
log-posterior -1309.095 -1314.809
Groups 19 19
Observations 548 548
Note: 95% HPD intervals are shown in parentheses.
from a subtler pattern of speech dominance that is sustained at the level of the sequence
of speaking turns. The pattern of one woman speaking and emboldening another woman
to speak, which is what we would expect if women were able to deliberate in enclaves,
does not occur. This finding has substantive implications, because women’s lines of ar-
gumentation cannot be given expression and be sustained in a mixed-sex setting. It can
result in the absence of gender-responsive provisions in the draft Statute. In contrast,
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when women do speak in succession, their experience of conflict, for example as bereaved
mothers of killed recruits, is articulated as a demand for the recognition of this loss in
the commission’s definition of human losses27.
3.8 Thematic Differences: De-centering
After considering the quality and sequences of female and male contributions, we shift
our focus to the thematic content of the speeches by men and women. Like other scholars
(Terman, 2017), we approach the analysis guided by theoretical expectations. In this
study, they are drawn from scholarly debates in the fields of political representation
and transitional justice. The text-as-data approach (Grimmer and Stewart, 2013) offers
an innovative way of studying transitional justice debates. Like Parthasarathy et al.
(2019), we show that this approach is suitable for studying deliberation in civil society
meetings. We use the text-as-data approach to augment the qualitative reading, manual
coding, and statistical modeling of the structure of debates by applying structural topic
models to our text corpus to estimate the differences in proportions of speaking time
that women and men dedicate to different topics in their speeches. In order to prepare
the corpus for analysis, we used a newly developed set of natural language processing
tools developed as part of the Regional Language Development Initiative (ReLDI) for
several Balkan languages, including the Serbian language that was used to standardize
the multi-language text corpus (Ljubešić et al., 2016), removed stopwords and lemmatized
the texts28.
Structural topic models (Roberts et al., 2014) are an extension of classical topic mod-
els based on Latent Dirichlet Allocation, proposed by Blei et al. (2003). Apart from the
estimation of topic proportions for each individual document, they allow one to incor-
porate meta information and estimate how additional covariates affect topic prevalence.
Rather than fitting a model on individual utterances, we aggregate them at the speaker
27See Konsultacije sa udruženjima žrtava, Beograd, Srbija, 3 July 2010.
28More details on preprocessing are available in the Appendix.
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Figure 3.2: Top 10 Words by Topic.
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level. Through an iterative procedure we find that a 10-topic structural topic model pro-
duces the best balance between statistical fit and substantive interpretation29. As with
other analyses presented above, we include only the speeches delivered by discussants and
not those delivered by moderators.
Figure 3.2 displays the most prevalent terms in each topic. We leave topic 10 unla-
beled as it largely represents a combination of the other nine topics. Figure 3.3 shows the
estimated effect of gender on the proportion of different topics and indicates a gendered
thematic pattern of discourse; women and men speak about different issues demonstrat-
ing different ways in which they approach the Statute deliberations. The topic “evalu-
ation” indicates that women scrutinize the proposed articles of the draft Statute from
the perspective of criminal justice, arguing that the Statute should maintain a distinc-
tion between the regional fact-finding commission (which is as a restorative transitional
justice mechanism) and criminal justice, whilst seeking clarification of the relationship
between the commission and local courts. They are concerned, for example, that the
29The Appendix contains additional information on topic diagnostics and alternative specifications. In
addition to gender, we include country, level (regional/non-regional), and type of participating community
(general/professional/victims) as covariates.
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draft Statute might give the commission quasi-legal powers akin to those that a national
court exercises in criminal proceedings30, such as providing for a criminal sanction for
non-appearance of individuals summoned to testify before the commission (instead of
voluntary testimonies). Likewise, women are preoccupied with legal consequence for indi-
viduals alleged to have committed war crimes in the proceedings before the commission,
and so on. Women are also associated with the topic dedicated to Kosovo31. Lastly, we
find in the RECOM’s case that women de-center, directing their contributions away from
their own experience of violence. For example, the needs of SGBV victims are elided by a
generic reference to all victims, while harm suffered by men in detention camps is singled
out in the topic ‘acknowledgement’32. By contrast, men focus more on practical issues
involved in the operationalization of the fact-finding commission. This is captured by the
topics: ‘implementation’ focused on the articles of the draft Statute and the election of
commissioners including criteria for their election, ‘reconciliation’ as the rationale of the
RECOM process focused on recognition of victims of crimes as humans, and ‘outcome’
reflected in their preoccupation with the report on all victims to be produced by states
participating in the RECOM commission.
Demonstrating a lack of arguments rooted in consideration of gender-specific expe-
riences of conflict, this exploratory analysis of themes addressed by female and male
speakers reveals a broad pattern of thematic differences, which also includes de-centering
in women’s speeches as they do not discuss how their own experience of violence should
be addressed. Both women and men contribute to shaping important aspects of the draft
Statute, although women approach the task from a holistic perspective on how restorative
justice should operate in post-conflict societies alongside retributive justice, whereas men
focus on ‘nuts and bolts’ of the commission’s operationalization33. This gendered thematic
30Italics indicate words in topics. Further information on topic interpretation is in the Appendix,
including speeches with highest scores on each topic.
31This, however, could be an artifact of the few women present at some of the meetings that happened
in Kosovo.
32See the harmonic mean words frequency and exclusivity (FREX) which also aided our interpretation
in the Appendix.
33We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this emphasis
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Figure 3.3: Topical Prevalence by Male and Female Discussants.
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pattern of speeches can be related to the lack of provisions for women’s equal participa-
tion in the commission’s work and the absence of procedures on how to address SGBV in
the commission’s operation illustrating the gendered character of the draft Statute that
is not responsive to women’s needs and interests.
3.9 Conclusions
Peace-making outcomes that are not responsive to women’s concerns are at the heart
of the reproduction of gender injustice and the persistent elusiveness of “quality peace”
(Wallensteen, 2015) for women. Inequalities persist even after the Women Peace and
Security Agenda spurred women’s peace activism, women’s demands for access to peace-
making, and women’s articulation of their particular needs (Shepherd, 2017). In the
area of post-conflict transitional justice, women’s advocacy has led to the codification of
accountability for wartime sexual and gender-based violence in international law. These
developments have in turn had an impact on public perceptions and policy responses to
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this issue in post-conflict zones (Warren et al., 2017). The burning question now is: why,
despite such “norm augmentation” in the post-Cold War period (Ní Aoláin, 2014, 625),
do we still see “old specters of unseen hierarchies operating to the detriment of addressing
harms experienced by women”?
This study of women’s speaking behavior during peace-making departs from the well-
trodden research agenda focused on women’s representation and gendered outcomes in
peace and justice processes. It provides a new perspective on gendered dynamics of peace-
making by identifying a novel axis of male domination at the micro-level of public dis-
course. We know that fewer women than men are likely to be at the negotiating table,
despite recent progress in narrowing the gap between men’s and women’s attendance.
Nonetheless, an important part of the puzzle of women’s limited substantive represen-
tation has been overlooked, given our still weak understanding of what happens when
women engage in the exchange of arguments with men on the other side of the table.
Feminist scholars have noted that the “add women and stir” solution has done little to
advance gender-just peace (Ní Aoláin, 2016). Going beyond the issue of representation,
our research reveals that the patterns of men’s domination during a public discussion are
subtle but nonetheless consequential – even when they are not expressed in obvious forms
such as interruptions. Women’s relative underrepresentation in peace-making continues
to be an issue that ought to be addressed. However, the focus merely on (numerical)
underrepresentation neglects the question how women’s voices matter in peace-making.
As we have shown in this study of post-conflict justice debates, not only do women take
the floor almost as often as men, but there is no substantial difference between men
and women in terms of the quality of deliberation. While the content analysis reveals
that men and women address different topics, we propose that the gendered structure
of turn-taking is key to women’s limited influence on peace outcomes. Women’s speech
is restricted during debates; women speak in shorter sequences than men, which shrinks
women’s deliberative space to develop their argumentation, including on those issues and
topics that would better reflect a whole range of women’s concerns and demands for
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equality, even if they wish to remain silent about sexual and gender-based violence34.
This lacuna in the scholarship that concerns a discursive dimension of a peace-making
process is also linked to the issue of data (Anderlini, 2007) and methods used to study
how peace-making is gendered. Efforts have centered on counting ‘bodies at the table’ or
provisions of peace-agreements that refer to women, which have become standard indi-
cators of women’s inequality and gendered peace that disadvantages women (Paffenholz
et al., 2016)35. Our empirical analysis of gendered speech patterns in a transitional justice
process contributes to efforts to quantify gendered dynamics during peace-making and
sheds new light on constraints on women’s influence.
While this research furthers the study of how conflict-resolution and peace-making
are gendered (David et al., 2018), it also provides new insights for scholars of political
representation and communication interested in the study of male domination in political
communication. Our investigation of women’s speaking behavior in civil society debates
confirms the value of increasing the number of comparisons by expanding the “sites” of
political representation (Krook, 2010; Parthasarathy et al., 2019), which are usually re-
stricted to institutional settings such as parliaments. We elucidate women’s participation
in a parallel non-state civil society process that also marginalizes women.
Exposing men’s dominance at the level of turn-taking, this study provides another
possible solution toward greater substantial gender equality for women in peace-making
and in politics more generally, beyond the imperative of equal representation and ac-
cess that have preoccupied scholars and practitioners. Observed at the micro-level of
discourse, our findings point to the need for greater attention to the management of
speaking turns during public debates. Extant research has pointed to the benefits of rec-
ognizing the marginalized and their views through enclave deliberation conceptualized
and implemented as deliberation in separate group(s) made up of those who are disad-
vantaged and whose perspectives are sidelined in mainstream debates (Mansbridge, 1999;
34On silence as a site of power and agency, see Selimovic (2020).
35Notwithstanding this, compiling new datasets (Bell and Badanjak, 2019) and refining definitions of
inclusion (Arthur, 2016) will provide more robust explanations in this vein.
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Sunstein, 2007; Karpowitz et al., 2012). This research provides a novel insight that the
benefits of enclave deliberation can also potentially be gained from turn-taking sequences
nested in the debates in mixed-sex groups and fora. Ultimately, we recognize that the
pattern we found might be only one aspect of a number of such micro-level instances
of lopsidedness that can lead to gendered outcomes. Whether this is so remains to be
established by future research aided by the inter-disciplinary study of the micro-level
of discourse, which stands to reveal new insights into the nature and consequences of
communicative interactions between women and men during post-conflict peace-making.
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A The RECOM Initiative in the Balkans: The Background
The Coalition for RECOM, which stands for the Regional Commission for Establishing
the Facts about All Victims of War Crimes and other Serious Human Rights Violations
committed on the territory of the former Yugoslavia from January 1991 to 31st December
2001, is a network of non-governmental organizations, associations, and individuals who
support a regional transitional justice process (Proces REKOM 2011). RECOM is a re-
gional network, and as such is distinct from global transnational networks whose member-
ship includes representatives of international institutions, international non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) and/or national governments. The RECOM initiative embodies a
regional rather than a commonly pursued state-centric approach to justice, either through
trials or truth commissions. Also, in contrast to internationally-imposed instruments of
post-conflict justice, the RECOM is a locally-driven initiative (Rangelov and Teitel 2014).
This initiative emerged as a response to a complex post-conflict legacy in successor
states of former Yugoslavia, characterized by a cross-border nature of crimes. It is also a
response to the limits of the international strategy of ‘exogenous justice’ pursued through
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia at The Hague (ICTY).
Notably, with its focus on victims, the RECOM is a response to inability of trials that
focus on the perpetrator and the punishment, either to acknowledge the suffering of the
victims or to promote reconciliation.
Responding to this legacy, together with the Documenta, an NGO from Zagreb, Croa-
tia, and the Investigative-Documentation Centre, an NGO from Sarajevo, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, the Centre for the Humanitarian Law, from Belgrade, Serbia, initiated a
regional approach to transitional justice in the Balkans. In May 2006, they launched a
debate on the mechanisms for establishing and documenting facts of war crimes in for-
mer Yugoslavia. In May 2008, this initiative transformed into the Coalition for RECOM.
From then on the consultative process focused on building a model of a regional fact-
finding commission (Kandić 2007). The coalition has amassed significant membership
of nearly 2,000 NGOs, associations, groups, victims, prominent individuals, veterans,
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lawyers, artists, journalists, academics, and youth – from all areas of the former Yu-
goslavia. But, the RECOM coalition’s reach was much wider owing to the consultative
process under its auspices. The consultations were debates about how best to address the
criminal legacy throughout the Balkans. They involved nearly 6,000 civil society members
from all ethnic groups affected by the wars fought in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s
(Serbs, Croats, Muslims, Albanians, Montenegrins, Macedonians, Slovenians, including
members of minority groups in the region). The consultations, held at the regional, na-
tional and local levels, unfolded in two stages.
In the first stage, the consultations were of a general nature, and produced an agree-
ment on a regional approach to transitional justice (Humanitarian Law Center 2009).
The second stage of consultations was focused on the proposed draft Statute. This docu-
ment was compiled by the Working Group that was tasked to translate the ideas about
a regional approach to transitional justice heard during the consultation process into a
document with specific provisions. These proposals were then put up for the discussion
before the broadest section of civil society stakeholders. Despite the legacy of violence
and the diversity of views, the consultative process produced a cross-ethnic agreement on
the Statute for the regional fact-finding commission.
Table A.1 shows the summary of the 20 consultations where the composition of the
draft Statute was discussed. It shows that the meetings covered a broad range of geo-
graphical locations, included a diverse part of the public, both general, as well as those
directly affected by the conflict.
B The Draft Statute: The Process and Data
The deliberation on the draft Statute of the regional fact-finding commission comprised
the last stage of the consultative process, and lasted from May 2010 to March 201136.
The draft Statute spelled out the commission’s mandate. It contained the provisions that
36Statut: Predlog Regionalne komisije za utvrdjivanje činjenica o ratnim zločinima i drugim teškim
kršenjima ljudskih prava na području nekadašnje SFRJ, 26 March 2011. Paper copy on file with one of
the authors.
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Table A.1: Summary of RECOM Statute consultation meetings
ID Date Country Place Level Community
1 2010-05-29 Montenegro Podgorica regional general
2 2010-05-29 Bosnia Tuzla non-regional victims
3 2010-06-01 Croatia Zagreb non-regional general
4 2010-06-05 Bosnia Banja Luka regional general
5 2010-07-03 Serbia Beograd non-regional victims
6 2010-07-13 Croatia Osijek non-regional general
7 2010-07-14 Croatia Vukovar non-regional general
8 2010-09-02 Croatia Knin non-regional general
9 2010-09-10 Slovenia Ljubljana regional professional
10 2010-09-15 Kosovo Priština/Prishtinë non-regional victims
11 2010-09-18 Bosnia Sarajevo regional victims
12 2010-10-22 Croatia Pakrac non-regional general
13 2010-06-11 Croatia Zagreb regional professional
14 2010-12-04 Serbia Beograd regional professional
15 2010-08-28 Bosnia Mostar regional general
16 2010-12-17 Kosovo Priština/Prishtinë regional victims
17 2010-12-17 Croatia Zagreb regional general
18 2010-12-18 Macedonia Skoplje regional general
19 2011-01-23 Serbia Beograd regional professional
20 2011-01-29 Bosnia Sarajevo non-regional general
would regulate all aspects of the commission’s work, including: the remit, the seat, official
languages, the procedures for establishing the Commission, such as appointment of com-
missioners, modalities of the commission’s operation, such as summoning of witnesses,
type of hearings, relationship with the judiciary, and the commission’s report. The Work-
ing Group comprising a multi-ethnic team of legal experts from the former Yugoslavia,
drafted their initial proposal based on the consultations held prior to the deliberations
on the draft Statute and on the analysis of statutes of other national truth and recon-
ciliation commissions in other post-conflict cases globally, while taking into account the
laws of all former Yugoslav countries. The consultations were held with a wide range of
stakeholders such as survivors and family members of victims, human rights activists,
journalists, teachers, veterans, lawyers and representatives of the youth groups.
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Each consultation was a one- or two-day long session. During the consultations the
participants had an opportunity to hear and consider various proposals on each article
of the draft Statute, and express their views. The proceedings were transcribed verbatim
in their entirety, and have been publicly available on the RECOM’s website. Keeping
a meticulous record of the consultative process had a two-fold purpose: documenting
and tracking the diversity of opinions before settling on the final version of the draft
Statute, as well as ensuring that this local transitional justice process is transparent and
open to scrutiny. Each consultative debate was dedicated to the same issue areas that
corresponded with the headings in the draft Statute as outlined above.
The draft Statute was adopted at the Assembly of the RECOM Coalition on 26
March 2011. The Assembly is one of the RECOM’s governing bodies (alongside the
Secretariat), and is comprised of the members for the Coalition. Without a hard and fast
rule on the membership of the Assembly, the Coalition considered members to be active
participants of the Coalition and of the consultation process, but made sure to maintain
ethnic representation of all groups involved in the conflicts of Yugoslavia’s dissolution. In
practice, the draft Statute was created by the participants of the consultative process as
it reflected their views presented during the debates37. For the purpose of our analysis,
the act of the adoption of the draft Statute cannot be interpreted as being a result of
qualitatively different dynamics than those that characterized the debates.
The draft Statute subsequently underwent minor amendments at the RECOM’s As-
sembly meeting, on 14 November 201438. Notably, in the revised version, the reference to
the representation of one female commissioner at least from each prospective state backing
the Commission was removed39. These amendments were a part of the institutionaliza-
tion process of the RECOM initiative. It consisted of appointing advocates representing
37See (Proces REKOM 2011).
38See Izmene Statuta REKOM, 14.11.2014. at http://recom.link/sr/
izmene-statuta-rekom-28-oktobar-2014-2/
39See Article 24, Criteria for Selection of Commissioners, Izmene Statuta Regionalne komisije za utvrd-
jivanje činjenica o ratnim zločinima i drugim teškim kršenjima ljudskih prava na području bivše SFRJ
na osnovu predloga Izaslanika predsednika/Predsedništva BiH za REKOM, 28 October 2014, available
at http://recom.link/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/SR-Izmene-Statuta-FINAL-12.11.2014-ff.
pdf
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the RECOM Coalition, and their engagement with state authorities in former Yugoslav
states, resulting in the changes to the draft Statute.
The final document - the draft Statute - is a major achievement as it represents a
consensual outcome following deliberation that included representatives of different ethnic
groups involved in the Balkan conflicts of the 1990s and the early 2000s. However, from
the perspective of gender inclusiveness, the draft Statute represents a typical case of a
gender-insensitive outcome of a transitional-justice process. The draft Statute includes the
reference to ‘rape and other grave forms of sexual abuse’ in the definition of a war crime
(Koalicija za REKOM 2011), but falls short of including provisions that would ensure
women’s equality in many facets of founding and running the commission; nor does it
contain arrangements appropriate for addressing war-time sexual violence, despite the
fact that public hearings of victims represent a lynch pin of this restorative transitional
justice process. Consequently, the consideration of the gender dimension in the Statute
has been considered a weakness of the RECOM process (Bonora 2019).
C Participants
Table C.2 shows the number of participants and moderators of both genders at each of
the consultations. The range is, roughly, between 20 and 70 with only consultation with
the former political prisoners in Kosovo (#10), without any women women discussants.
Overall, while the number of women discussants tends to be lower, this difference is not
stark.
Full speech participation models are given in Table C.3.
D Robustness checks of turn-taking effects
As described in the article we find significant negative effect of gender on the number
of speeches delivered in a sequence. Given that the number of direct interruptions is
very small, as our manual coding of transcripts has shown, the mechanism driving this
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Table C.2: Summary of consultation participants
Moderators Discussants
ID Participants Women Men Women Men
1 49 2 1 26 20
2 32 1 2 9 20
3 34 2 1 20 11
4 39 5 0 18 16
5 41 1 2 11 27
6 18 2 1 7 8
7 27 1 2 16 8
8 26 1 1 10 14
9 47 4 2 24 17
10 47 2 1 0 44
11 70 3 4 22 41
12 51 2 2 22 25
13 54 2 1 24 27
14 50 4 2 17 27
15 45 5 6 14 20
16 60 3 2 21 34
17 58 2 2 30 24
18 44 2 3 6 33
19 27 3 3 11 10
20 27 2 3 10 12
result could be higher probability of men being followed by men, rather than women being
followed by women. Here we provide an alternative modelling of the effect, complimentary
to the Poisson specification found in the article. Table D.4 shows the models with the
binary outcome of whether the speaker’s gender at each turn alternates, given the gender
of a previous speaker. As these are essentially lagged models, in all cases we also disregard
the very first speaker in each of the 20 consultations.
E Corpus Summary
The text corpus consists of 20 debates that were held in the languages spoken in the
Balkans. These include Slovenian, Macedonian, Albanian, Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian
and Montenegrin languages. The multi-language nature of the corpus presents a particular
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Table C.3: Multi-level models of speech participation with 95% HPD intervals in paren-
theses
Log(words)
(1) (2)
Sex (ref: Male)
-0.116 -0.112Female (-0.252, 0.031) (-0.25, 0.028)
0% Female Discussants (-0.033, 0.033)
Diversity (ref: Mono-ethnic)
-0.204Dyadic (-1.813, 1.451)
0.176Multi-Ethnic (-1.363, 1.703)
Level (ref: Non-regional)
-0.207Regional (-1.656, 1.328)
Type (ref: General)
-0.068Professionals (-1.149, 0.988)
-0.075Victims (-1.257, 1.092)
Translation (ref: No)
0.123Yes (-1.017, 1.27)
4.917 4.951Intercept (4.624, 5.198) (3.33, 6.611)
1.273 1.274
σy (1.23, 1.319) (1.228, 1.323)
0.386 0.625
σα (0.178, 0.767) (0.244, 1.377)
log-posterior -2481.234 -2488.032
Groups 20 20
Observations 1472 1472
challenge for quantitative text analysis. It raises the question of availability of tools for
translation, should researchers not be familiar with the language(s) of the data. This
issue can be resolved in a straightforward way if all documents (assuming that each
document represents a debate) are in the same language, or at least each document
individually is in one language. The RECOM debate presented a double challenge. Some
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Table D.4: Multi-level logistic models of changes in speaker’s gender with 95% HPD
intervals in parentheses
Speaker’s gender alternates
(1) (2)
Previous speaker (ref: Male)
0.141 0.134Female (0.088, 0.194) (0.081, 0.186)
0.007% Female Discussants (0.002, 0.011)
Diversity (ref: Mono-ethnic)
-0.106Dyadic (-0.346, 0.122)
-0.162Multi-Ethnic (-0.397, 0.044)
Level (ref: Non-regional)
0.119Regional (-0.099, 0.349)
Type (ref: General)
0.022Professionals (-0.132, 0.176)
0.083Victims (-0.078, 0.233)
Translation (ref: No)
-0.082Yes (-0.245, 0.079)
0.313 0.104Intercept (0.249, 0.378) (-0.097, 0.33)
0.468 0.468
σˆy (0.451, 0.485) (0.451, 0.485)
0.015 0.007
σˆα (0.005, 0.034) (0, 0.025)
log-posterior -992.762 -1000.535
Groups 20 20
Observations 1452 1452
debates were held entirely in a single language, i.e. one debate in Serbian and one in
Albanian. However, most debates were transcribed in multiple languages, as speakers
from different ethnic groups joined in the discussions. From the practical perspective of
multi-ethnic deliberation this did not present a problem as Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian
and Montenegrin languages, spoken by most participants in the debates, are mutually
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intelligible. This, however, is not the case for Albanian, Macedonian and Slovenian that
had to be translated. However, from the point of view of quantitative text analysis,
the differences even in the languages that are mutually intelligible and do not require
translation are both lexical (e.g. Serbs use the word ‘mleko’ and Croats ‘mlijeko’ for
milk; or ‘hleb’ and ‘kruh’ for bread) and grammatical imply that these languages de facto
have to be treated as different languages. These differences derive from their historical
development as variants of the Slavic language. Following the violent break-up of former
Yugoslavia, languages were subject to nationalization. Language was used to assert the
identity of newly-independent nations. Linguistic engineering also included banishing
words commonly used by different nations (Bugarski 2009). The result was a greater
‘cultural and linguistic separation’ (Kuhiwczak 1999).
The descriptive summary statistics of the consultation corpus are shown in table G.2.
While there is considerable variation in the length of consultations, most of them contain
enough data for the application of quantitative text analysis in general and structural
topic models in particular.
F Intercoder reliability
We assess intercoder reliability by calculating raw percentage of agreement, Cohen’s κ
(Cohen 1960) and Krippendorff’s α (Krippendorff 2004) for each individual component
of the DQI. All speech acts were coded by two independent coders (once by one of the
authors and separately by a research assistant after extensive training). The estimated
reliability indices are shown in Table F.6. The α-agreement ranges from ~65% to 90%,
which is not dissimilar from the previous application of comparable coding schemes in the
literature (Gerber et al. 2016) and, given the overall complexity of the task, represents
an acceptable level of agreement.
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Table E.5: Summary of the corpus of consultation transcripts
ID Tokens Types Sentences Utterances Speech Acts
1 15568 9195 645 63 27
2 24214 13214 939 66 31
3 33085 19914 1622 342 103
4 29466 17850 990 184 88
5 65862 35305 2642 252 61
6 18903 10267 841 46 67
7 20389 11379 792 99 27
8 19616 9846 800 54 18
9 22806 12885 913 111 12
10 41317 22781 1851 220 31
11 23302 13383 1060 99 38
12 20694 11641 952 57 34
13 37390 22618 1584 145 142
14 26158 15416 1146 67 101
15 29986 16380 1269 72 66
16 20052 11716 987 130 40
17 22057 12515 601 124 68
18 27166 14020 1216 148 28
19 59164 38553 2952 714 194
20 20737 11380 917 138 35
Total 577932 330258 24719 3131 1211
G Measuring Quality of Deliberation
To aggregate the components we fit a standard two-parameter IRT model of the following
form:
logit−1(P (xij = 1|γj, αi, βj)) = γj(αi + βj)
In other words, we are interested in the probability of speech act i satisfying the de-
liberation component j (being coded as 1), given the quality of a speech act αi and the
difficulty, βj, and discrimination, γj of a given component. We fit the model in Stan (Car-
penter et al. 2017) by running three Markov chains with 10’000 iterations from randomly
generated starting values. We use the standard uninformative prior specification for the
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Table F.6: Inter-coder reliability for DQI coding
Components Agreement Cohen’s κ Krippendorff’s α
Interruption 98.76 0.821 0.821
Justification Rationality 78.78 0.652 0.652
Content (common good) 92.49 0.671 0.671
Content (difference) 88.93 0.681 0.681
Content (abstract) 95.21 0.710 0.710
Respect (participants) 93.48 0.678 0.678
Respect (groups) 90.67 0.661 0.661
Story Justification 98.84 0.907 0.907
model:
α ∼ N(0, 1)
β ∼ N(µβ, σβ)
µβ ∼ Cauchy(0, 5)
σβ ∼ Cauchy(0, 5)
γ ∼ LN(0, σγ)
σγ ∼ Cauchy(0, 5)
Figure G.1 shows convergence diagnostics for γ parameters. In the interest of space
traceplots for other parameters are omitted, but are available upon request.
Table G.7 shows how the levels of the original categorical or ordinal variables as-
signed to each speech act were dichotomised into binary items for aggregation into single
composite score.
To evaluate and compare the model we also aggregate DQI component by running
principal component analysis and extracting the first principal component, doing factor
analysis and using factor scores on the first factor, as well as calculating summative index.
Figure G.2 shows correlations between the aggregated scores the quality of deliberation
estimated through different methods.
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Table G.7: Aggregation of DQI categories
Component Aggregation Code Original Label
0 interruption
Interruption
1 normal participation
no justification
0
inferior
qualifiedJustification Rationality
1
sophisticated
0 neutral (no reference)
ethnic group
my countryContent (common good)
1
my region/multie-ethnic
0 no reference
Content (difference)
1 reference
0 no reference
Content (abstract)
1 reference
negative (disrespectful, foul language)
0
no reference
neutral referenceRespect (participants)
1
positive (explicitly respectful)
other groups denigrated
0
not mentioned
neutral (mentioned but not denigrated)Respect (groups)
1
explicit respect
0 no story
unrelated story
related story (sole justification)Story Justification
1
related story (reinforces rational justification)
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Figure G.1: Convergence diagnostic of DQI aggregation
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Figure G.2: Comparison of DQI aggregation methods
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H Topic Models
Despite recent work on the importance of preprocessing decisions for quantitative text
analysis in general (Denny and Spirling 2018) and topic models in particular (Schofield
and Mimno 2016,@Schofield2017), this literature looks only at data in the English lan-
guage. Some experimentation with the corpus has shown that the use of a stopwords
list (as there is no off-the-shelf stopwords list in Serbian, it has been compiled by one
the authors) and lemmatization largely resulted in more interpretable estimates without
changing the conclusions substantively. A more advanced form of stemming, lemmati-
zation involves standardizing words into linguistically meaningful lemmas rather than
truncating words to their technically convenient, but often uninformative stems. This ap-
proach is more computationally involved due to required part-of-speech resolution prior
to lemmatization. However, it is necessary for Serbian which is a heavily conjugated
language in comparison to English. To prepare the corpus for the analysis, we further
removed punctuation and converted all tokens into lower case. Numbers were retained as
a considerable part of the discussion revolves around specific provisions and articles of the
Statute, which are labelled with numbers. In addition, we removed all the word types that
occurred fewer than 10 times across all consultations. For model fitting, we aggregate all
speeches at the speaker-level as individual documents. As most discussants participated
in only one consultation, here we use the characteristics of their first consultation
To determine the number of topics we compared held-out likelihood, semantic coher-
ence and residuals presented in figure H.3, as well substantive interpretability of models
with 5 to 50 topics. The model with 10 topics yielded the best trade-off between differ-
ent criteria. This model offers the highest held-out likelihood, estimated on portion of
the words that were held-out during model training, as well as semantic coherence or
pointwise mutual information. In other words, the extent to which the words that more
probable under the a topic co-occur within the same document. Furthermore, it provides
the largest improvement in residuals (how far the sample dispersion is from 1, the closer
the better). Table H.8 further provides an output from a range of algorithms used to
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generate sets of words describing each topic.
As a robustness test to show the main results, namely, between-gender differences in
topics evaluation and implementation, are not sensitive to the number of topics we present
an alternative specification with 5 topics. Figures H.4 and H.5 show the translated words
with highest probabilities for each topic and the estimated effects of gender on topic
prevalence. We have also fitted a model with all topic prevalence covariates, apart form
gender, excluded. It did not affect the substantive findings and we omit it in the interest
of space. These results are available upon request.
Figure H.3: Diagnostics of STM fit
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Figure H.4: Distribution over words in 5 topics
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Figure H.5: Topical Prevalence by Male and Female Discussants for 5 Topics
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Table H.8: Topic Labelling
Topic Labelling Algorithm Words
prob krivični, komisija, sud, misliti, kazati, član, lice
frex krivični, učinilac, sumnja, tužilac, izjava, davanje, priznanje
lift 47, hitan, neispunjavanje, nepouzdan, obezbeđenje, 1.09, 20091
score krivični, sumnja, učinilac, postupak, tužilac, kazna, izjava
prob zločin, pravo, ratni, žrtva, činjenica, ljudski, komisija
frex čovečnost, kršenje, alternativa, oružan, popis, težak, utvrđivanje
lift amirov, dal, izvorište, konsultacioni, konzultacija, ograničavajući, osuđenik2
score kršenje, alternativa, čovečnost, zločin, oružan, definicija, popis
prob godina, čovek, reći, kazati, porodica, nestali, rat
frex zrenjanin, zatvor, državljanstvo, krst, naprimer, crven, selo
lift feniks, izgoreti, plav, 88, 93, bala, bljesak3
score zrenjanin, euforija, mentalitet, 213, metak, krst, naprimer
prob član, država, komisija, misliti, statut, rekom, predsednik
frex panel, članica, selekcioni, izbor, sposobnost, kriterijum, donositi
lift aneks, blisko, dvotrećinski, funkcioniranje, haotičan, isključenje, izmjena4
score panel, selekcioni, sposobnost, kvorum, osobina, dvotrećinski, članica
prob rat, žrtva, čovek, godina, misliti, zločin, država
frex veteran, prošlost, budućnost, mlad, aleksić, suočavanje, otmica
lift 06, 1.000.000, 1.059, 114, 16.500, 1968, 19715
score aleksić, veteran, nacionalizam, škola, pančev, neprijateljski, brigada
prob rekom, država, žrtva, pitanje, dokument, određen, izveštaj
frex tajan, dokument, tribunal, preporuka, haški, aspekt, informacija
lift blajburg, delomičan, izbalansirati, jednosmeran, kompetentan, kulturno, kupovati6
score dokument, izveštaj, tajan, preporuka, institucionalan, dobrovoljnost, ombudsman
prob čovek, godina, doći, znati, reći, žrtva, kazati
frex vukovar, grad, avionski, logor, ispričati, ti, suditi
lift auto, bristol, kafa, kajati, obnova, otkaz, porušiti7
score avionski, prijedor, grahovo, doboj, delikt, trifunović, verbalan
prob godina, znati, kosovo, reći, žrtva, zločin, rekom
frex euleks, opraštati, posmrtni, oprostiti, 1999, ostatak, albanija
lift 1244, baletić, dick, kidnaper, marti, milijana, neprimenjiv8
score euleks, oproštaj, žaljenje, opraštati, oteti, metohija, 1998
prob bosna, hercegovina, žrtva, broj, kosovo, rekom, govoriti
frex hercegovina, bosna, broj, gora, dubrava, opcija, sarajevo
lift divjak, komisionar, munira, opkoliti, reprezentativan, sejdić, tlo9
score dubrava, hercegovina, srbin, kosovo, intenzitet, bošnjak, vučitrn
prob misliti, rekom, čovek, reći, znati, godina, važan
frex zanimati, 5, kontekst, struka, važan, vremenski, odeljenje
lift 1913, dačić, destruktivan, duhovan, gordan, indirektno, izvaditi10
score sprema, 5, trn, odeljenje, obrazovni, okupiti, indirektno
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I Software statement
The analysis was run under Linux Ubuntu 18.04 using R version 3.5.1 (R Core Team
2018). We relied on the following R packages in our empirical analysis:
bayesplot (Gabry and Mahr 2018),
dplyr (Wickham et al. 2018),
GGally (Schloerke et al. 2018),
ggplot2 (Wickham 2016),
irr (Gamer et al. 2012),
kableExtra (Zhu 2018),
knitr (Xie 2018),
lme4 (Bates et al. 2015),
ltm (Rizopoulos 2006),
lubridate (Grolemund and Wickham 2011),
magrittr (Bache and Wickham 2014),
pander (Daróczi and Tsegelskyi 2018),
processx (Csárdi and Chang 2018),
readr (Wickham, Hester, and Francois 2017),
rstan (Stan Development Team 2018),
rstanarm (Stan Development Team 2016),
stm (Roberts, Stewart, and Tingley 2018),
stringi (Gagolewski 2018),
stringr (Wickham 2018),
tibble (Müller and Wickham 2018),
tidyr (Wickham and Henry 2018), and
quanteda (Benoit et al. 2018).
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Chapter 4
Record Linkage with Text: Merging
Data Sets When Information is Limited
166
ABSTRACT
The recent years have seen the emergence of new, more scalable ways to link information
about different entities across multiple data sources. However, merging data sets when
the number of variables used for record linkage is restricted remains challenging. In this
paper I consider the case when the information is limited to a single multi-token text
string. This situation often occurs when researchers work with organization names, user
accounts or any other short labels. Using Lobbying Disclosure Act data I illustrate sub-
stantive implications that the choice of record linkage approach can have in empirical
research. I review the existing approaches and consider three types of noise that can
typically be encountered in this scenario: character-level, word-level or a combination of
both. Furthermore, I conduct a simulation study showing the sensitivity of the existing
approaches to the presence of errors occurring at different levels. The results suggest that
the optimal choice of a record linkage approach depends on contextual knowledge about
the most likely type of noise, as well as stress the need to conduct sensitivity analysis
using different record linkage approaches.
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4.1 Introduction
Political science research is increasingly relying on more than one source of data (Brady,
2019). This brings exciting new opportunities for empirically testing old and new theo-
ries, that previously were inaccessible to scholars due to limitations of disparate datasets.
However, this advancement comes at a cost. While in some cases it is possible to un-
ambiguously link multiple datasets with few to no errors, this task becomes far more
challenging in other circumstances. For example, in a cross-country analysis, it is usu-
ally feasible to enumerate all labels or codes that can be possibly used to refer to the
same state. In many other cases this task is far from straightforward. Merging together
datasets that contain individuals (Enamorado et al., 2019), organisation names (Bonica,
2014; Kim, 2017) or event records (Donnay et al., 2019) requires more elaborate design of
linkage procedure. Some of the adopted approaches have a long lineage, when they have
been used for decades in census and survey research (Newcombe et al., 1959; Newcombe
and Kennedy, 1962), other, more recently developed (Sadinle, 2017), are yet to be tested
on the types of data common in political science.
One particular task, not infrequently encountered in applied research, is the merging
of multiple data sets when the only variable that they have in common is the text field
containing the name of organization, geographic area or article name. In this paper I argue
that this condition poses a distinct problem that cannot be adequately addressed neither
by the methods developed within the emerging literature on text matching (Roberts
et al., 2018; Mozer et al., 2019) due to the short length of the available text, nor by
the more established approaches used for linking individuals (Fellegi and Sunter, 1969;
Enamorado and Imai, 2020), due to exclusive usage of information contained in the name.
The complications arise due to the unobserved nature of the noise found in the real-life
data. More specifically, I consider three types of noise: (1) character-level corruption, (2)
word-level corruption and (3) combination of the first two. Character-level noise is likely
to occur as a result of errors introduced by the optical-character recognition (OCR), e.g.
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when the scanned archival materials are processed with the specialized software, or as a
typo made by a human operator manually entering the data. Word-level distortion can
be encountered when there are multiple accepted names that are used to refer to the
same geographic or corporate entities (e.g. the same parliamentary constituency can be
referred to as “Cities of London and Westminster” or “Cities of London & Westminster”).
In many scenarios, however, a researcher is likely to encounter the third type, some
combination of character and word-level noise. In this paper I use a simulation study and
a real-world dataset to evaluate the performance of different record linkage approaches
to problems where information for matching is limited to text. First, to make the results
of the study language- and dataset-agnostic and isolate the effects of different types of
noise, I use simulated data that is generated to reflect the features of real text labels
and then introduce randomly introduce noise of a known type. For additional tests I
further use a dataset of organization names in the UK to assess the performance on real
data. I argue that while none of the current approaches can be taken as a “silver bullet”,
empirical researchers can leverage their background knowledge about data-generating
process to account for the most likely type of text distortion. At the same time, when
core substantive results critically rely on a merged dataset it is important to conduct
sensitivity analysis, showing the consistency of findings across different approaches to
record linkage.
The purpose of this paper is three-fold. First, I review the currently available ap-
proaches for dealing with textual labels as the only available identifier. I conduct a case
study, using LDA disclosure and PPP loans data to illustrate the substantive implications
that the choice of a record linkage approach can have in practice. Second, I conceptualise
and introduce three different types of noise that can be observed in such labels. And,
third, I evaluate currently existing methods for record linkage based on these labels using
a common metric, which makes them more comparable with each other and elicits differ-
ent trade-offs that this task faces1. To assess their performance I use simulated and real
1While there are existing review articles on name matching (Cohen et al., 2003), they do not cover
more recent developments in this area and the comparison is done on data sets that are considerably
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datasets that are more akin to those that are encountered in political science literature.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In the following section I present the
historical overview of the development of record linkage. Then I review the currently
available approaches and conduct an illustrative case study. After that I outline a frame-
work of analysing labels as textual data. In the fifth section. I evaluate these methods
on the simulated and real data sets. And, lastly, I show their performance on real-world
data.
4.2 Background
With its origins in public health and epidemiological research (Dunn, 1946), record link-
age2 has been advocated as an alternative to expensive large-scale longitudinal studies
(Jutte et al., 2011). The first key insight was that the odds of observing an agreement
pattern in a pair of records carries different amount of information depending on how
rarely the values in those records occur in the population (Newcombe et al., 1959; New-
combe and Kennedy, 1962). In other words, the two records that contain the same first
name “Catherine” are much less likely to be a true match than those with “Stavroula”.
Conveniently, the probabilities of observing different values for first names, last names,
etc could be calculated from census data. Furthermore, as noted by the authors, the same
logic could applied beyond names. For instance, the place of birth also has different dis-
criminating power depending on the population of a given location and how common its
name is.
The statistical foundation of most contemporary implementations of record linkage
algorithms was laid in the seminal work of Fellegi and Sunter (1969). They proposed
separation of record pairs into matches, non-matches and potential matches given the
vector comparing individual fields for this pair (agreement pattern). While the assumption
different from those used by political scientists.
2These two sections are meant to provide a brief overview of record linkage as applicable to textual
labels. For more thorough introduction to broader record linkage literature see Christen (2012).
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that fields are independent from each other is likely to be violated in reality this often
does not substantially affect the results. Another critical step of using Fellegi-Sunter
framework is the calculation of posterior probabilities of a record pair being in each
match class, given the agreement pattern. In practice, this is usually done either by
relying on a “gold standard” dataset or using Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm
for estimating unknown parameters (Winkler, 2000; Enamorado et al., 2019). The specific
details of how agreement pattern is to be estimated varies across the tasks. While for the
date of birth this could be a simple difference between the two dates in days or years,
in case of names this would typically be the string distance expressed in the number of
characters that need to be changed in order to convert one name into another.
So far most of the literature has been concerned with the task of matching records of
individuals3, who provide a range of characteristics for comparison, such as names, age,
gender, address, etc. While this is hardly surprising given the amount of data collected
by censuses and large-scale surveys on an annual basis, this leaves the question of how
well the currently available approaches perform on tasks, where there the information is
restricted to only a single variable containing textual data. In the following section I will
review the key approaches.
4.3 Existing Approaches
Currently, there are four main approaches available to applied researchers for linking
observations across multiple data sets. Table 4.1 summarizes them and their key features
and drawbacks.
The first possible solution is to simply merge two data sets treating the label field as
a unique identifier and linking rows that contain exactly the same names. Although this
approach is very crude, depending on the label structure and the nature of noise in the
data, it can offer high precision with low recall. More specifically, its performance depends
3However, see Cohen et al. (2003).
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on whether the uniqueness assumption is met. While in many instances geographic units,
organization names and newspaper titles can be assumed to be unique or almost unique
in the population, this assumption appears highly implausible for individual names, sur-
names, gender and even addresses. Thus, one would not expect a similar number of false
positives when applying simple merge to labels. At the same time this approach critically
depends on labels being universal across different sources and limited noise from data
entry, such as optical character recognition or clerical input.
Table 4.1: Summary of Record Linkage Approaches.
Method Nature Features Example
Simple Merge Deterministic Unique labels assumed SQL joins
String Distance Similarity score +/- Character-level comparison Levenshtein- Arbitrary threshold Jaro-Winkler
Text Similarity Similarity score +/- Word-level comparison cosine- Arbitrary threshold
Probabilistic Linkage Probabilistic + Estimated probabilities RecordLinkage+/- Character-level comparison fastLink
To allow more flexibility, instead of simple merge, a researcher might choose to calcu-
late edit distances (Navarro, 2001) between all possible pairs and then choose some cutoff
when a pair is considered to be a match. Edit distance is usually defined as some func-
tion that takes two strings as input and produces a scalar4 that in its basic form counts
the number of changes required to convert one string into another. One of the earliest
and most elementary distance measures, Levenshtein distance (Levenshtein, 1965), sim-
ply counts insertions, deletions or substitutions of individual characters as possible edit
operations for this transformation. This basic approach can be extended by incorporat-
ing other types of edit operations, such as transposition (Damerau, 1964) or accounting
for the lengths of compared strings (Winkler, 1990). The two most important aspects
of any record linkage procedures based exclusively on string distance measures are (1)
4Although in practice, string comparison function can take more than two strings and produce a
vector or matrix of distances, for simplicity of exposition, I will focus my discussion here on the case of
two input strings.
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character-focused nature of comparisons made and (2) arbitrariness of cutoff threshold
for matches. The focus on individual characters comprising a text string can be benefi-
cial if the expected errors occur at this level. The examples could be texts that result
from OCR and incorporate typos made by clerical error during data entry. However, the
downside of this approach is that it completely ignores the structure of the label data. In
cases, when alterations happen at the level of individual tokens (e.g. using “&” instead
of “and” in names of geographic areas) it can result in a large number of false negatives.
Another caveat of relying on string distance measures for merging data sets is the need
to decide on a cutoff point when two records are considered to be a match. While this
permits a higher degree of flexibility than a simple merge5, this comes at a cost of the
need to balance precision and recall. While setting the threshold too high can result in
missing many true matches, making it too low, on the contrary, will result in many false
positives.
A different way to consider short text labels is to think of them not as sequences of
characters, but as collections of individual tokens that can change their position within the
label. This approach in text-as-data literature (Grimmer and Stewart, 2013) is referred
to as “bag-of-words”. By disregarding the position of words in labels, the principle source
of information on potential matches is the presence and the number of identical words
in a candidate record pair. Some measure of similarity can then be applied to calculate
the distance between the two representations of labels in the vector format. One of such
measures, cosine similarity, between two labels i and j could be calculated as:
cos(li, lj) =
∑W
w=1 liwljw√∑W
w=1 l
2
iw
√∑W
w=1 l
2
jw
where W is the total length of vector representations or, to put it differently, the
number of unique words occurring in both labels. As opposed to string distance compar-
isons, text similarity measures offer a more flexible approach to deal with the word-level
5Effectively, simple merge can be considered a special case of string distance-based record linkage,
when the allowed distance is taken to be 0.
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variation in the labels. The same corporate entity, can be referred to as “Heathrow Air-
port”, “Heathrow Airport Ltd” or, simply, “Heathrow”. However, this approach does not
solve the problem with arbitrary threshold, which has to be selected as a decision rule
for separating candidate pairs into matches and non-matches.
While the statistical apparatus for probabilistic record linkage was developed some
half a century ago (Fellegi and Sunter, 1969), accessible open-source implementations
have appeared only recently (Sariyar and Borg, 2010; Enamorado et al., 2019). In a
nutshell, probabilistic record linkage is a mixture model where the specific agreement
pattern observed is a function of the underlying latent membership in the discrete class
of true matches or true non-matches. The key quantity of interest can, thus, be defined
as:
θij =
∏K
k=1 P (γij|Mij = 1)∏K
k=1 P (γij|Mij = 0)
where θ is the ratio between products of probabilities of observing values γij in a
k-component agreement pattern, given that labels i and j represent a genuine match:
Mij = 1. The crucial assumption that makes computation tractable is the independence
between components k. In practice, the computation of this quantity of interest requires
knowing whether i and j represent a true match, something which is rarely known. This
can be learnt from a “gold standard” training dataset or using an EM algorithm (Winkler,
2000; Sariyar and Borg, 2010; Enamorado et al., 2019). While probabilistic record linkage
allows for modelling the parameters of interest, instead of relying on arbitrary cutoffs,
the need to have discrete components for comparison appears problematic for variable-
length multi-token strings. Indeed, if two labels “Heathrow Airport” and “Heathrow” are
segmented into individual tokens, then they would have different number of components.
However, treating them as a single field for comparison necessitates the calculation of
string distance between the two, which, in the presence of additional words, is likely to
be overestimated.
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4.4 Labels as Text
Political scientists successfully applied a range of computational approaches to textual
data (Grimmer and Stewart, 2013) to estimate ideological positions (Laver et al., 2003;
Slapin and Proksch, 2008; Diermeier et al., 2012), explain internal working of censorship
apparatus (King et al., 2013), assess the impact of franchise extension on speech behavior
in parliament (Spirling, 2015), explore the agenda-setting power of social media (Barberá
et al., 2019) and predict the onset of political violence (Mueller and Rauh, 2018). All
these applications use texts that can safely be assumed to contain natural language. Be it
party manifestos, floor speeches in parliament, social media posts or newspaper articles,
they were all written for the eventual perusing by other humans. Even when applying dif-
ferent ‘bag-of-words’ models, which scramble sentences and render them meaningless for
a human reader, one can still be certain that the distributional properties of text remain
intact. However, it is uncertain to what extent would a collection of short strings that
contain names of different entities meet the same criteria. Before I proceed to assessing
the performance of different methods, it is important to show that this type of textual
data indeed behaves statistically similar to a more common source.
The universal statistical property of natural languages, most extensively documented
by and named after Zipf (1935) provides one such test. It states that word frequency and
its rank in the frequencies table have an inverse power relation. In other words, the second
most frequent word will occur approximately half the number of the most frequent, the
third half the number of the second and so on. More formally, the frequency of a word w
with rank r can be expressed as:
F (wr) =
C
rα
(4.1)
where C is a normalization constant (for English language C is often taken as ≈ 0.1) and
α is value of the exponent characterizing the distribution (in Zipf’s original formulation
α ≈ 2).
To make the distributions easier to compare in graphical form across different corpora,
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Figure 4.1: Log-log Token Plot. Token frequency for 500 most frequent words plotted
against token rank on a log-log scale for 3 data sources.
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Note: Client names from data released under the Lobbying Disclosure Act and compiled by OpenSecrets
(LDA), simulated dataset of 200,000 short labels (Sim), 239 State of the Union addresses in the US from
1790 to 2016 (SOTU) are used.
I plot the logarithm of frequency and rank instead of the raw numbers. Figure 4.1 shows
Zipf’s distribution for 3 different sources. The first one is a more canonical corpus of
State of the Union addresses by the US president to Congress, extensively studied before
(Rule et al., 2015; Benoit et al., 2019). The second source is more pertinent to the record
linkage problem. Here the figure shows the frequency and rank of the 500 most frequent
tokens used in names of organizations reported as lobbyists’ client under the Lobbying
Disclosure Act, often used in interest group studies (Ansolabehere et al., 2002; Kim, 2017;
You, 2017). And the third one is an artificial dataset generated for the simulation study
below, which was designed to exhibit all the properties of a typical collection of entity
labels in text form without incorporating the specificities of any particular data set. As
can be seen from the figure, the distributions for addresses and labels appear very much
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alike with both almost following a straight diagonal. Although coarse, the comparison of
Zipf’s distributions shows that entity label data is not dissimilar to other textual corpora
and its statistical properties should not pose a problem for the application methods for
text analysis.
4.5 Case Study: Lobbying and PPP Loans
To illustrate the implications of choosing one record linkage approach over another it is
helpful to consider some real-world datasets and approximate substantive analysis that
a researcher might wish to carry out on them. One such dataset could be the already
noted Lobbying Disclosure Act, which provides extensive details on lobbying activities in
the US. Starting from 1996, all lobbyists have to file semi-annual reports, documenting
all clients and income received from or expenditure on the in-house lobbying activities.
This data has been used extensively in the lobbying literature (Ansolabehere et al., 2002;
Kim, 2017; You, 2017) and at the same time it exists in unstandardized form, a not
atypical situation in political science research. While in principle researchers can compile
the disclosure reports themselves from the official government source6 (Goldstein and
You, 2017), it is not less common to use pre-existing compilations (You, 2017). In what
follows I will be relying on the dataset compiled by the Center for Responsible Politics7.
In the wake of the ongoing coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic and the accompanying
it economic crisis, the US Congress adopted a number of measures to alleviate the shock
under the broad CARES (Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security) Act. One of
those measures was the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP), a $669-billion business loan
program administered by the US Small Business administration. In essence the program
allowed small business owners to apply for loans, backed by the government, to cover
the payment of salaries to payroll employees. These loans can then be partially or fully
forgiven, if a business owner retains the jobs. The public release of the data on companies
6https://lobbyingdisclosure.house.gov/
7https://www.opensecrets.org/
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that received such loans since the start of the program has drawn criticism on the grounds
that many lobbyists were among the businesses that received a stimulus package8.
Given the controversy, surrounding the distribution of forgivable loans, a researcher
might be interested in the relationships between corporate lobbying and getting a loan.
Unfortunately, the most interesting question, whether an organization that was engaged
in lobbying in the past few years was more likely to receive a loan than the one that
did not, is impossible to test empirically. As the released data contains only successful
borrowers and not all applicants, we cannot address this question directly. However, we
can still ask a number of substantively interesting questions with this data. For example,
one of the declared purposes of the PPP loans was job retention. Conceivably, one would
expect the organizations that promised to keep more workplaces intact were more likely
to be granted a loan. It is then possible to assess whether lobbying played any moderating
role in this relationship. In other words, did organizations involved in lobbying managed
to be among the receivers of loans. To conduct this analysis a researcher would need to
see what organizations were listed in the PPP receivers data and compare them with
those in the LDA data. As the number of entities listed in both datasets is in the tens of
thousands, rendering manual matching infeasible, this requires some automated record
linkage approach. Here I illustrate how the choice of a record linkage approach can have
severe implications for inference and dramatically affect substantive conclusions drawn
by a researcher.
To test the effects of record linkage approaches on inference, I downloaded the data
released by the Small Business Administration9 listing loan receivers across all US states
and some territories (e.g. Guam and Puerto Rico), who got loans above $150,000. In total
this dataset contains data on 661,218 organizations. For substantive and computational
reasons, as well as to increase the chances of successful matches, I further restricted
this dataset to those that received loans in excess of $1M, which reduced it to 82,708
8See, for instance, https://www.politico.com/newsletters/politico-influence/2020/07/07/
which-lobbying-and-public-affairs-firms-got-ppp-loans-789005.
9https://www.sba.gov/funding-programs/loans/coronavirus-relief-options/
paycheck-protection-program
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organizations. Also, rather than trying to find these organization among all those that
reported lobbying activity, I focus only on those that filed reports between 2017 and
2019. There are approximately 14,000 organizations that reported lobbying activity for
this period10.
10This number is approximate and not exact as the original datasets required deduplication, a subtask
often encountered in record linkage. The precise number depends on how deduplication is done. In its
raw form the dataset contains 13,931 unique strings for the given time period.
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Table 4.2: Analysis of Lobbying in PPP Loans. Reported number of retained jobs is the dependent variable.
Simple Levenshtein Distance Cosine Similarity
raw cleaned < 0.1 < 0.2 < 0.25 > 0.9 > 0.75 > 0.7
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
10.1698 10.1912 9.5699 5.2395 7.5744** 13.4242 3.1079 4.0893Lobbied (2017-19) (9.7377) (5.4342) (8.1205) (4.2899) (2.853) (9.5333) (5.0294) (3.6977)
45.0087*** 44.9735*** 44.9988*** 44.9836*** 44.815*** 44.9651*** 45.0441*** 44.9298***Organization Type (Non-Profit) (1.4612) (1.4586) (1.4607) (1.4614) (1.461) (1.4611) (1.4637) (1.468)
0.228 0.2506 0.2211 0.2225 0.1977 0.2188 0.2367 0.2265Organization Type (Other) (2.1905) (2.1903) (2.1905) (2.1905) (2.1904) (2.1905) (2.1905) (2.1905)
State FE
137.1935*** 137.1378*** 137.2024*** 137.2546*** 137.0349*** 137.1629*** 137.1796*** 137.1099***Constant (9.3714) (9.3711) (9.3712) (9.3709) (9.371) (9.3713) (9.3727) (9.3723)
Observations 77480 77480 77480 77480 77480 77480 77480 77480
R2 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
Note: OLS model estimates are shown. Reference category for organization type is business. Different datasets compiled using 3 record linkage approaches
are used.
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Table 4.3: Analysis of Lobbying Expenditure in PPP Loans. Reported number of retained jobs is the dependent variable.
Simple Levenshtein Distance Cosine Similarity
raw cleaned < 0.1 < 0.2 < 0.25 > 0.9 > 0.75 > 0.7
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
-2.6753 0.3985 -1.365 -2.4764* -1.5021* -1.4613 -1.4259 -0.7065Log(Lobbying Expenditure) (3.2759) (1.5663) (2.6208) (1.0814) (0.6688) (3.1396) (1.2504) (0.8423)
31.1771 40.3861** 38.5782 57.1709*** 61.7728*** 19.715 33.8171** 40.3934***Organization Type (Non-Profit) (30.5018) (13.9689) (21.8814) (10.1629) (7.1018) (29.1699) (11.2916) (8.1442)
-11.5341 8.1971 23.1395 -4.7989 12.3039 -34.426 21.8922 12.9273Organization Type (Other) (56.781) (35.5595) (43.7266) (22.0556) (14.5207) (53.8893) (26.5939) (19.5993)
State FE
128.6863 131.5971 120.7588 127.4832 130.4711** 121.3411 115.455* 121.7887**Constant (96.6657) (77.4518) (98.2976) (92.5959) (49.4061) (96.7813) (50.0778) (43.7028)
Observations 162 521 233 843 1931 169 615 1152
R2 0.3 0.13 0.25 0.13 0.1 0.29 0.11 0.09
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
Note: OLS model estimates are shown. Reference category for organization type is business. Different subsets of the data compiled using 3 record linkage
approaches are used.
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The three record linkage approaches that I consider in this example are (1) simple
merge, using raw and some basically cleaned data, (2) Levenshtein distance and (3) cosine
similarity with multiple cut-offs. More specifically, in the case of cleaned simple merge, I
remove all common words in corporate names (such as llp, llc, corp, etc.) and trim any
extraneous whitespaces. In the case of Levenshtein distance I calculate the string dis-
tance between all pairs of names and then for each entry in the PPP dataset I choose the
one from the LDA dataset containing the closest organization name. As absolute string
distance can be sensitive to the length of the original string, I further normalize it by
the number of characters in the names of loan receivers. Put differently, thus normalized
Levenshtein distance of 0.1 indicates that 10% of characters in the original name have
to undergo change to be converted into the name from the right-hand side dataset of
lobbyists. i use three different cut-offs of 0.1, 0.2 and 0.25, naturally, resulting in progres-
sively more successful matches. And, lastly, prior to calculating cosine similarity between
all pairs of candidate names, I remove all punctuation marks. Here I use the cut-offs
of 0.9, 0.75 and 0.7. The specific cut-offs in each case were selected to be both broadly
equivalent11 and provide a comparable number of successful matches.
After merging PPP dataset with the data on lobbying, I estimate two baseline OLS
models, focussing on two principal explanatory variables: (1) lobbied, a binary indica-
tor of whether the organization lobbied the government between 2017 and 2019 and (2)
log(lobbying expenditure), a continuous explanatory variable combining amount spend on
both in-house and consultant lobbying activities. Tables 4.2 and 4.3 show the results of
fitting these models on datasets created using different record linkage approaches. Com-
paring between the two models, it appears that record linkage had a larger impact on
the second set of models. While relaxing some matching assumptions, such increasing
the permissible normalized Levenshtein distance to 0.25 did result in the higher number
of matches in the first set, which in turn made the coefficient for lobbying significant
11Cosine similarity of 0.9 indicates that word vectors representing the names of two organizations are
very similar as does Levenstein distance of 0.1. Note the opposite direction of comparison, the lower the
distance and the higher the similarity the closer are the matches.
182
(βˆlobbied = 7.57, p < 0.01 in model 5), the sign and magnitude of coefficients is consistent
across different record linkage approaches. This cannot be said about the relationship be-
tween lobbying expenditure and the number of retained jobs. Recall that our substantive
hypothesis here is whether lobbyists were more successful in securing loans, while keep-
ing fewer jobs. While the first set of models reported in Table 4.2 provide scant support
for this, higher lobbying expenditure appears to be consistently associated with lower
number of retained jobs, controlling for organizational type and location. However, in a
more conservative approach of simple merging after some pre-cleaning we see the coeffi-
cient switching its sign, albeit it is not statistically significant. Overall, this relationship
appears to be negative as per our hypothesis and consistent with the criticism of more
political commentators.
Having shown with this short case study the importance and substantive implications
that the choice of a record linkage approach can have for empirical analysis in political
science research, the next logical step is to see what performance can be achieved in
principle.
4.6 Simulation Study
A Basic Setup
The basic idea behind a simulation study on record linkage is to create artificial data
sets the appear as similar as possible to real-world data, add several types of statistical
noise that imitates different ways in which the information contained in one of them
could be distorted and apply currently available methods to evaluate their performance
against known ground truth about true matches. Correspondingly, I create simulated
data sets that incorporate the features of real label data without having to rely on the
particularities of any specific source. Thus, this simulation study, first, allows to assess
the performance more precisely as the true matches are available and do not have to be
generated by hand-coding the data. Second, it allows to isolate the effects of the different
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types of noise and their combinations that could be present in real data. Third, it allows
to test not only matching performance, but also computational efficiency and scalability
of different approaches, as the size of data can be defined extraneously. Fourth, generating
entirely artificial data makes the results more generalizable and potentially applicable to
a wider range of domains than just organization names, that I use for evaluation in the
following section. And, fifth, while some of the hyper-parameters used to generate the
data are empirical quantities valid for English, the fact that the resultant tokens are not
genuine English words, makes the results less linguistically restricted than a random draw
from some pre-defined vocabulary.
B Data Generating Process
Modelling the data generating process for textual data is not unproblematic. Language
is a complex socio-cultural phenomenon that displays a lot of variation across localities,
classes and individual authors. Even short names of companies, geographical units or
literary works can contain tropes that would be extremely hard or virtually impossible
to identify automatically. For example, the company name ‘YPlan’ contains a pun which
requires some phonetic knowledge that is not necessarily to a parsing system. Fortunately,
the task for which the simulated text is used in this article is much simpler than the
extraction of hidden meanings from labels.
The simplest and often used approach to simulate textual data, common in computa-
tional linguistics (Li, 1992), is to define a set of characters (e.g. lowercase English letters),
that includes whitespace, and generate a random text as a sequence of characters drawn
from a multinomial distribution:
t ∼Multinomial(n, k,pi) (4.2)
where n is the length of text t and k is the number of entries in the alphabet and
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(pi1, ..., pik) are probabilities associated with each letter12. The whitespaces randomly oc-
curring throughout the text are then treated as word boundaries. While being very intu-
itive and simple to implement, this approach, however, generates data that is statistically
and qualitatively different from real data. Although the in-built inverse relationship be-
tween word length and word frequency accurately describes it in the limit, it often does
not hold on real data of even relatively large sizes. As figure 4.2a shows, the lengths of
most frequent words used in organization names vary considerably, from single-character
articles ‘a’ to such words as ‘international’.
Figure 4.2: Frequency Distribution of Tokens. 50 most frequent tokens are shown.
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(b) Simulated
Note: A random sample of 100,000 organizations and 100,000 simulated labels are used. 3 most common
tokens (limited, ltd, services) are excluded from the BvD figure.
In order to make the simulated data more realistic, I use the data-generating process
that directly incorporates Zipf-Mandelbrot distribution. In addition to that I use some
empirical regularities for English language, that make the tokes appear more natural and,
oftentimes, not entirely implausible.
The data generating process is divided into two parts: vocabulary generation and
text generation. In the first step I generate tokens as random iid draws from categorical
distribution:
wi ∼Multinomial(µi, k,pi) (4.3)
12As an extension of Zipf’s law, Mandelbrot (1954) provided mathematical foundation for this distri-
bution and showed that even without any human intention such text generating process would exhibit a
very long right tail.
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where a word i contains µi characters that come from alphabet of length k, each letter of
which has (pi1, ..., pik) probability of occurring. The alphabet here is defined as all letters in
English language, but without including the whitespace character. Although it is possible
to set hyper-parameters to randomly generate (pi1, .., pik), to make the final result more
akin to English-language labels, I use empirical relative frequencies of different letter in
real words13. In turn, µi is generated from a Poisson distribution:
µi ∼ Poisson(λ) (4.4)
where λ is taken to be 6, as the average length of words in English (Rothschild, 1986).
In the second part, after generating the vocabulary of a fixed pre-defined size, I sim-
ulate labels as a random sample of tokens from this population. To draw this sample I
use Zipf-Mandelbrot distribution as follows:
tj ∼ Zipf −Mandelbrot(τj, C, α) (4.5)
where the label j contains τj tokens. C and α are the scaling parameters that were de-
scribed in the equation 4.1. Zipf-Mandelbrot distribution, which is sometimes described
as the discrete version of the Pareto distribution (Adamic, 2011), provides a very useful
approach to simulating textual data. The key advantage of using Zipf-Mandebrot dis-
tribution over discrete probability distributions, such as Poisson or negative binomial,
is that, first, it incorporates power law relationship between frequency and rank, which
characterises real-world texts. And, second, it models higher and more realistic type-to-
token ratio across the generated labels, than even an overdispersed distribution such as
negative binomial would allow without explicitly modelling its first moment as a func-
tion of other covariates. The length of labels is set to be between 1 and 5 tokens and is
13The letter frequencies were compiled by Peter Norvig and are available here:
http://norvig.com/mayzner.html.
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randomly drawn from the categorical distribution:
τj ∼ Categorical(l,pi) (4.6)
with l, the maximum number of tokens being equal to 5 and (pi1, ..., pil) having uniform
distribution over permissible label lengths.
Figure 4.2b plots the distribution of 100 most frequent tokens occurring in the simu-
lated data set of 100’000 labels. While the curvature the line appears smoother than in
real data on the left, it it s important to note the absence of 2 outliers in the simulated
data. The log-log plot in figure 4.2 shows that apart from the dozen most frequently
observed tokens, the distributions for all three data sets are closely aligned.
C Noise Simulation
After generating the population of text labels, each unique label is assigned an id14. I
draw 2 random samples of 10,000 each from this population. The dataset A is kept intact,
while the labels in the dataset B are distorted at a rate of 0.315. Specifically, for each label
j in dataset B a draw from a binomial distribution with a probability of corruption of
0.3 is used to decide whether the label remains unaltered. If not, given the pre-specified
type of noise, one of the following scenarios can occur. For character-level distortion
replacement, deletion or insertion of a number of characters16 is chosen at random. In
the case of word-level distortion one word selected at random is either removed or its
position is changed. To simulate the combination of the two types of noise I, first, apply
the procedure at the word-level and then the new label gets distorted at the character-
14The assumption of unique identifier based on labels is based on the expectation that in the population
the names are genuinely unique. Some real-world deviations from this assumption should not be critical.
However, if this assumption can be expected to be severely violated, such as with the personal names,
the implications of this study might be less applicable.
15Introducing the noise into one and not both datasets provides an optimistic estimate of the perfor-
mance of record linkage methods. This scenario, however, is not unrealistic as researchers often treat the
names in one curated dataset as a golden standard and would like the other datasets to conform to this
standard.
16The number of characters affected is picked at random and can be at most 3 or the maximum length
of the label.
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level. In total I create three versions of the distorted dataset B, each incorporating a
different type of noise structure. While the text labels are affected, unique identifiers
assigned at the earlier stage provide a way to systematically assess the performance of
the record linkage approaches.
D Simulation Results
Figure 4.3 shows the main results of applying record linkage approaches on the simulated
dataset. For methods which require the setting of arbitrary threshold for matches the
sensitivity of these choices is shown with lines. Overall, the the two random samples
contain 1,172 true matches (roughly 10% of each of the two datasets), textual labels that
were originally identical across them. Restricting the total size of the datasets allows to
limit the number of true non-matches, a metric which tends to inflate the estimates of
record linkage performance. As matches often constitute a minority of all records in a
given dataset, achieving high accuracy is easy in cases where data shows a large degree
of variation and comparison pairs tend to be dissimilar.
Each panel shows the performance of record linkage approach according to two mea-
sures: precision and recall. As they do not include true negatives, these measures are
more robust to class imbalance which is frequently encountered in matching problems.
Recall that precision in this context is the number of true matches divided by the total
number of matches suggested by record linkage approach: True MatchesTrue Matches+False Matches . Recall
also captures the proportion of true matches, but out of all the matches present in the
dataset: True MatchesTrue Matches+False Non-Matches .
Among all the noise types that can be encountered in textual labels, the one that
includes a combination of character- and word-level corruption presents the most chal-
lenging problem for all record linkage approaches. The highest precision for this problem
is achieved by simple merge (0.98), by only at the cost of losing more than 25% of true
matches. The percentage of unmatched records is a function of the distortion rate, which
was set at 0.3 for the the purposes of this simulation. In general, simply merging the two
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Figure 4.3: Performance Comparison of Record Linkage Approaches on Simu-
lated Dataset. Precision and recall varying by the type of noise introduced and different
thresholds for match.
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Note: The cutoffs used are 1-6 for Levenshtein, 0.9-0.7 for cosine similarity.
datasets is equivalent to matching all the uncorrupted records and dropping any records
that contain any noise. However, in real-world settings the distortion rate can almost
never be known directly. Thus, it is impossible to estimate either the proportion of the
data that becomes missing due to failed matching or what kind of missingness that is17.
In contrast to stable performance of strictly deterministic merge, the arbitrary choice of
thresholds in string distance and text similarity measures illustrates the inherent trade-
off between precision and recall. In the extreme, almost perfect recall could be achieved
17One can easily imagine a case, in which organizations with foreign-sounding names, get misspelled
more frequently and, thus, are dropped out of the matched dataset at significantly higher rates than
organizations that contain only common English words.
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by lowering the cutoff, but this comes at a price of vastly inflating the number of false
matches.
More importantly, the two approaches show the trade-off between adapting record
linkage to dealing with character-level or word-level noise. While any string distance
measure, be it Levenshtein (1965), Jaro (1995) or other18, are adapted to matching records
with character-level discrepancies, text similarity measures are better suited to tasks
where entire words from the label get omitted or substituted. Probabilistic record linkage
alleviates some of these problems, but having string distance at the core of creating
agreement patterns, it also shows poor performance on word-level problems with only
0.76 precision and 0.87 recall.
Overall, the simulation study provides a useful baseline, language-agnostic framework
for evaluating the performance of different record linkage approaches. While none of the
methods is well-suited to tackle every type of problem, the trade-offs between precision
and recall and character-level and word-level type of noise are important to bear in mind
when designing record linkage step of the analysis.
4.7 Real Data Evaluation
It is possible that despite all the precautions, the simulated dataset differs substantially
from any real-world data with labels. To check for this eventuality I conduct further
performance evaluations using Bureau van Dijk dataset containing organization names in
the UK. While in some sense this test is more restrictive as it is by construction limited
to English language19, it incorporates all the real-world-data caveats that might closer
resemble the tasks faced by empirical researchers.
The setup of this experiment closely follows that of the simulation study above with
18An important exception to this is Monge and Elkan (1996) metric which includes a secondary function
at the token-level.
19Despite the names of UK-registered organizations being largely English-based, it is worth noting
that a small but, non-negligible, number of small businesses and local branches of global companies use
English transliteration of foreign names derived from other languages.
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the important difference that instead of being generated, the text labels are drawn at
random from the complete list of organization names. The entire labels list contains ap-
proximately 12 million records. For computational efficiency and to ensure the presence
of non-negligible number of true matches, first, I scale this dataset down to 100,000 ran-
domly drawn entries. It is important to note that in addition to using the original names,
I also retain the original identifiers supplied by the data provider. While organizations
are legally obliged to have distinct names, data-entry errors and higher-level aggrega-
tion of data from multiple sources do not guarantee the absence of identical names with
different identifiers20. After scaling-down the original dataset, I draw two independent
random samples of 10,000 records. By chance they contain 921 true matches, or, roughly,
10% of organization names are present in both datasets A and B. As with the simulated
datasets, dataset A is retained in its original form21, while the labels in the dataset B are
distorted at the rate of 0.3.
Figure 4.4 presents the results of applying 4 record linkage approaches to matching
uncorrupted records in the first dataset to partially distorted organization names in the
second dataset. As before, three different noise types and the variation resulting from
different choice of threshold for matching with string distance and text similarity are
shown. First thing to note is that, overall, the results are largely consistent with the
performance evaluation on the simulated dataset. The corrupted labels that contain both
types of noise are the hardest to find a correct match. The string distance and text
similarity measures exhibit the same trade-off between adjusting for character- and word-
level noise. One of noticeable differences between the simulated and real data is higher
ceiling for precision achieved by all of the approaches. The reason for that is the higher
diversity of word types present in real data. Indeed, the 100,000 sample of BvD data
includes 65,000 unique features, while the simulated dataset of the same size contains
only 15,744. While this might appear as a poor simulation attempt, the variability of
20This provides a further extension to the simulation study above where the labels were treated as
unique by design.
21The caveat of potentially over-estimating the performance of record linkage approaches due to dis-
torting only one dataset applies here as well.
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Figure 4.4: Performance Comparison of Record Linkage Approaches on Dataset
of Companies Names. Precision and recall varying by the type of noise introduced and
different thresholds for match.
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Note: The cutoffs used are 1-6 for Levenshtein, 0.9-0.7 for cosine similarity.
word types in textual label data often surpasses that of usual corpora. For instance,
SOTU corpus spanning over two centuries of language changes contains less than half of
the number of word types than BvD (33,288). Thus, small changes in labels render the
probability of falsely matching the records higher in more sparse datasets independent of
the type of error introduced.
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4.8 Conclusions
In this paper I review the four main approaches to addressing record linkage problems
when information is limited to textual labels. A simulation study using artificially con-
structed data and an analogous study using real-world data illustrate the sensitivity of
the results to the choice of an overall method as well as a specific threshold for match-
ing. The results illustrate two important trade-offs: emphasis on precision as opposed to
recall and adapting for character-level as opposed to word-level noise in the data. While
the former is a more typical problem for automated methods of classification, the latter
is a more problem-specific and could be explicitly acknowledged and accounted for in
empirical research.
Although the distortion rate can rarely be known in real-world data analysis, the most
likely type of noise is something that could be inferred from the details of data collection
process or the circumstances of the original data generation. For example, manual input by
humans or optical-character recognition are more prone to typos, misidentified letters or
other character-level problems. On the contrary, discrepancies in data-collection standards
across agencies, states or government departments can be a likely cause for encountering
different ways of referring to the same entity, be it electoral ward or company name. In
those cases using approaches that are more suitable for dealing with word-level noise can
result in a matched dataset of a higher quality.
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Appendix
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A Case Study
Distribution of String Distances
Figure A.1 shows the distribution of Levenshtein distances between Paycheck Protection
Program (PPP) loans data and released data under the Lobbying Disclosuer Act (LDA),
compiled by OpenSecrets. As the comparisons of raw distances is sensitive to the length
of the string, the right-hand Figure further shows the relative Levenstein distances, calcu-
lated by dividing the number of characters in the PPP data by the minimal Levenshtein
distance to any record in the LDA data.
Figure A.1: Distribution of Levenshtein Distances when comparing PPP-LDA datasets
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Distribution of Cosine Similarities
Figure A.2 illustrates the distribution of cosine similarities between Paycheck Protection
Program (PPP) loans data and released data under the Lobbying Disclosuer Act (LDA),
compiled by OpenSecrets.
Figure A.2: Distribution of Cosine Similarities when comparing PPP-LDA datasets
0
5000
10000
15000
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
Maximum Cosine Similarity
nu
m
be
r o
f o
rg
an
iza
tio
ns
201
B Software Statement
The analysis was run under Linux Ubuntu 20.04 using R version 4.0.0 (R Core Team
2020). I relied on the following R packages in my empirical analysis:
data.table (Dowle and Srinivasan 2019),
dplyr (Wickham et al. 2018),
ggplot2 (Wickham 2016),
kableExtra (Zhu 2018),
knitr (Xie 2018),
lubridate (Grolemund and Wickham 2011),
magrittr (Bache and Wickham 2014),
readr (Wickham, Hester, and Francois 2017),
stringdist (Van der Loo 2014),
stringi (Gagolewski 2018),
stringr (Wickham 2018),
tibble (Müller and Wickham 2018),
tidyr (Wickham and Henry 2018),
quanteda (Benoit et al. 2018), and
zipfR (Evert and Baroni 2007).
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